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 Abstract  
 
This Master's Thesis defines the debt policy of the current European Union Member States towards the 
developing nations. Since no official policy for debt exists in the EU, it is defined to include debt practices 
(loans and debt relief in development cooperation) and debt within the EU development policy 
framework. This study (1) describes how the issue of external debt appears in the development policy 
framework, (2) compares EU Member States' given loans and debt relief to grants for the developing 
nations (1960s to the 2000s), and (3) measures the current orientation in ODA of each EU Member State 
between grant aid and loan aid using the Grant-Loan Index (GLI). Theoretical aspects include reasons for 
selecting between loans (Bouchet 1987) and grants (Odedokun 2004, O'Brien and Williams 2007), policy 
context of the EU (Van Reisen 2007) and the meaning of external debt in the set-up between the North 
and the South. In terms of history, the events and impact of the colonial period (where loans have 
originated) are overviewed and compared in light of today's policies. Development assistance statistics are 
derived from the OECD DAC statistics portal and EU development policy framework documents from the 
EU portal. Methodologically, the structure of this study is from policy analysis (Barrien 1999, Hill 2008, 
Berndtson 2008), but it has been modified to fit the needs of studying a non-official policy. EU Member 
States are divided into three groups by Carbone (2007a); the Big-3, Northern and Southern donors, based 
on common development assistance characteristics. The Grant-Loan Index is used to compare Carbone's 
model, which measures quality of aid, to the GLI measuring the structure of aid. Results indicate that EU-
15 countries (active in debt practices) differ in terms of timing, stability and equality of debt practices in 
the long-term (1960s to the 2000s). In terms of current practices, (2000-2008), it is noted that there lies a 
disparity between the actual practices and the way in which external debt is represented in the 
development policy framework; although debt practices form a relevant portion of total ODA practices for 
many EU-15 Member States, the issue itself plays a minor role in development policy documents. 
Carbone’s group division applies well to the Grant – Loan Index’s results, indicating that countries with 
similar development policy behaviour have similarities in debt policy behaviour, with one exception: 
Greece. On the basis of this study, it is concluded that EU development policy framework content in terms 
of external debt and debt practices are not congruent. The understanding of this disparity between the 
policy outline and differences in long-term practices is relevant in both; reaching the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals, and in the actual process of developing development aid. 
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Tämä Pro Gradu -työ selvittää millainen on nykyisten EU-maiden velkapolitiikka kehittyviä maita 
kohtaan. Tarkastelussa on nykytilanne ja pidemmän aikavälin muutos. Virallista velkapolitiikkaa ei ole 
linjattu EU:ssa ja se määritellään tässä tutkimuksessa erikseen EU-maiden velkatoimien (lainat ja 
velkahelpotukset kehitysyhteistyössä) ja kehityspolitiikan linjausten sisällön muodostamaksi 
kokonaisuudeksi. Tutkimuksessa selvitetään (1) miten kehitysmaiden ulkomaanvelka esiintyy EU:n 
nykyisen kehityspolitiikan linjauksissa, (2) vertaillaan EU-maiden eroja annetun laina-avun ja 
velkahelpotusten määrää lahja-apuun (1960–2008) sekä (3) muodostetaan ”Lahja-Velka Indeksi”, joka 
mittaa EU-maiden nykyisiä eroja kehitysavun orientaatiossa laina-avun ja lahja-avun suhteen (2000–
2008). Käsitelty teoria pohjautuu lainojen (Bouchet 1987) ja lahja-avun antamisen (Odedokun 2004, 
O’Brien & Williams 2007) problematiikkaan, EU:n politiikkakontekstin kuvaamiseen (van Reisen 2007) 
ja ulkomaanvelan merkityksen analysointiin ”Pohjoisen” ja ”Etelän” välisenä haasteena. Historiaosiossa 
esitellään lainanannon alkuperää (Duignan & Gann 1971) ja arvioidaan siirtomaa-aikakauden tapahtumia 
ja niiden merkitystä nykyisessä velkapolitiikassa. Tilastollinen aineisto on OECD:n DAC:n 
tilastoportaalista, EU:n kehityspolitiikan linjauksia koskevat dokumentit EU:n verkkoportaalista. 
Tutkimuksen rakenne noudattaa policy-analyysia (Barrien 1999, Hill 2008, Berndtson 2008), mutta sitä on 
muokattu tukemaan epävirallisen politiikan tutkimusta. EU-maat jaetaan tarkastelussa Carbonen (2007a) 
mukaan ryhmiin (”3 suurta”, ”pohjoiset” ja ”eteläiset”), jotka pohjautuivat yhteneviin kehityspolitiikan 
piirteisiin. Lahja-Velka Indeksin avulla vertaillaan, miten Carbonen kehitysavun laatua mittaava malli 
suhteutuu ryhmäjaon osalta kehitysavun rakennetta mittaavan indeksin tuloksiin. Tutkimustulosten 
mukaan EU-15 maat (joilla velkatoimia on ollut) eroavat velkatoimien osalta pidemmällä aikavälillä 
ajoituksen, vakauden sekä tasapuolisuuden suhteen. Nykytoimien ja voimassa olevien kehityspolitiikan 
linjausten välillä todetaan vallitsevan epäsuhta; vaikka velkatoimet muodostavat merkittävän osan useiden 
EU-maiden kehityspoliittista toimista, niiden rooli ja osuus kehityspolitiikan linjauksissa on 
marginaalinen. Carbonen ryhmäjaon todetaan soveltuvan myös tähän aineistoon; pohjoiset donormaat 
ovat oletetusti apuorientoituneita, ”3 suurta” velka- ja apuorientoituneita ja eteläiset maat pääasiassa 
velkaorientoituneita, poikkeuksena Kreikka. Tutkimuksen perusteella todetaan, että EU:n velkapolitiikan 
linjaukset ja viralliset toimet eivät nykyisellään ole mittakaavaltaan yhteensopivia. Tämän epäsuhdan ja 
velkapoliittisten toimien erojen ymmärtäminen on tärkeää kehitysyhteistyön tavoitteiden saavuttamisen 
kannalta, sekä itse kehitysyhteistyöjärjestelmän kehittämisen näkökulmasta.  
Avainsanat 
Kehitysyhteistyö 
EU-maat 
Kehitysmaat 
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Preface
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fessor J. Koponen and M. Stocchetti. While Juhani has been a major influence
in finding the right composition for this study overall, Marikki has given great di-
rection concerning issues relating to especially the EU. Both have proposed right
kind of questions which have helped in finding right kind of answers. Professor K.
Vehkalahti has given me the opportunity to finish this thesis during an internship
under the Department of Social Research. During this internship he has dedicated
his time for guiding me, and also given great ideas especially concerning the use
of SURVO and LATEXsoftwares. I would also like to thank other faculty members,
especially PhD P. Multanen and PhD J. Gould, for their open spirit in teaching.
The short time period spend in your lectures has had a great influence on my life.
During the past year I have participated in a mentor program of the Finnish Asso-
ciation of Political Scientists and I’m grateful for my mentor PhD R. Horppu, who
has guided me during the past year. Thank you all for your time and patience.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents for letting me freely choose my direction
in life and Visa, thank you for your endless support during the time I’ve spent
studying at the University of Helsinki. You have made me laugh and find my way
whenever the process of this Master’s Thesis had devoured me too deep.
Helsinki
December 2010
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Chapter 1
Introduction
”Debt is a social and ideological construct, not a simple economic fact.”
–Noam Chomsky, 1999
”A country facing debt difficulties today would run into the same problems it did
three decades ago, namely that there is no internationally recognized procedure to
work–out sovereign debt difficulties in a fair, predictable and transparent manner.”
– Eurodad, 2010
The Member States of the European Union have given Official Development As-
sistance ODA to the developing nations since the 1960s (OECD DAC, 2010). Col-
lectively, The European Union is the world’s largest provider of development as-
sistance; in 2008 the EU–15 provided $70.2 billion in aid, representing 59 per cent
of total OECD DAC aid (OECD Aid, 2010). In addition to giving development
aid in the form of grants, EU Member States also give loans. Since the debt cri-
sis of the 1980s, high external debt in the developing nations has been considered
one of the main obstacles of development. The detrimental nature of loans to the
developing nations has been known for nearly three decades, still in 2007 36.8 per
cent of Africa’s loan accumulation was bilateral in nature (21.84 per cent was mul-
tilateral and 41.58 per cent private)(OECD DAC, 2010). Although the European
Union Member States have acted as creditors for decades and the direct link between
high external debt and poor level of development is widely known, no official policy
for loans to the developing nations has been created within EU’s development policy.
This Master’s Thesis describes and analyzes the debt policy profile of the EU and
its Member States by forming the debt policy profile in three parts; (1) explaining
how the issue of external debt appears in the EU development policy framework,
(2) describing how EU Member States have given loans and debt relief in relation to
grants to the developing nations since the 1960s to the 2000s, and (3) by measuring
the orientation of ODA of each EU Member State between grant aid and loan aid
for the current development era by developing a Grant – Loan Index.
21.1 Research Problem and Objective
In 2006, the overall total debt accumulation for the developing world was $2.7 tril-
lion, and the overall annual (global) total for development assistance was $106 bil-
lion. (WB, 2010b,a) Developing nations high external debt appeared as a problem
in global economics and politics in the aftermath of the debt crisis in the early 1980s.
Although external debt in itself is not a problem, high amounts of it and lacking
economic or political capability of a nation to handle its payments continue to be a
hindrance of development. (Befekadu, 2001, Fikru and Getachew, 2008, Hippolyte,
2009)
The relationship between grants and loans in Official Development Assistance
is quite complex. Numerous different kinds of types of both grants and loans have
evolved, developed and appeared in the structure of ODA in OECD DAC statistics,
since the 1960s (OECD DAC, 2010). In addition to the added number of different
types and sectors of ODA, many agreements have been consummated between var-
ious EU Member States and the developing countries during the time period from
the 1960s to the 2000s.
Content wise, studying the debt policy of the European Union Member States
is important since the developing world still suffers from severe hindrances of de-
velopment, to which high external debt has an influence on. Developing world still
suffers from extreme poverty; about 1 billion people live on less than 1$ per day
(Earth Institute, 2010) Income gaps in the world overall are still widening; in 2008
the World Bank announced statistics concerning the year 2005, and concluded that
at least 80% of humanity lived on less than $10 a day (Global Issues, 2010) and more
than 80% of world population live in countries where income differentials are still
widening. (UN Human Development Report, 2009). EU is the world’s largest donor
and the primary goal of its development cooperation policy is poverty eradication
(EU Policies 2009). Development assistance and loans within it have been given
since the 1960s (OECD DAC, 2010), but no official debt policy still exists. Out of
current loan accumulation, more loans are bilateral than multilateral (OECD DAC,
2010) although most often critique is directed towards the multilateral creditors, see
for example Chossudovsky (1999), and George (2004). Most of development assis-
tance research has been focused around the outcomes of given aid, not necessary
the composition or structure of given aid. See for example Carbone (2007a) and
Odedokun (2004).
The aim of this study is to make EU debt policy politically visible by describing
first the actions in general, while also comparing them to statements concerning
debt in development policy framework. EU debt policy is currently not known or
present in development policy discourse, but this study changes that by forming
EU debt policy profile. Making the policy ”visible” and real by studying it is very
important. This profile has value firstly because defining practices is the needed
initial step in the lengthy process of studying the policy’s larger influences. Secondly,
3knowledge of the differences in these actions give insight to determining the current
fields of improvement. These are important when EU Member States act to reach
development policy goals, such as those outlined in UN’s Millennium Development
Goals to which the EU Member States agreed to in 2000. Thirdly, defining the
debt policy profile provides new knowledge of the EU development policy practices,
which can be applied in the different fields of both EU and development studies.
1.2 Research Method and Design
The study of politics and policies have different roles in a society. The objects of
study can either be decision–makers, citizens (or groups of citizens), institutions,
or media, for example. Research questions can involve the actions and interactions
of these actors, such as actual decisions and decision–making, (policy) practices, or
communication between the different actors. (Roos, 1973, pg. 224) The research
question of this study is ”What is the European Union’s debt policy profile?”. The
focus of this study is in the debt practices of the European Union and the framework
of development policy, see figure 1.1. This figure presents external debt within the
framework of development policy, and the debt practices as a part of the development
policy in general. These practices have not been guided by an official policy, and the
only way the question of external debt appears officially in the development policy
of the EU is within statements in the policy framework.
Figure 1.1: EU’s debt policy within development policy.
Debt Practices
EU Development policy
EU DEBT POLICY?
"external debt"
Development policy framework
Debt practices are defined here as those items included in Official Development
Assistance which are directly linked to the external debt of the developing nations.
These include loans and debt relief. In this study they are compared to grants in
order to provide an understanding concerning scale of practices. The key definitions
used in study are explained in table 1.1.
Development policy framework is the current formation of all agreed upon issues
in EU’s development policy. This study analyzes and compares the statements of
debt in the current development policy framework to actual practices in the field.
4Table 1.1: Key concepts used in study.
Term Definition
ODA Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as
flows to developing countries provided by official
agencies, including state and local governments.
Each transaction of which meets the following tests:
i) it is administered with the promotion of the
economic development and welfare of developing
countries as its main objective; and ii) it is
concessional in character and conveys a grant element
of at least 25 per cent (OECD Glossary, 2009).
Grant aid (in ODA) Transfers in money or in kind, for which no
repayment is required. Includes grants for technical
co–operation, grant–like flows, i.e., loans extended by
governments or official agencies in currencies of the
donor countries but repayable in recipients’
currencies and transfer of resources through sales of
commodities for recipients’ currencies, less local
currency balances used by the donor for other than
development purposes. Debt relief is included in
grant aid but also reported as a separate item.
(OECD Glossary, 2009).
Loan aid (in ODA) Transfers for which repayment is required. Only
loans with maturities of over one year are included in
DAC statistics. Data on net loans include deductions
for repayments of principal (but not payment of
interest) on earlier loans. (OECD Glossary, 2009)
Grant element Mathematical assessment on the financial terms of a
transaction; the difference between the face value of
a loan and the present value (at a rate of discount of
10 per cent) of the service payments the borrower
will make over the lifetime of the loan. Three factors
determine it: interest rate, grace period and
maturity. (OECD Reporting, 2009)
Sector VII (in ODA) Sector VII ”action relating to debt”, includes debt
forgiveness, conversions, swaps, buy–backs,
rescheduling and refinancing. (OECD Reporting,
2009)
5Since the framework presented is current, but debt practices data is analyzed from
the 1960s to the 2000s, history and evolution of the development policy is also
presented. As a result, the evolution of both of these; the debt practices and the
development policy framework are overviewed. The focus of analysis mainly remains
on the debt practices, which have not been coherently compared before and which
provide new information. The overall content of development policy framework is
already of course known, but here it will be discussed mainly from the perspective
of how the issue of external debt appears in it. As such, these two parts together
will form a comprehensible profile of EU’s debt policy.
Focusing on the structure of development assistance in depth serves the purpose
of developing more useful and better functioning development aid practices (loans,
grants and debt relief) through increased knowledge of the differences among Mem-
ber States. The goal is not necessarily to label EU Member States as either ”good”
or ”bad” donors, but to identify differences and provide information needed to de-
velop development assistance. Suffice to say, EU Member States have largely differed
in the ways and methods of giving development assistance. This is both a challenge
and a highly interesting factor when studying EU politics; what are the differences
between donors within a Union which has agreed to common goals and ways of prac-
ticing development policy, while still leaving room for individual decision–making?
Histories of relations between the different EU Member States and the developing
nations differ substantially. Development policy cooperation of the EU was estab-
lished in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 (van Reisen, 2007, pg. 47). The field of
development cooperation is a field of shared competence in the EU, where Member
States have the power to legislate and adopt legally binding acts on their own (EU
Principles, 2009). How do these differences appear in the debt practices? And what
influence do these differences have on the common goals of the Union? For these
reasons, the concrete actions of Member States and the commonly agreed upon pol-
icy framework of the entire Union have been separated in this study, as they are in
real life in policy areas which are shared in competence.
Concrete goal of this study is to form the debt policy profile of the EU by com-
paring the debt practices and development policy framework. Both of these entities
include different aspects to the debt policy; debt practices include loan aid and
grant aid since the 1960s, (and debt relief within grants since late 1980s) to the
2000s, development policy framework includes EU’s (currently in force) statements
concerning the external debt of the developing nations. These documents are the
European Consensus on Development, Millennium Development Goals, Policy Co-
herence for Development, Intervention areas and Geographical partnerships. More
itemized content is presented in chapters four and five. Overall the questions an-
swered in this comparison concern the nature and content of the occurred changes
in the debt policy. The role of the group of former colonies, African, Caribbean and
Pacific ACP countries is also explored, as are the differences between donor groups;
the EU and the multilateral organizations. This part also introduces the Grant–Loan
6Index, which measures individually the orientation of each EU Member States’ ODA
as being either grant–oriented, loan–oriented, or something in between. This exper-
imentary part of this study is a concrete example of how the data presented in this
study can be applied using hypothesis–driven approach. Otherwise, the approach
of this study is descriptive and ”hypothesis generating” in spirit (Rosling, 2010).
Although this study remains mostly in the general level as this subject has not been
studied before and no previous analysis is available, more itemized and specified
results are also presented.
In the debt practices part EU Member States are either (i) grouped together
as one, (ii) divided into groups based on their development assistance policies, or
compared as (iii) individual actors. Option (i) is used when overall development is
described, and when EU is compared to other large political entities, such as the
multilaterals. Option (ii) is used in most of the data analysis where differences and
similarities between donors’ practices are evaluated. Option (iii) is used when more
detailed information is needed, concerning for example actual grant and loans sums,
or the orientation of ODA.
When option (i) is used, countries included are OECD DAC member countries:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. These are also referred
to as the EU–15. Option (ii) includes three groups; the Big–3, Northern Donors
and Southern Donors. Big–3 countries are France, Germany and the UK. North-
ern Donors are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and
Sweden. Southern Donors are Austria, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. In option
(iii) countries are represented as individuals, as mentioned1.
More specifically, the groups used in option (ii) are based on Carbone’s compar-
ison concerning the quality of EU Member States’ Official Development Assistance.
Carbone (2007a) divided EU Member States into four different groups based on
their performance in foreign aid. The fourth group, Eastern Donors, is excluded
from this study as these countries are not OECD DAC members and have not given
comparable volumes of grants or loans. The division used by Carbone is (partially)
based on an index developed by the Centre for Global Development, which as a
measure ”rewards for high volumes and letting taxpayers write off charitable contri-
butions, but penalizes them for tying aid, for overloading recipients with too many
projects and receiving debt payments from loans”. (Carbone, 2007a, pg. 43) The
group division by Carbone is used in this study for the concrete reason of data
volume management, and the knowledge–based reason of comparing similarities be-
tween development assistance behavior and debt practice behavior. Data included
in this study is vast, and managing the content of it is easier when Member States
are compared in groups based on previously recognized similar attributes. Division
1Since the current EU has changed its formation during history on many occasions, it should
be noted that all current EU–15 countries are included in data analysis since the 1960s, whether
or not they have been a part of European cooperation before the European Union
7to groups is also important since the volumes of given ODA differ quite substan-
tially. Finding similarities and disparities between development assistance and debt
practice behavior is one general level goal of this study. As Carbone’s model mea-
sures the quality of ODA, this study measures the structure of it. The groups by
Carbone are also used in the developed Grant–Loan Index, where the ”fit” between
Carbone’s model and Grant–Loan Index is explored.
Policy Analysis
Choosing the correct research method for studying this subject requires considera-
tion of the selected data and its type(s). Since this subject has not been studied
in a comprehensive manner before, the objective of this research has to be mainly
descriptive in nature.
Descriptive research often works as a prerequisite to future studies with more
detailed and specific hypotheses. Descriptive study presents detailed descriptions of
a certain phenomena or an event, and documents the interesting features concerning
it. Descriptive study focuses on the practices, events, beliefs and processes concern-
ing the topic and can be either qualitative or quantitative in nature, but can also
include conducting surveys in the specific field. (Hirsja¨rvi et al., 2008, pg. 134–135).
Hodgett and Deneulin (2009) have argued that quantitative data alone is not
enough to evaluate issues liked to development policy in the context of EU. They
argue also that when researching policy–making, there is no distinction between
qualitative and quantitative research. (Hodgett and Deneulin, 2009, pg. 66) Hirsja¨rvi
et al concur by arguing that the relationship between qualitative and quantitative
data is not competing or contradictory; use of the one does not exclude the other one.
Hence, there is no clear dicotomy between the two, and the relationship between
them is more like a continuum. (Hirsja¨rvi et al., 2008, pg. 131–133)
Therefore, this study is not specifically labeled as either qualitative or quantita-
tive, but as coherent descriptive analysis including both aspects of the phenomena
under focus; the content of the debt practices (quantitative data) and content of de-
velopment policy framework (qualitative data). The selected method for this study
must support vast amount of data, use of both qualitative and quantitative data,
and the descriptive goal of this study. The selected method which fits the criteria
is that of policy analysis.
Policy analysis is one of three fields of politics emerging in the post-behavioral pe-
riod, other two are political philosophy and critical perspective to society. (Berndt-
son, 2008, pg. 76) The field of politics became fragmented during the 1960s when
African Americans experienced subordination and the war in Vietnam was on–going,
both caused widespread demonstrations in the United States. During the same time
many radical young researchers combined ”criticism towards society” to ”criticism
towards science”. In the study of politics, that critique was mainly presented to-
wards behavioralism. During this time many, for example Walker (1966) agreed
8that research did not respond to existing problems, but focused more on the exist-
ing and already ”in place” power structures. The critical discourse following these
events was named ”postbehavioral revolution” by Easton in 1969. (Berndtson, 2008,
pg. 76,)
Policy analysis focuses on studying political decisions and their effects. Most
often its aim is to rationalize public decision–making. Most policy analysts wish to
accentuate the concrete characteristics of their studies, emphasizing the link between
research and ”real” and acute problems. Unlike the behavioralists, policy analysts do
not believe that any phenomena in politics are unchangeable or constant. Through
policy analysis, the consideration of the power of government officials and organiza-
tions has gained in popularity and the stature of political institutions has emerged
in pivotal role in the study of politics once again, as it was during the earliest stages
of political studies. Policy analysis combined with rational choice theory is known
as new political economy, and neo-institutionalism (or new institutionalism) is a
separate field within policy analysis, which focuses on the relevance of public insti-
tutions to the politics of the entire society. (Berndtson, 2008, pg. 80–81)
The structure of research for this Master’s Thesis is derived from the policy an-
alysts Barrien (1999) and Hill (2008). Hill (2008) has argued that ”a pattern of
actions over a period of time constitutes as policy, even if these policies have not
been formally sanctioned by a decision” (Hill, 2008, pg. 8). This is the case in EU’s
debt policy; practices have been long on–going, but not made into an official policy.
Barrien on the other hand has provided a structure for the concrete organization
of policy analysis. The traditional policy analysis includes six steps; (1) verify, de-
fine, and detail the problem, (2) establish evaluation criteria, (3) identify alternative
policies, (4) evaluate alternative policies, (5) display and distinguish among alter-
native policies and (6) monitor the implemented policy. Traditional policy analysis
also is usually either study of an existing policy, or study for policy recommenda-
tion. (Barrien 1999) In this case, the study is partially both of these, but cannot
directly be labeled directly as either one. Steps of the policy analysis process are
therefore revised to fit the needs of this particular study. The revised research steps
are (1) verify, define and detail the problem (chapters two and three), (2) identify
and analyze policy framework (chapter four), (3), identify and analyze debt prac-
tices (chapter five), (4) compare policy framework and debt practices (chapter six),
(5) evaluate alternative policies (chapter six), and finally (6) evaluate overall policy
(chapter six).
This Master’s Thesis follows this structure of applied policy analysis and is di-
vided in two parts; (I) background and (II) debt policy. Background part includes
research step one, verifying and detailing the problem. Field of research is presented
in chapter two, and history concerning the issues in chapter three. In more detail,
chapters two and three of this study verify and detail the problem by discussing
the dilemmas concerning loans and grants, and the overall structure of development
9assistance and the different factors influencing it. Although there is no particular
theory tested in this study, this chapter summarizes the different theoretical perspec-
tives pertaining to selecting different methods of development promotion. Chapter
two includes EU’s development policy framework structure and political economy’s
perspectives to aid and loans. Chapter concludes with more theoretical analysis
concerning the set–up between creditors and debtors, i.e. the North and the South.
Chapter three starts by explaining the most important event in history concerning
the issue of external debt, the debt crisis of the 1980s. Chapter also explains the his-
torical origins of loans, EU’s delayed reaction to the debt crisis as well as proposed
solutions to the problem. Chapter three concludes by analyzing the differences in
policies between the Member States in the light of the historical issues presented.
Debt policy (part II) includes identifying and analyzing the policy framework and
indentifying and analyzing the debt practices. EU development policy framework is
presented in chapter four, and the debt practices data and its application in the form
of Grant–Loan Index in presented in chapter five. Chapter four outlines the content
of the EU development policy documents concerning the issue of external debt of the
developing nations. Chapter five dwells into the content of these practices in detail,
where statistical analysis is done in its entirety. This includes defining ODA type
evolution, differences in ODA by sector, and finally analyzing the differences in loans,
grants and debt relief to the developing nations by income and region. Conclusion
in chapter six includes the comparison between development policy framework and
the debt practices and an overall evaluation of the situation. The final chapter
six includes summary of the key findings, comparison between policy content and
practices, and an overview of the debt policy profile of the European Union Member
States by comparing the debt practices and development policy framework content.
Chapter ends with an analysis concerning the restrictions and challenges of the
study. List of prolific future study areas is also given. Overall research design is
presented in figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Research design.
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More itemized data content for development policy framework is presented in
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Table 1.2: EU development policy framework data content.
Debt Policy
Item
Data / Source Content Presentation
and
time period
Reason
for selection
Development
policy
framework
European
Consensus on
Development
Statements
in Consensus
concerning
external debt.
Description and
content analysis,
signed in 2005.
Most important
development
policy outline
document.
Millennium
Development
Goals
Development
goals to which
the EU Mem-
ber States
agreed to,
focus on goal
8, sub–targets
13 and 15.
Description and
content analysis,
signed in 2000.
MDGs include
EU development
policy goals.
Other
EU docu-
ments (Policy
Coherence for
development,
intervention
areas, ge-
ographical
partnerships)
Other relevant
documents
in develop-
ment policy
including or
excluding
the issue of
external debt
Description
and content
analysis, cur-
rently relevant
documents.
Important to
know in order to
form a coherent
perspective to
issue.
table 1.2 and for debt practices data in table 1.3. Both tables include the different
components of data used, what they contain, and which time period they concern,
and also why they were selected for the study.
Since data is gathered in a purely technical manner from public data sources,
no specific plan for specific ethical considerations is needed, as no personal or con-
fidential data is handled. Otherwise, wider ethical perspectives are taken into con-
sideration especially in the overall handling of data and in the process of analyzing
it. The statistical data from OECD DAC has been gathered on the same day (April
11, 2010), except for ACP and non–ACP data, which was gathered later in the fall
(October 10, 2010), since it was not available before that in a convenient format
through the OECD DAC statistics portal.
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Table 1.3: EU debt practices data content.
Debt
Policy
Item
Data / Source Content Presentation and
time period
Reason
for selection
Debt
practices
ODA by type
/ OECD DAC
statistics por-
tal
Types of ODA
linked to the
issue of exter-
nal debt
Table format
including defi-
nition of types,
and summary
of decades when
each type has
appeared in
the structure
of ODA for the
EU–15 countries,
years included:
1960–2008.
ODA type data is
one of two main
data structures of
ODA, and the de-
velopment of that
structure over
time is highly
relevant.
ODA by sector
/ OECD DAC
statistics por-
tal
Sector data,
focus on sector
VII ”Action
relating to
debt”
Development of
the share of sec-
tor VII in overall
ODA and each
Member State,
1967–2008
ODA sector data
is the second of
two main struc-
tures of ODA, fo-
cus is on the de-
velopment of sec-
tor’s share in total
ODA.
Grants, loans
and debt re-
lief by region
and income
/ OECD
DAC statistics
portal
Grant and
loan aid given
by the EU–15,
debt relief in-
cluded within
grant aid, but
also discussed
as a separate
item.
Presented in
sums and by
recipient region
and income,
role of ACPs
and non–ACPS
and differences
between multilat-
erals and EU–15
also compared.
Data from years
1960–2008.
Loans and debt
relief in relation
to grant aid form
the core of ”debt
practices” data.
Grant
– Loan
Index
Grant – Loan
Index / OECD
DAC statistics
portal
Index formed
to measure the
orientation of
each EU Mem-
ber States’
ODA.
Comparison of
EU–15 coun-
tries’ grant–loan
orientation as
individual actors,
each given points
according to six
variables, years
2000–2008.
Index defines
each Member
State current
ODA practices
as either grant
or loan oriented,
or something in
between.
Part I
BACKGROUND
Chapter 2
Field of Research
The general role of a theory in a study offers a shortcut for communication. It
organizes ideas and reveals assumptions, creates possibly fresh ideas, may bring
about the complexity of the issue, creates explanations and predictions concerning
the issue and can attest the interconnectedness of issues. (Hirsja¨rvi et al., 2008,
pg. 135–136)
Field of research and the theoretical background for this Master’s thesis includes
three different entities presented in table 2.1. International Political Economy IPE
field, European Union development policy field, and the North – South conflict field.
Development policy field and IPE together form the core theoretical aspects, and the
North – South conflict field is included to provide insight into the overall structure
in which debt policy is practiced in. This chapter starts with explaining the problem
of high external debt of the developing nations and over viewing the recent empirical
studies concerning EU’s actions in the field. After these the theoretical aspects are
presented.
Table 2.1: Fields of research.
International
Political Economy
EU
Development
Policy
North–South
Conflict
Ideology and chal-
lenges of loans
Treaties
and agreements
Theoretical aspects to
North–South conflict
Ideology and chal-
lenges of grants
Policy evolution International
development
Political views to de-
velopment assistance
Policy process Theories of global
stratification
In terms of the theoretical fields included, political economy gives the over-
all structure according to which action is based on. The field of international (or
global) political economy summarizes differing methods of development promotion.
Chapter aims to answer questions concerning the motives and reasons why a donor
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would choose either loans or grants as the main method of development assistance.
Choosing either grants or loans or both has also been surprisingly scarcely stud-
ied (Odedokun, 2004, pg. 242–244), but general level comparison is presented. EU
development policy field includes issues which explain the boundaries, outline and
traditions of EU practices overall. This chapter is highly important, since EU policy
field is unique in nature. I will particularly focus on questions concerning the nature
of EU’s development policy features and policy processes. North – South conflict
field opens up the larger and wider context in which development happens through
aiding and lending between countries of the North and the South. Different theories
and views are overviewed, which summarize the past and present ways of conceptu-
alizing the relationship between the developing and the developed world. As income
gaps keep widening (UN Human Development Report, 2009), the perspective of the
set–up between the North and the South continues to be relevant.
The different theoretical perspectives and theories included in this chapter are
not tested in the customary way, since the objective of this study is not to directly
examine the fit between a certain theory and actual events. The overall meaning
and relationship between theory discussed in this chapter and history in the next,
are summarized and explained in the context of the EU debt policy in the beginning
of part II, in the beginning of chapter four, refer to figure 4.1.
2.1 Unsustainable External Debt in Development
External debt of the developing nations has been in the global agenda after the Debt
Crisis of the 1980s mainly during the 1990s and the year 2000, when the massive
Jubilee 2000 debt relief campaign was in process. Since then, the issue seems to
have lost a lot of its appeal. What is the relevance of the issue today and is there
anymore a problem with high external debt of the developing nations?
Unsustainable external debt still plays a key role in global poverty (Fikru and
Getachew, 2008, Hippolyte, 2009, Befekadu, 2001) and that without debt cancella-
tions, it is impossible to remove global poverty (Greenhill, 2009). External debt it
itself External debt becomes problematic when the amount of debt exceeds country’s
capability of handling its loan payments. (Kraay and Nehru, 2006, pg. 341–354) Vast
amount of research has been published concerning the different and more specific ef-
fects of high external debt to both social and economic development. High external
debt is, however, more than just a mere economic issue, it extends to most aspects
of a society. It is also an issue of democracy (Eskelinen and Sorsa, 2010, pg. 30–32),
and symptom of a ”skewed global financial system” (Eurodad Debt Overview, 2010).
Research concerning external debt’s influence on economic development has fo-
cused on tracing the linear (or non–linear) relationship between the amount of ex-
ternal debt and economic growth. The prevailing understanding in this field is that
whether or not the relationship between external debt and growth is linear, high
amount of debt debilitates growth, and a reasonable amount of debt (in relation
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to income) fosters it. Studies concerning the size of debt burden have concluded
that large debt burden limits growth and increase in living standards. It also low-
ers investments in the debtor country, and causes crowding–out phenomenon where
high debt payments prevent from allocating resources to production. Crowding–out
phenomena is also linked to growing uncertainty through high interest rates and
inflation. (Pattillo et al., 2002, pg. 3–5)
External debt’s influence on social development naturally relates to economic
growth, but the social aspects of high external debt should be separately empha-
sized. Problems caused by high external debt in the developing nations do not also
stay within the limits of the developing countries; they spread to the developed part
of the world as well. George (1992) has approached this phenomenon by defining
six different ”boomerangs” caused by high external debt of the developing nations,
which influence the societies of the Norths as well. These ”boomerangs” are the
environment, unemployment, drugs, immigration, taxes and conflict. These six dif-
ferent issues are affected by high external debt in the developing nations, but the
harm caused by them spreads globally. (George, 1992) Global financial system is also
affected by the debt problem. Debt situation harms commercial banks as lenders,
governments as lenders and borrowers, as well as the multilateral financial institu-
tions as lenders and borrowers, and overseers of the global economy. (Mugasha,
2007, pg. 860) In addition to generic problems caused by high debt, the system in
itself has a small margin for error in loans and mistakes are common. The accumu-
lation of large loans has been made fairly easy to the developing nations. (Wallace,
1990, pg. 229-230) Therefore, many important reasons for eradicating high and un-
sustainable external debt in the developing nations do exist, from the perspective
of both, the developing and the developed countries.
Recent Studies
Recent studies in this specific field of debt actions of the EU Member States have
not been found. Research concerning both, the reason why governments select
either grants and loans and the basis for debt practices actions have been scarcely
researched due to unknown reasons. Most relevant recent study found is Matthew
Odedokun’s (2004) comparison of multilateral and bilateral loans versus grants.
Odedokun examined data from the years 1970 to 1999 for 22 donor countries and
72 recipient countries. His focus was on economic modeling of the data and the fit
between mixed models of ODA. He excluded Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal
and Spain from his comparison, which are included in this study. Odedokun’s focus
was also global, not entirely EU–centered, and reasons for exclusion were perhaps
concerned with the fact that some of these countries have not given any loans (or
very little of them), such as Luxembourg and Ireland. In this study they are included
as that is an important policy difference in the context of EU development policy.
Odedokun’s findings were focused on the different types of loans (soft loans, non–
concessional loans) and grants. He concluded that grants are utilized relatively
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inefficiently in developing nations when compared to official loans. He also found
that loans with greater concessionality (loaned with less than market value terms)
are more prone to be over–borrowed. (Odedokun, 2004, pg. 256). Again, Odedokun’s
findings concern more the outcomes of these policies, not policy differences between
EU Member States, which are under focus in in this case.
Master’s Theses topics concerning the issues of external debt in the University
of Helsinki have included studies concerning the effects of external debt to growth
(Ma¨kela¨, 2009), the success of HIPC and PRSP programs in the cases of Ethiopia,
Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia during the years 1996–2004 (Toivio, 2006) and the
Finnish concessional credit system1 (Halonen, 2007). Ma¨kela¨ (2009) concluded that
the higher the amount of external debt a country has, the least growth it will
experience, i.e. high external debt hinders growth (Ma¨kela¨, 2009, pg. 105–111).
Toivio (2006) concluded that the HIPC program did not bring a sufficient solution
to the debt situation in the countries examined. He concludes that despite the
programs, the expenses for paying off the debt are still too high, and that the
criteria defining sustainable levels of debt should be re–examined. He also states
that a more coherent and effective approach should be adopted and that the current
programs are not proceeding as fast as needed. Concerning the programs overall,
he argues that the programs seem to be working towards keeping the countries in
the peripheral position, not the opposite as promised, and that these programs are
still used in the power struggle between the ”North” and the ”South”. (Toivio,
2006, pg. 100–101) Halonen (2007) found that concessional credit emerged in the
Finnish policy documents in 1996, a year after joining the EU. Most of concessional
credits have been given to LMIC countries, who are able to utilize them better
than poorer countries. Overall Finnish concessional credit has been able to fulfill
the goals set for it. Interestingly, over half of the concessional credit from Finland
during 2001–2004, and also during 1987–2006, has gone to China (Halonen, 2007,
pg. 72–74). Concessional credit system is not discussed in this study as a separate
item, although it is included in the country data statistics.
Recent studies concerning general EU development policy are more numerous
than those concerning debt practices. These studies have been mainly oriented to-
wards coherence, consistency and political will, see Olsen (2008), policy evolution
and administrative reforms refer to Dearden (2008), aid reform see Holden (2008),
enlargement’s effects on the EU development policy, see Lightfoot (2008) and Vachu-
dova (2005), and for the role of specific donors in relation to others, refer to Selberbik
and Nygaard (2006) for a case of the Nordic countries, Siitonen (2005) for a case of
1Concessional credit in this study is an export credit for mainly Finnish made deliveries, which
is supported by an interest subsidy. In this case, the interest subsidy is paid out of Finland’s
development cooperation budget. The recipient of the credit pays no interest. Concessional credits
can be issued to Low Income Countries and Lower Middle Income Countries whose GNI (Gross
National Income) per capita is less than USD 3945. However, OECD recommends that tied aid
credits should not be granted to countries with the UNs Least Developed Country status and/or
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)(Finnvera, 2010)
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small donors and Finland, and Carbone (2007b) for the case of Italy, for example.
Policy Coherence of Development has also been a topic increasingly discussed
(Carbone, 2008), as has been the general work in EU against global inequalities
(Holland, 2008), and the self–interest of EU in the development policy (Hurt, 2010).
Many have also compared EU’s development policy to that of other important actors.
Comparison with USA, refer to Fabbrini (2008), cooperation with multilaterals, see
for example Baroncelli (2009). These studies relate to this comparison in more
indirect way and provide input as increasing understanding of the EU development
policy field challenges.
Research concerning the role of external debt and debt sustainability in global
economy has been actively and widely discussed in many contexts. Vallee and
Vallee (2005) have questioned the true nature of current understanding concerning
the ”sustainability of debt sustainability”, and call for ensuring that additional fi-
nancing is made available to support long–term fiscal sustainability in low–income
countries. Berr and Combarnous (2007) argue that an alternative approach to debt
sustainability would be needed, since the approach adopted after the debt crisis has
emphasized mainly the creditor’s point of view. In more recent studies, Hernandez
and Gamarra (2010) have compared debt sustainability and the currently on–going
financial crisis for the IDA countries in Africa. They argue that the current debt
crisis might cause a wave of defaults in the future, and that additional debt relief is
needed. These studies give support and emphasize both the importance of studying
EU debt policy from different perspectives, and vice versa the different perspectives
of the EU donors.
What makes this study and this field especially interesting is the global financial
crisis starting in 2008, which has influenced the wider context and ”political en-
vironment”. Although the crisis was caused by a liquidity shortfall in the United
States banking system, it led to vast global consequences. This crisis is consid-
ered to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It
has affected both the developing and the developed world and once again reminded
of the importance of credit laws and policies. In Europe, Greece was the country
most affected; its incautious lending practices led to a bailout by the other Euro-
pean Member States, see for example (Helsingin Sanomat September 19th, 2010)
and inspired much needed discussions concerning the development of national and
also common and preventive credit policies in the EU level. Next, the theoretical
aspects of the IPE are discussed.
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2.2 International Political Economy and the Issue
of Debt
International Political Economy IPE emerged as a subject of study in the mid–1970s.
IPE has since then developed into a distinct field of International Relations. Field
of International Political Economy includes many subjects, such as international
finance and trade, Third World development and the North–South conflict, also en-
vironmental and gender issues have been recently included. (O’Brien and Williams,
2007, pg. 1)
Choosing the ”right” or the ”most appropriate” method of development pro-
motion has been a challenge donors have faced since the beginning of development
assistance. Different options range from pure grants to loans, multilateral and bi-
lateral channels of aid, as well as debt relief and debt forgiveness. Many possible
options have resulted in a situation where most often countries use not one but a
mix of different development ”methods”, and not until recently (year 2000), has
there been a shift towards favoring purely grants2. (Odedokun, 2004, pg. 239)
The selection of a country’s own ”development method” is influenced by many
different political and economic issues, as well as differing development aid goals.
Differing histories and financial situations between the donors have resulted in a
situation where vastly differing policies are implemented by the different donors.
On a separate note, in addition to the differing methods of development concern-
ing mostly development assistance, many countries have adopted separate policies
concerning their approaches towards high external debt of the developing nations.
(Odedokun, 2004, pg. 239)
Eradicating the debt problem has been attempted by many different organiza-
tions and initiatives, since high external debt became ”an official problem” after
the initial stages of the debt crisis. These different methods have been more or less
successful and they have often embodied political conditions. These programs and
initiatives, such as the HIPC, Enhanced HIPC, MDRI and the Jubilee 2000 have
been previously vastly studied in terms of their influence and success. See for exam-
ple Claessens et al. (2007), Nwachukwu (2008), Pickup (2008), Presbitero (2009),
or Shawki (2010). It is however important to recognize them as practices in which
the EU Member States have participated and they are as such items included in
analysis in the way they have been reported in the OECD DAC Statistics. They are
also briefly discussed in chapter three, where history of external debt is discussed.
The overall tension between development assistance by grants or loans has in-
spired several authors. Others clearly defend grants as the primary method based
on data concerning the detrimental nature of loans, while the defenders of loans
argue that loans are in fact a good method, if the loan sums remain at sustainable
levels. Most agree that lending to the poorest of the developing nations is pointless,
as loans require a society in which the funds can be utilized well. Motives and goals
2This concerns global data, not just EU Member States
19
of giving either grants or loans also differ, and the issues concerning the method
selection is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
2.2.1 Ideology and Challenges of Loans?
The ideology behind giving loans to the developing nations stems from the liberal
economic perspective to development, where loans are seen as a proper and efficient
method for promoting development. Bouchet (1987) has identified five different ap-
proached to debt, within two paradigms. First approach perceives loans as mainly
useful, and it includes three different perspectives. The second approach interprets
loans as being mainly a negative phenomenon, and it includes two different perspec-
tives.
Banking approach emphasizes country risk analysis, and is focused on private
banks. Developing nations’ credit problems are also understood as problems of the
banks, since they are the mainly the creditors. Specific analysis of the economic,
financial and political elements of the lending risk should be executed before lend-
ing. Bouchet states that, in reality there seems to be much lending, but not a lot
of decision–making. Bouchet suggests there should be more supervision and less
regulation to make this approach work in practice as well. Approach is based on
neoliberal ideology. Some countries that act as bilateral creditors also emphasize
country risk analysis, and lending to areas where the loans can be utilized well.
(Bouchet, 1987, pg. 70,76,191)
The official approach searches for a good mix of adjustment and financing. Ex-
ternal loans should be used to finance highly productive investments, which then,
through multiplier effect, would increase income and domestic savings in the long
run and that way would generate development throughout the system. Approach
is based on orthodox development theory and it has been criticized to be based
on an unrealistic idea of the market and biased towards the economic perspective.
Approach does not take into account the links between loans, domestic economic
policies and structure of development. (Bouchet, 1987, pg. 85,104–108)
The functionalist approach’s focus is on the macroeconomics level, on the dif-
ference between the quantities of resources required by a developing nation versus
those which are supplied to them. Economic development will happen once this
gap closes and external loans are seen as a solution to make this happen. Political
ideology behind this approach is value–neutral. Approach analyzes certain things
superficially, such as the dynamics of power relationships between debtors and cred-
itors. Also, the perspective has a strong normative position regarding what should
be the pattern of growth in developing nations. (Bouchet, 1987, pg. 119,134,137)
Marxist approach regards debt in historical, structural and relational terms,
where capital flows are seen as an instrument of dependency. External debt is inter-
preted to be ’the dark reverse side of development aid’, which enables creditors to
keep the debtors in a constant state of economic and political subjection. Approach
is based on Karl Marx’s Capital published in 1867. Bouchet argues that this view
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”relies upon a highly deterministic model which overlooks the dimension of choice
and the institution of state”. Also, the view regards debt ”as both, the consequence
and cause for exploitation” and overlooks the fact that it is the end result of a policy
choice. (Bouchet, 1987, pg. 141,152–156)
Dependency approach aims at challenging neoclassical theories, Keynesian anal-
ysis, structuralist formulations and ”mechanical” Marxism and calls for a model of
nondependent development. Three main points of this approach are that interna-
tional finance relations are a key feature of dependency, official lending institutions
are an important component of the domination structure (metropolitan centers)
and the increasing participation of transnational banks in development finance lays
the basis for market privatization of Third World debt. Approach’s main influences
have been Economic Commission for Latin America ECLA, Trotsky’s Law of uneven
and combined development, and also neo–Marxian analysis of the world expansion
of the capitalist system. The theory itself is ambiguous regarding the conclusion
of underdevelopment analysis. The approach does not give any clear solution to
how the debt crisis should be solved. It also views the situation mainly from the
dependency perspective, neglecting the possible opportunities loans might provide
to developing nations. (Bouchet, 1987, pg. 178–179,182–184)
As is in the case of grants, motivations for giving loans are often a mix of dif-
ferent reasons. No current country directly represents any of the above mentioned
theoretical approaches. Also, the attitudes towards loans as a form of development
assistance have changed since the debt crisis (and since these approaches were out-
lined). It can be seen from the data analyzed in this study that there seems to be
somewhat clear division between the EU Member States in terms of using loans.
Some have not given any loans; some have given them for a long time. Motivations
for giving loans vary highly; same outcomes can have highly differential motivations,
for example not lending for moral reasons, or not lending since there are no funds to
be loaned. Defining each Member State’s position or loan policy is the task of this
study and this definition process uses pure data in the process. Political statements
and agreements have not included clear motivations or reasons for giving loans, ex-
cept on a very highly level. The currently in force EU documents including such
statements are discussed in chapter four.
2.2.2 Ideology and Challenges of Grants?
Using grants as the main method of development assistance has its own specific
motivations, ideas and challenges. Economic aid has been one of the most promi-
nent, persistent and enduring features of global international development activities.
O’Brien and Williams (2007) identify three issues concerning aid that remain of cru-
cial importance; motivation, effectiveness and conditionality.(O’Brien and Williams,
2007, pg. 321)
The main motivation for aid still seems to be to most self–evident reason; hu-
manitarian. Others motives are political and economic. Giving aid is considered
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morally sound and right; those that have, have to share with those who do not”
(Pearson, 1969, pg. 8). Odedokun has explored the possible theoretical frameworks
suitable for the issue, and claims the selection in behalf of grants is based on mainly
altruism, respect, status, and other indirect benefits relating to ”gift giving”. Other
reasons might include the possibility of tying aid, and therefore gaining indirect but
perhaps substantial benefits (Odedokun, 2004, pg. 243).
Economic reasons for giving grant aid is simply that external resources have a
positive impact on local savings and growth. Aid fills the so called ”savings gap” and
the ”foreign exchange gap” by adding resources for savings and provision of foreign
exchange. Currently aid policies focus on improving economic policies, increasing
the efficiency of capital and protecting the consumption of the poor. Political goals
of aid may include preservation of order, peace and stability, but some might have
motives closer to national interests of donors. Most often reasons for giving bi-
lateral development assistance in the form of grants come from a combination of
motivations. (O’Brien and Williams, 2007, pg. 321–322)
The idea of moral grounds for giving aid has been challenged by critics, for
example by Bauer (1971) who has argued that no moral basis exists for aid giving
since Western governments have primary responsibility of their own inhabitants’
well–being. Critics have also argued that grants given as foreign aid go mainly to the
”pockets of the rich in the poor countries” and that most aid is wasteful expenditure
(O’Brien and Williams, 2007, pg. 321–323). Leftist critics have also brought up the
dependency point of view, in which the main motivation for giving aid is perceived to
be maintaining the economic and political power over the recipient countries (Hayter,
1971), and therefore being incapable of generating neither growth or development
(O’Brien and Williams, 2007, pg. 323). Aid is also argued to decrease savings in
the developing nations and economic motivation of donors is truly motivation for
creating market shares in the recipient countries. (O’Brien and Williams, 2007,
pg. 323). Koponen (1999) has also suggested not focusing on the motives behind
giving grants, but more on the overall construct of what is aid as a historical and
social construct (Koponen, 1999, pg. 1–2).
In addition to the actual giving of grants, much criticism has gone to the condi-
tions attached to aid in general (including both grant as well as loan aid). Regular
conditions for aid include economic conditions, such as support for exports from the
donor country. Political conditions include the pursuit of foreign policy objectives
and more general systemic objectives countries might have (such as promoting good
governance or even neo–imperial objectives). (O’Brien and Williams, 2007, pg. 323)
In addition to choosing how much grants to give and to which country, donors need
to decide if and what policy conditions to set for their grants.
Debt relief as aid has been also vastly researched, mostly after the debt crisis
of the 1980s. When a developing nation is unable to pay its debt, it has three
options: debt forgiveness, debt restructuring, or default, i.e. they simply don’t pay.
In the past, European governments had an easy way of dealing with countries which
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used the final option of default; brute force, which led to invasion, occupation and
regime changes. Nowadays, all agree that using military means to collect unpaid
debt is not an option, but what should be done instead, is unfortunately not as clear.
(Stiglitz, 2003, pg. 213,215). The problem is that debt relief has its own prisoner’s
dilemma; if a debtor country is unable to pay, banks and States are caught in a
difficult situation. Each creditor is unwilling to give debt relief, for the reason that
they might end up bearing the cost other debtors would not have to take part in.
Each of the creditors had an incentive to be ”a free rider” and let the others bear
the burden of debt relief. For this reason, it is not surprising that no state or bank
wanted to forgive loans of the LDCs, and the cycle of debt has kept on and will keep
on going. (Balaam and Veseth, 2008, pg. 154)
However, several authors still have argued for debt relief and debt cancellation.
Greenhill and Blackmore (2002), representing Jubilee Research, compared data for
10 African countries and found out that debt relief resulted in large increases in
spending on education and health, and no increase in spending on defense. They
found out that in 1998, spending on education was only $929 million and in 2002 it
was $1306 million, more than twice the amount paid to foreign creditors. Before debt
relief, more than twice as much was spend on debt service than health. Since then,
spending on health has risen by 70 per cent (2002). (Greenhill and Blackmore,
2009) Greenhill and Blackmore’s findings are concurred by Hassan et al. (2005)
who researched the impacts of foreign loans on the economic growth of 82 severely
indebted underdeveloped countries over the time period of 1991–2001. Study reveals
that foreign debt has a negative and insignificant impact on the economic growth of
these countries. Although debt cancellation may be less effective in the long term,
based on the data, they are still supported for. (Hassan et al., 2005, pg. 61)
2.2.3 Political Views to Development Assistance
In addition to the benefits and risks of giving grants or loans to the developing
nations, the selected method of aid is affected by the different political views to
development aid. Different political views to aid are the realist, idealist, institu-
tionalist and liberal perspectives. Realists interpret foreign aid to be driven by
governments and used as a tool to promote national interests. Idealists see foreign
aid as mainly being influenced by non–material motivations; altruism and moral
obligations. Institutionalists emphasize the meaning of international organizations
in the setting of the international development agenda. International organizations
are useful in placing targets for the quality and quantity of aid. Liberals explore
the domestic dimension of foreign aid, meaning that the pressure from domestic
groups like political parties, NGOs, etc. can be more important than other reasons.
(Carbone, 2007a, pg. 40–42)
The importance of differing perspectives to development aid are emphasized
when different political parties make decision concerning development practices,
grants, loans or debt relief. It is important to recognize that these different aspects
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exist within the EU, and within all of its Member States’ governments as well3
(Hirvensalo, 2009). Next, the field of development policy in the context of the
European Union is presented, especially focusing on practices and actors involved
with external debt of the developing nations.
2.3 EU Development Policy and the Issue of Debt
It is important to understand the wide and complex entity of the European Union’s
development policy when comparing loans, grants and debt relief in development
assistance and when defining and analyzing the debt practices.
Conceptualizing the EU development policy can be done is many ways, but
mainly it consists of four different parts: actual development policies, geographi-
cal partnerships, means and measures of policy actualization and procurement and
grants (EC Development Policy, 2009). These components and the main issues be-
longing under each part is listed in figure 2.1, which has those components including
statements concerning debt, which are included in data analysis, highlighted in blue.
Figure 2.1: EU development policy areas.
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EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY
In addition to these main parts of the development policy, the most influential
documents currently guiding EU’s (internal) development policy are; the European
Consensus on Development, Cotonou Agreement and the EU Strategy for Africa
(Kehys, 2009). Also, EU Member States have committed to the UN’s Millennium
Development Goals (EU MDGs, 2009) The main documents included in this study
are those documents within the EU development policy which state something con-
cerning the external debt of the developing nations. These documents are the (1)
3Hirvensalo (2009) representing the Ministry of Finances in Finland, concluded that for example
in Finland the different political parties hold significant power over whether or not questions are
brought to the agenda. For example when the Minister of Finance in Finland was from the Social
Democratic party, he considered the issue to be of high importance, but later when the Minister
changed to a representative of the National Coalition Party; external debt of the developing nations
seems to have been removed from active discussions. (Hirvensalo, 2009)
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European Consensus on Development, (2) Millennium Development Goals, (3) Pol-
icy Coherence for Development, (5) Intervention areas, and (4) Geographical part-
nerships. These were listed initially in chapter one, in table1.2 and they are analyzed
in chapter four.
Development policy cooperation of the EU was established in the Maastricht
Treaty, which was signed in 1992, and came into force in 1993. Maastricht Treaty
established the legal basis for development cooperation by the EU Member States.
As a result of the Maastricht Treaty, the development cooperation was clearly and
fully integrated into the acquis communautaire, i.e. the legal provisions already
negotiated in the earlier European treaties. Maastricht Treaty set three different
objectives for development cooperation; (1) promoting social and sustainable devel-
opment, (2) campaign against poverty, and (3) integration of developing countries
into the world economy. (van Reisen, 2007, pg. 47). In order to further define
Community responsibilities, the Maastricht Treaty and Amsterdam Treaty (1997)
set out the principles of the four C’s: Coherence, Complementarity, Co–ordination
and Consistency. Coherence between policies that have an impact on third countries
and the objectives of development cooperation, complementarity between Member
States and the Commission activities in development, Co–ordination between actions
of the Member States and the Commission, and Consistency between the policies
of the Common European Security and Defence Policy ESDP and the development
co–operation. (van Reisen, 2007, pg. 47)
In the EU there are in general three types of competences; exclusive, shared and
complementary. The responsibility in the area of development cooperation is shared
with the Member States.
In the case of shared competence the EU States the following:
”Member States and the Union have powers to legislate and adopt legally binding
acts in a specific area. The Member States exercise their powers in so far as the
Union has not exercised, or has decided to stop exercising, its competence. EU De-
velopment cooperation policy, in addition to being of shared competency, is to be
reinforced by the Member States and the Union. The reduction and eradication of
poverty is the primary objective of Union development cooperation policy and that
this objective should be taken into account.” (EU Principles, 2009)
The meaning of shared competency in the case of debt practices within the Of-
ficial Development Assistance, is that EU Member governments may practice and
”exercise their power” in this field freely within certain limits set by legislation. Due
to this, it is expected that much variation exists in terms of debt practices between
the Member States due to differences in histories, traditions and financial situation.
The content of the policy framework items are thoroughly examined in chapter
four. The wider structure and evolution of the policy framework and way of actu-
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alizing development policy is discussed in this chapter by time periods. Each time
period is first described overall in terms of the most relevant events, after which
most important treaties and agreements are presented in detail. The most focus
is given to currently in force documents and actors involved. This chapter also in-
cludes analysis concerning the nature, obstacles and challenges of policy–making in
the EU, and ends with a short overview to the different actors the EU cooperated
with in the field of external debt.
2.3.1 EU Development Policy Evolution
In order to fully understand the wide context involved in EU’s current development
policy, it is important to know the overall evolution of the EU development cooper-
ation. The evolution and change in European development policy has been a change
from colonialism to multilateralism, and a shift in focus has occurred from being
Africa–centered and focused on the former colonies, to including the entire scope
of developing countries (van Reisen, 2007, pg. 34,37,42) Brown identifies the three
most important phases of development cooperation to be the development from EU
approach to support of structural adjustment programmes in the ACP states in
Lome´ IV, the introduction of political conditionality into Lome´ in 1990s, and the
recasting of EU development cooperation in the Cotonou Agreement negotiations.
(Brown, 2004)
The next chapter ”History of External Debt” overviews the meaning of the his-
torical relations between the developing nations and the EU, this chapter defines the
characteristics of different time periods in development cooperation and overviews
the different agreements and treaties signed since the late 1950s to the 2000s. The
important role of former colonies is also discussed in both of these chapters, in this
chapter the focus is on the legislative relationship between the former colonies and
the EU Member States, in the following chapter the focus is on the origin of lending
practices.
The former colonies have been directly and straightforwardly interlinked with the
establishment of the EC and later the EU. The formation of the European Union
has been a clear product of the new world order following World War II, in which
the division to East and West was a key component. (van Reisen, 2007, pg. 29)
The strong ties between the former colonies and European countries also are the
reason why European development policy started with a strong focus on the ex–
colonies. Later the focus has shifted from this group to a much wider and larger
recipient group, and cooperation with multilaterals has also heavily increased. In the
midst of these changes, the agreements and policies have also changed on numerous
occasions.
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TIME PERIOD I: 1950s to 1980s
The period between the 1950s and 1980s was limited in geographical areas as well
as policy wise, but was very progressive. North–South relations were formed on
the basis of two pillars: aid and trade privileges. Strong emphasis was put on the
concept of partnership. (Carbone, 2007a, pg. 58) Van Reisen concludes that during
this time period Europe’s relations with the Third World were based upon former
colonial ties. Developing world was seen as the source of energy and raw materials
needed for economic development in Europe. During this time period the Treaty of
Rome was signed in 1957, and it created EDF as an instrument to collectively share
the burden of financial assistance to the colonies. (van Reisen, 2007, pg. 31–33).
Due to the current relevance of the EDF and its link to the Cotonou Agrement, it
is discussed further under ”Time Period III: the 2000s”. During the time period
after the Second World War, a move towards cooperation with the multilaterals was
made, as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was set up
to manage the Marshall Plan. New lexicon was introduced during this time period
as well; new words such as ”development”, ”co–operation” and ”partnership” were
included in development policy vocabulary and development co–operation was no
longer linked explicitly to the colonies. (van Reisen, 2007, pg. 29–35)
In the early 1970s was when a shift in focus started to occur. EC went from being
entirely focused on associated countries, to having cooperation with non–associated
areas as well. Many things had an influence on this, mainly the enlargement in
1973, when UK, Denmark and Ireland joined. This represented a turning point
in EC development cooperation history; UK acted as an example of a country with
highly developed relations with its (then already former) colonies. Also, the oil crisis
of the 1970s added EC’s interest in the countries of Middle East and Mediterranean.
In 1974 Euro–Arab discussions were active, but eventually the success of those was
limited since the Europeans did not want to go against the position of the United
States. In 1974 the bilateral relations between some European countries and the
Mediterranean were newly organized as a cohesive ”Global Mediterranean Policy”).
Increased activity of the Europeans in the 1970s led to new agreements and protocols
on technical and financial cooperation with 17 Middle Eastern and Mediterranean
countries. This cooperation included grants as well as loans. (van Reisen, 2007,
pg. 38–39)
In late 1970s the scope of European development assistance widened further as
Greece, Portugal and Spain joined in during the 1980s. This process extended the
Latin American countries to the scope of EC’s external relations. During the 1980s
as the scope expanded even further, the European Parliament stated that financial
and technical assistance should focus on the most poorest countries and lowest
income groups in those countries. In the 1980s the importance of external aid grew
exponentially in both financial and political terms; available resources increased as
new countries joined, and the external cooperation was widely discussed in budget
negotiations. (van Reisen, 2007, pg. 44–46)
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In the early 1980s the debt crisis also emerged. It started in Latin America but
spread quickly to other regions of the developing world. The overall reasons for the
eruption of the crisis and Europe’s reaction and proposed solutions to the events are
discussed in chapter three in detail.
Many agreements were signed during this time period between the European
countries and the developing nations: Yaounde´ I in 1963–1969, Yaounde´ II 1969–
1974 (EC Yaounde´ 2009), Generalized System of Preferences GSP was established
in 1971 (EC GSP 2009), Lome´ Conventions , trade and aid agreement in 1975/1976,
Lome´ I was in force during 1981–1985 and Lome´ II in 1986–1990.4 (EC Lome´, 2009)
Lome´ Convention
Lome´ I was for a long time the most visible and important part of the relationship
between the European Community and the ACPs. Right from its ”birth”, it claimed
to be unique. (Brown, 2004, pg. 17) The Lome´ Convention set out the principles and
objectives of the EEC countries and the ACP states. Lome´’s main characteristics
were the partnership principle, the contractual nature of the relationship, and the
combination of aid, trade and political aspects. Lome´ I main characteristics included
non–reciprocal preferences for most exports form ACP countries to EEC; equality
between partners, respect for sovereignty, mutual interests and interdependence; the
right of each state to determine its own policies; security of relations based on the
achievements of the cooperation system. (EC Lome´, 2009) Lome´ had long–term
time perspective, 5 years for Lome´ I–III and 10 years for Lome´ IV. Lome´ I was
signed in 1975, Lome´ II in 1979, Lome´ III in 1984 and Lome´ IV in 1989. (EC
Lome´ 2009) Before Lome´, the Yaounde´ Convention I in 1963 and II in 1969 defined
the cooperation between European Economic Community and countries associated
countries. First EDF was established and used in 1958–1963, when the Treaty
instituting the EEC defined particular relations with the EEC Member States and
the (former) colonies. (EC Yaounde´, 2009)
TIME PERIOD II: Late 1980s to Late 1990s
As the 1980s came to an end, the events in 1989 leading up to the fall of the Berlin
Wall had an enormous effect on the EC in many aspects. The developments in East-
ern Europe coincided with an active and sensitive phase in EC evolution and in 1992
the Maastricht Treaty established the European Union. In addition to establishing
the common foreign, security and defense policy, the European Monetary Union,
also development cooperation was included. (van Reisen, 2007, pg. 46) Although the
formal basis of development cooperation remained and became even more poverty–
focused during this time period, EU’s development cooperation shifted away from
the poorest countries to the Eastern European regions, as well as countries of the
4The reception of these agremeents and treaties in the developing nations is a highly interesting
subject, but not discussed in this study due to limitations on lenght.
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former Soviet Union. (van Reisen, 2007, pg. 50–51)
During this time period the ACPs had to increasingly share their aid with other
regions, mostly with Eastern and Southern European areas. As the Treaty of Maas-
tricht came into force, a stronger emphasis was put on common foreign and security
policy, for which externals assistance was used as a convenient tool. During this
third time period the community became more and widely involved with the de-
veloping world; its policies have overstretched and become more fragmented. This
has also caused substantial criticism and problems regarding aid. (Carbone, 2007a,
pg. 58)
Problems have also been caused by the debated upon position of the development
cooperation in overall EU politics. The principles of coherence and consistency define
the relationship between external policy areas. The principle of coherence sets out
that EU policies with an impact on developing countries should be coherent with
development objectives. The principle of consistency is defined as the need for the
different components of EU’s external policies, including development cooperation,
to support overall policy objectives towards the developing world. The different
components of EU’s external policies are all equal and one policy field is not superior
to any other. (van Reisen, 2007, pg. 49–50)
Lome´ IV was in force between 1989/1990–1999 (EC Lome´ 2009). The HIPC
Initiative came into force in 1996, and the Enhanced HIPC in 1999. HIPC Initiatives
will be later discussed in the next chapter in more detail, but in general they are
joint IMF–World Bank approaches to debt reduction, which the EU Member States
finance. (IMF HIPC, 2009) On a separate note, in 1990 the European Network on
Debt and Development (Eurodad) of 58 NGOs working on issues related to debt,
development finance and poverty reduction was established. (Eurodad intro, 2009).
TIME PERIOD III: the 2000s
The 2000s have been an interesting time period of development cooperation in terms
of agreements, global cooperation and new development policy focus areas. After
September 11th 2001, the Council has given higher priority to EU’s security policy
and some have advocated for stronger defense policy of the EU5. (van Reisen, 2007,
pg. 50)
During the 2000s, EC development policy has become even more poverty–oriented
and more efficient in the 2000s, but at the same time new kinds of security issues
and trade liberalization have become fully integrated into the development field.
This includes also the new ACP–EC partnership agreement, known as the Cotonou
Agreement. (Carbone, 2007a, pg. 58) Cotonou Agreement came into force in 2000;
it is the most comprehensive partnership agreement between developing countries
and the EU. Since 2000, it has been the framework for the EU’s relations with
5Overall development policy has been continuously under pressures of subordination to the EU’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy, and of being directly linked to other external issues, such as
migration, security and defense. (van Reisen, 2007, pg. 60)
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79 ACPs (EC Cotonou, 2009). Millennium Development Goals were also adopted
in year 2000, the same year Jubilee 2000 called for massive debt relief. European
Consensus on Development was signed in 2005. The multilateral Debt Relief MDRI
came into force in 2006, granting 100 per cent debt relief for eligible multilateral
loans from the IMF, IDA and AfDF (IMF MDRI, 2009). During the 2000s two dif-
ferent additional steps have been taken to reach better aid effectiveness: The Paris
Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). The Paris declaration
is an international agreement to increase efforts in harmonisation, alignment, and
aid management. It is a joint progress towards enhanced aid effectiveness, with
five different principles: ownership, alignment, harmonization, results and mutual
accountability. The Accra Agenda for Action builds on the commitments of the
Paris Declaration, and includes predictability, country systems, steps concerning
conditionality and untying of aid. (OECD Paris and Accra, 2010)
Cotonou Agreement
Cotonou Agreement is the most comprehensive partnership agreement between the
EU and the developing countries. The Agreeements history lies in the Lome´ Con-
vention previously presented. Since 2000, it has acted as a framework for relations
between the EU and 79 ACP States (former colonies). The agreement is also known
as the ”ACP–EC Partnership agreement”. It was concluded for a twenty–year pe-
riod from March 2000 to February 2020, and came into force in April 2003. Revision
have been made into the agreement, first one in 2005, which came to force in July,
2008. The agreement is global in nature, and it introduces important changes and
objectives to the ACP–EC cooperation. It also includes the Economic Partnership
Agreements EPAs. EPAs are a plan to create a free-trade area between the EU and
the ACPs(more information, refer for example to (Stocchetti, 2007). The agreement
has been designed to establish comprehensive partnership between the ACP and
the EC, and it is based on three complementary pillars; development cooperation,
economic and trade cooperation, and the political dimension. The objective of the
Cotonou agreement is to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, these objectives
are consistent with other objectives of gradual integration into the world economy
and sustainable development.(EC Cotonou, 2009)
The Agreement established poverty eradication clearly the principlal objective.
It also assigned a greater role for the civil society, and reinforced the political di-
mension of relations between the ACP countries and the EU. It also included a
renegotiation for trade relations with the parties involved. (van Reisen, 2007, pg. 56)
In more detail, the Cotonou Agreement states the following concerning the goals
of the partnership:
”Sustained economic growth, developing the private sector, increasing employment
and improving access to productive resources shall all be part of this framework.
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Support shall be given to the respect of the rights of the individual and meeting basic
needs, the promotion of social development and the conditions for an equitable distri-
bution of the fruits of growth. Regional and sub–regional integration processes which
foster the integration of the ACP countries into the world economy in terms of trade
and private investment shall be encouraged and supported. Building the capacity of
the actors in development and improving the institutional framework necessary for
social cohesion, for the functioning of a democratic society and market economy,
and for the emergence of an active and organized civil society shall be integral to
the approach. Systematic account shall be taken of the situation of women and gen-
der issues in all areas – political, economic and social. The principles of sustainable
management of natural resources and the environment shall be applied and integrated
at every level of the partnership.” (EC Cotonou, 2009)
The fundamental principles of the agreement are equality of the partnership and
ownership of strategies, participation, pivotal role of dialogue and mutual obliga-
tions, and differentiation and regionalization. The actors of this cooperation include
non–state actors from private sector and civil society, in addition to the states.
The Cotonou Agreement is implemented mainly through the European Develop-
ment Fund EDF, which is funded by the EU Member States. For the time period
2008–2013 the EDF has been allocated 22.7 billion Euros, 65% more than for the
time period 2000–2007 (13.8 billion Euros). (EC Cotonou 2009). For comparison’s
sake, the total aid given by the EU Member States in 2008 was 70.2 billion (USD).
(OECD Aid, 2010)
European Development Fund EDF
European Development Fund EDF has been in use since 1959, but due to its contin-
uing relevance and link to the Cotonou Agreement, it is discussed here. The EDF is
funded by the European Member States, and it is subject to its own financial rules.
It does not come under the Community’s general budget and it is managed by a
committee. Each EDF has been concluded for a period of about five years, the first
one started already in 1959. The 1957 Treaty of Rome made provision for the EDF’s
creation to grant technical and financial assistance to former colonies. Since then,
it has financed the ACP and OCT states under the Yaounde´ I and II, Lome´ I–IV,
and of course, the already mentioned Cotonou agreement and its revised version
currently in force. (EC EDF, 2009)
EDF uses different kinds of financial instruments, grants, risk capital and loans to
the private sector. EDF works in part in cooperation with the European Investment
Bank, which will contributed a total of 1.7 billion Euros from their own resources
to ACP and OCT development during the ninth EDF (2000–2007). Member States
have their own bilateral agreements and do implement their own initiatives separate
from the EDF and other Community funds. (EC EDF, 2009)
In addition to the agreements, actors and organizations involved with external
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debt are overviewed next. From within the EU structure, the European Commission
(and DG Development), the ECOFIN and the European Investment Bank are dis-
cussed. From outside the EU, the World Bank, the IMF and Paris Club are briefly
presented.
OTHER RELEVANT ACTORS AND ISSUES
In addition to these time periods and organizations discussed here, the actual ”real
life” method of carrying out development policy in the European Commission and
largest multilateral organizations should to be included briefly in this discussion.
Although the focus of this study is once again on the EU Member States, some
important factors are to be mentioned concerning the European Commission, mul-
tilaterals and global lending market, actors with which the EU member government
cooperate with.
European Commission and DG Development
”The European Commission is the EU’s executive body. It represents and upholds the
interests of Europe as a whole. It drafts proposals for new European laws. It man-
ages the day–to–day business of implementing EU policies and spending EU funds.
The Commission also makes sure that everyone abides by the European treaties and
laws”. (EC Introduction, 2010)
The European Commission is divided into several departments and services. The
departments are known as Directorate–Generals (DGs). DG Development, respon-
sible for overseeing issues concerning development policy.
EC states the following concerning DG Development:
”DG Development initiates and drafts development policy as set out in the EU
Treaty. It promotes a European approach to development across the EU countries
to influence international debate and work more effectively to combat poverty. The
DG coordinates political relations with sub–Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the
Pacific (ACP), the African Union, regional economic communities, and the Over-
seas Countries and Territories in all the areas for which it is responsible, based on
the Cotonou Agreement and strategies relating to those countries. In this context,
DG Development drafts cooperation strategies with ACP countries and the overseas
countries and territories, and coordinates and monitors funding provided through the
European Development Funds and the Development Cooperation Instrument.” (DG
Development, 2010)
In the process of practicing its functions, DG Development works in cooperation
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with other Commission departments6. The organizational chart of the DG develop-
ment has been divided on the basis of the different tasks DG Development is involved
with, there are for example specific persons responsible for different parts of ACP
relations, and thematic issues, such as economic development, aid programming
and management, natural resources, to name a few, but no one has been specifically
named to be working with issues concerning external debt. (DG Development, 2010)
In addition to DG Development, Economic and Financial Affairs Council ECOFIN
is also involved with the external debt of the developing nations. ECOFIN com-
poses of the Economics and Finance Ministers of the Member States, and also the
Budget Ministers, when budgetary issues are discussed. The council meets once a
month and it covers numerous EU policies including economic policy coordination,
economic surveillance and monitoring Member States’ budgetary policies and public
finance, the Euro, financial markets, capital movements and most importantly re-
garding this study, the economic relations with the Third World countries. ECOFIN
also prepares and adopt the budget for the EU (annually about 100 billion Euros).
Decision–making in ECOFIN is by qualified majority in consultation with the Eu-
ropean Parliament (fiscal matters are an exception, they are decided by unanimity).
(Council of the EU, 2009)
European Investment Bank EIB
European Investment Bank is the EU’s financing institution, its shareholders are
the 27 EU Member States. EIB’s board of Governors is composed of Finance minis-
ters of the EU–27 countries. EIB provides long–term finance support in investment
projects. Outside the EU, the EIB has been active in over 150 countries; it is working
to implement the financial pillar of the EU external cooperation and development
policies, including financial sector development, infrastructure development, security
and energy supply, and sustainability. EIB is the largest international non–sovereign
lender and borrower, and it works in close cooperation with EU institutions, espe-
cially the European Parliament, European Council and the European Commission.
In 2009, 89% (79 billion Euros) of EIB financing went to the EU region. (EIB,
2009) The focus of this study is not on the non–governmental loans from the EU
institutions, but on bilateral debt practices, and therefore the EIB is not included
in analysis, but it is however identified as an interesting and important field.
World Bank and the IMF
Multilateral actors involved with the issue of developing nations’ external debt are
numerous. World Bank and the IMF are the most influential actors, the main
difference between them is that World Bank borrows and lends, and the IMF is
more of a credit union, where members have common access to a ”pile of money’
6Mainly with DG Trade, DG External relations, EuropeAid, Humanitarian Aid Office DG
ECHO and DG Enlargement
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collected from the countries’ individual contributions. This money can be accessed
in times of need. The World Bank lends only to creditworthy governments of the
developing nations. The poorer the country is, the more favorable are the terms
of the loans. Nations that have a GNP per capita over $1,305 may borrow from
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). These loans
have an interest rate slightly higher than the market rate at which the Bank itself
borrows. These need to be repaid in 12–15 years7. Nations that have a GNP per
capita under $1,305 may borrow from the IDA. Generally IDA’s loans go to countries
with annual per capital GNP below $865. IDA’s loans are interest free and have a
maturity of 35 or 40 years. (Driscoll, 2009)
Paris Club
In addition to organizations giving loans, there are separate renegotiation institu-
tions in cases of default. In such cases, debt owed to bilaterals is renegotiated
through the Paris Club. In case the same happens to multilateral debt, it is renego-
tiated through the Paris Club. And, finally in case debt owed to private commercial
banks is not paid, it is renegotiated through the London Club. These three levels
form a cohesive whole, leaving out investments in bonds and equities. (Mugasha,
2007, pg. 860)
The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors, i.e. governments. Since
the year 1956, the Paris Club has reached 410 agreements with 86 different debtor
countries; overall it has given 539 billion USD in loans with different terms (Paris
Club, 2009). The Club’s role is to find solutions to payment difficulties of the debtor
countries, such as rescheduling debts or postponing the payments. The Club is very
informal even though its actions are very powerful. It makes decisions on the basis
of consensus and it can be described as a ”non–institution”. The Paris Club has
no legal basis or status, and its functions are based on rules and principles agreed
by the creditors. Paris Club has 19 permanent member countries. Most EU–15
countries are members, except for Greece, Luxembourg or Portugal. Paris Club
offers information about loans from each creditor to each debtor and information
about the terms of loans. (Paris Club 2009) London Club is the equivalent of Paris
Club for commercial lenders working in the international lending market (Eurodad
Debt Overview, 2010)
Figure 2.2 presents a timeline, which summarizes the most important events in
both the history of development assistance and loans to the developing nations.
The different eras of development policy in the European Union’s recent history
as well as the evolution of the actual development policy indicate that many substan-
7IBRD loans in 2006 were given in total sum of $23.6 billion, the largest sector loans were allo-
cated to was law, justice and public administration (25%), followed up with transportation (14%)
and energy and mining sector (13%). Sectors with least loans were allocated to were information
and communication sector (less than 1%), water, sanitation and flood protection (7%) and industry
and trade (7%) (WB, 2009a, pg. 56)
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Figure 2.2: Timeline of European development assistance.
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tial changes have occurred over a relatively short time period. Many new agreements
have been summoned and new partnerships have been proactively formed. As the
history, structure and content of the development policy have been overviewed, poli-
cies in general are discussed. Next chapter overviews the process and explains how,
why and what kind of policies come to exist in the EU, and explores reasons for the
non–existence of a debt policy within the development policy.
2.3.2 EU Policy Process and Obstacles
The actual policy process in the EU is not comparable to any other process in
global politics. It is complex nature, involves numerous actors and includes differing
policy emphases of each Member State. These special features are the basis for this
distinctive process, its coordination and strive for coherence. The complexity of the
policy process guarantees the existence of many obstacles in policy–making, as well.
Policies in the EU can be analyzed through the different stages of the actual
policy process. Member governments of the EU have access in the system in all
phases: policy design, negotiation, legitimation and implementation. (Bulmer and
Lequesne, 2005, pg. 29) In the traditional areas of EU policy, formal right of pol-
icy initiative and policy design rests in the Commission. However, policy proposal
processes are more open and Commissions’ officials have a variety of sources for
proposals. Different cases in the past have shown that the success of governments’
efforts in getting certain issues on the Commission’s agenda depend on how far the
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government is willing to push the issue. Governments differ greatly in their willing-
ness to exploit these options. In some areas of EU policy development, governments
play more explicit roles in the actual framing of the policies, such as in the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy CFSP. (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005, pg. 29–30)
The policy negotiation process is very important regarding the use of power and
influence by the Member States. The negotiation process overall includes several
actors which the EU Member governments aim to influence, such as the preparatory
working groups and high level groups of national officials. (Bulmer and Lequesne,
2005, pg. 30–31) Once the policy has been negotiated and agreed in the Council
of the EU, they have to be legitimatized and ratified within the Member States in
order for them to take effect. Policy implementation in the EU Member States has
always been through agencies of one kind or another. (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005,
pg. 33–35)
In general, there are both concrete and philosophical obstacles to common poli-
cies in the EU. Main policy obstacles stem from differing policy objectives, contro-
versial policies or past relations affecting current behavior. For example in the case
of external policy, policy obstacles they can involve alliances, influence of history,
etc. (Smith, 2008, pg. 10–11) The main obstacle to a common foreign policy for
the EU is that the Member States insist on pursuing their foreign policy interests
separately rather than as one. Member States are also interested in ensuring that
the policies made in the EU cause the least damage to them as possible. It has
been argued that the Member States do not share common interests and that the
diversity within the systems prevents it from making agreements. There are impor-
tant questions of sovereignty in this area also. The lack of cohesion weakens EU’s
position in the global political arena, mainly because no common military system
has been created and the EU is therefore incapable of backing up its diplomacy
with force. Philosophical obstacles include more generic items, such as the lack of
a true ”European identity”, which is an effective obstacle for many common Euro-
pean efforts. Foreign policy for example is seen as ”the expression of the identity
and interests of a particular community”. (Smith, 2008, pg. 10–11)
In addition to policy obstacles, it is also important to evaluate why certain poli-
cies do not exist. The most prominent reason is possibly the fact that many policies,
which eventually pass the system and become official, are based on the lowest com-
mon denominator (Smith, 2008, pg. 10). Forming general level policies concerning
items such as loans to the developing nations faces the challenge of complementing
each Member States’ historical relations, preferences, and development assistance
choices. Even though in the recent past actions in the field of development policy
and debt practices have somewhat converged, they are still far from being consistent,
as is to be shown in the data analysis. Policy coherence and coordination relating
to this are discussed next.
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2.3.3 EU Policy Coherence and Coordination
Since the European Union is in fact a union of 27 Member States, policy coordi-
nation is not a simple task. Each Member state has their own perspectives, views
and policy agendas in each policy field. Policies in the EU are often based on the
lowest common denominator, i.e. the most basic and least sophisticated level to
which the members agree on. Using the lowest common denominator in policies
can often weaken the Union politically. (Smith, 2008, pg. 10) In addition to policy
coordination, policy coherence is also important in a union including various actors.
Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) is also included in the 2005’s European
Consensus on Development, and included in data analysis in chapter four where
development policy framework is discussed.
EU states the following concerning Policy Coherence:
”The EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all poli-
cies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. To make this
commitment a reality, the EU will strengthen policy coherence for development pro-
cedures, instruments and mechanisms for all levels, and secure adequate resources
and share best practice to further these aims.” (EC Consensus, 2009, pg. 13)
Based on this statement, the non–existence of a common ”debt policy” can be
considered to be problematic as activity in the field does exist and has existed for
a long time, and it has clearly and heavily affected the developing nations. Since
development cooperation is a field of shared competence and the member govern-
ments are free to develop and choose their own practices, no such policy is expected
to exist in the current EU. However, the question remains of what is the overall
purpose of maintaining the shared competence in this case; to promote the free will
of member governments and their own commitment to the currently in place goals of
development policy? EU has itself claimed that rethinking of the way EU influences
the conditions for development, is needed (EU Legislation MDGs, 2009). In 2010
it has remained evident that the goals and sub–targets of MDGs are hard to reach.
In September 2010 president Obama also concluded that an altered approach to
development is needed for all global actors involved (Helsingin Sanomat September
23rd, 2010).
On a separate note, contradictory trends in EU policies and development co-
operation are not rare. Even though the perspective of EU’s development policy
has been more global since the 1970s and 1980s, still in the 2000s tension exists
between rival perspectives of exclusive regionalism and EU multilateralism. Ex-
clusive regionalism supporters focuse and emphasize Africa’s role in development
cooperation. Multilateralism supporters on the other hand have a global focus in
development cooperation, under which all developing countries fit. In the mean time
still separate funds for ACP countries (in the EDF) and other developing countries
37
exist in the EU. The Commission has proposed that the EDF would be placed under
the ”regular” community budget, but so far no such decision has been made. (van
Reisen, 2007, pg. 56–57)
This chapter has aimed to give a concrete overview of the European develop-
ment policy field. It has included both the development of the European develop-
ment cooperation, and current issues relating to policies in the EU. Next, the more
theoretical relationship between the North and the South is discussed.
2.4 North – South Conflict and the Issue of Debt
The relationship between the EU Member States and the developing nations can
also be extended to the theoretical level, on which many different views have been
presented concerning what external debt means in the interaction between the two
actors. This set–up between ”North” and ”South” has been present in political
studies, concretely and abstractly, for as long as political studies has been a separate
field. Since there has been money, and unequal distribution of it, there has been also
actors involved representing each side. This discussion often brings up the wide gap
between the two sides, not merely concerning money, but also polices. Regulations
and agreements within these policies also often appear to remain humanely distant
from the concrete needs of the highly indebted and least developed countries.
Practicing international development is in fact a distinct political process where
the consideration of power is essential. The liberal perspective to the issue empha-
sizes mutual interests between the countries in the developing and the developed
nations; while the global political economists perceive that in reality there is a co–
existence of common and competing interests. Issues of dominance and dependence
still remain of importance and need to be discussed when discussing development
promotion on a global scale. The central question in North – South relations seems
to be ”who speaks for whom?” Another important issue is also that who gets to
frame the questions of development? Are the developing nations still passive re-
cipients of aid, like President Truman stated in his inaugural Presidential address
in 1949, or in fact active partakers in development? (O’Brien and Williams, 2007,
pg. 327–328, 331)
The importance of the North–South conflict in issues concerning the question of
external debt of the developing nations is especially important, since the developing
nations remain in the defendant position in this discussion.
Mainly, as in the case of agreements between the EU and the developing nations,
the relationships between the North and the South have been present in debates
concerning finance and trade related issues. External debt has not been in focus
until the 1980s.
In the 1950s demands for reform of the international trading order were common
and increased aid was called for. The central platform for North–South relationships
was the United Nations. North–South conflict heated in the 1970s when discussions
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concerning the New International Economic Order NIEO started8. NIEO brought
a large reform, which also concerned the IMF and the World Bank9 Developing
nations criticized these international organizations for pushing the agenda of the
North. Eventually many reasons influenced the failure of NIEO, but one of the
main reasons was the reluctance of the North to enter into serious negotiation with
the countries representing the South. During the 1980s there was discussion about
how the fragmentation of the ”Third World coalition” resulted in a demise of the
North – South conflict, but O’Brien and Williams argue that this view fails to see
the conflict set up as a structure of international political economy, which still exists.
The reason for its existence is simply the income gap between rich and poor states.
(O’Brien and Williams, 2007, pg. 328–329) Demeny argued in 1981, that although
material progress will occur during the following decades, the demographic patterns
and developments will most likely increase the income gap. (Demeny, 1981, pg. 308)
Statistics presented in chapter one have shown this prediction to be accurate.
O’Brien and Williams (2007) identify debt crisis as the time period when frag-
mentation occurred in the ”Third World coalition”, which affected a new type of a
relationship to be formed between the developing and the developed world. There
were two different reasons for this. Firstly, the debt crisis created a range of special
interests, when countries sough to battle their own debt burdens and different coun-
tries were given differential treatment in the process (some welcomed debt reduc-
tion, others were worried that it would devalue their creditworthiness). Structural
adjustment programs promoting liberal economic thought severely detracted the in-
dependence of the developing nations. Secondly, the successful industrialization of
some of the developing nations (NICs) is said to have exacerbated the differences
among developing countries. Considering these developments and a currently more
fragmented ”Third World”, the North – South conflict still persists and is detectable
in many discussions. (O’Brien and Williams, 2007, pg. 329–331)
The problem of the North – South conflict has been conceptualized more theo-
retically in history by scholars representing three different theories of Global Strat-
ification; Modernization theory (for example Rostow (1960), Dependency theory,
for example Prebisch (1959), and World–Systems Theory, for example Wallerstein
(1974). Whilst modernization theory examines factors internal to a country’s devel-
opment, dependency theory looks at relationships between countries (or groups of
them), and world systems theory perceives countries always acting within a context,
not as isolated entities. (Andersen and Taylor, 2006, pg. 254)
Modernization theory was developed originally in the 1960s to explain why some
countries had achieved economic development, and why some had not. The theory
perceives economic development as progress where traditional societies transform
8NIEO aimed to improve developing nations’ position in global economy by changing terms
of trade, increase development assistance and reduce tariffs of the developing nations, etc. (Bair,
2007) Discussions were especially active during the years 1973–1979 (O’Brien and Williams, 2007,
pg. 328–329).
9See for example Marshall (1994), Bair (2007).
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into more complex and differentiated ones (Rostow, 1960). This transformation pro-
cess requires change in values, institutions as well as attitudes. Poverty is interpreted
to have been a result of adherence to traditional values and customs that prevent
societies from competing in a modern global economy. Modernization theory has
been criticized for not being able to sufficiently take into account the relationships
between countries, which do affect economic and / or social conditions10. (Andersen
and Taylor, 2006, pg. 252)
Dependency theory understands economic development to come from the ex-
ploitation of the least powerful nations to the benefit of the wealthier countries
which then control the economic and political systems of those countries. Poverty is
seen to be a result of the dependence of low–income countries on wealthier nations.
Prebisch (mainly influenced in the 1950s and 1960s) found that the wealth of poor
nations decreased when the wealth of already developed countries increased (for
more detailed information, see Prebisch 1959). Social change in societies is under-
stood as a result of neo–colonialism and the expansion of international capitalism.
(Andersen and Taylor, 2006, pg. 252)
World–systems theory, mainly developed by Wallerstein (1974), on the other
hand understands economic development emerging from the development of a world
market that links the core, semi–peripheral and peripheral nations. Poverty is then
the result of core nations’ extraction of labor and natural resources from these
peripheral states. Theory’s roots lie in the thinking of the dependency school and
scholars such as Karl Marx and Fernand Braudel. Social change is seen to be leading
to an international division of labor where increasing amount of profits is put to
the hands of a few while the poorest and least powerful continue to be exploited.
(Andersen and Taylor, 2006, pg. 252) Role of external debt in the up–keeping of the
set–up between the core and periphery is of importance, at least according to critics
of the credit system. For example George (1989) has argued that the debt crisis
of the 1980s was symptomatic of ”an increasingly polarized world organized for the
benefit of a minority that will stop at nothing to maintain and strengthen its control
and privilege.” George argues that actors such as creditor–country governments, U.S.
banks, World Bank and the IMF are working together to ”keep the Third World in
line” and that debt should be removed from financial agenda to the political agenda.
(George, 1989)
Dependency theorists in general have presented arguments similar to George,
by stating that the debt crisis could be perceived to be caused by the extreme de-
pendence of the developing nations’ (especially African) economies on international
competitive economic conditions, over which the countries have had very little con-
trol over. The idea is that economic development of the developing nations was
made impossible by the domination of world economy by the already industrialized
countries. The implication is that poverty, including high indebtedness, is s result
of the manner in which the countries have been integrated to the world system.
10See also Said (1978).
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Liberal economic theory on the other hand challenges this perspective by arguing
that economic liberalization as an overall process will help in increasing the flow of
foreign investment into the developing countries. Loans are seen as the only way
of supporting investment, but the conditions tied to them may cause even higher
dependency than before. (Ikejiaku, 2008)
The theories briefly overviewed here are not about the issue of external debt,
but they do give insight to where the development ideologies and opposing views
have stemmed from during the time period under focus of this study. Different
perspectives to economic development are present in all societies, just as are the
different perspectives to loans and development cooperation as well. Most often
these are also interlinked.
Relationship between the North and the South in discussions and theories seems
to be especially complex due mainly to the defendant position of the developing
countries and the most likely fact that majorities in North currently support neolib-
eral theory perspective to the debt issue. It seems that only on rare occasions the
representatives of the North and the South discuss the problem together. Majori-
ties in the developing world have experienced the problems of high debt and most
likely have adopted the ideology of dependency theorists. Looking at the situation
aggravated, it would seem that the it will not change until change happens in the
ideological level, and when real dialogue occurs. In reality the array between the
North and the South might not be as extreme as presented here, more than two dif-
ferent perspectives do exist. The EU Member States are a good example of countries
representing the ”North” with dissimilar perspectives to the matter. These differ-
ences between the Member States are explored in the data analysis of this study
and in more detail in the developed Grant – Loan Index.
Chapter 3
History of External Debt
This chapter focuses on explaining the key events and time periods in history mean-
ingful to the current and recent past relationship concerning EU Member States and
the developing nations in the field of external debt. This includes mainly the origin
of loans (separate stories for the existence of the idea of loans, and for metropolitans,
and countries with no colonial background, giving loans to the developing nations).
The point separating different perspectives of external debt can be considered to be
the debt crisis of the early 1980s, which transformed the general attitude towards
loans from neutral and / or positive, to mainly negative.
This chapter aims to answer questions such as how and when did the tradition
of giving loans start from in general and what historical factors contribute to the
currently differing policies between donors. The reasons of the debt crisis are also
covered briefly, main focus is on the EU Member States’ delayed reaction to the
Crisis and as well as the proposed solutions. These will be later on linked to the
data analysis. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the meaning of history;
i.e. differing characteristics of the Member States’ development assistance.
Due to limitations concerning length, main focus will be on the role of credit in
the development of the global financial system and the interaction between the North
and the South in their different roles as metropolitans and colonies (1400s–1900s),
creditors and debtors (1400s–1980s / 2000s) and donors and recipients (1960s–
2000s).
3.1 How External Debt Became a Problem?
The single most important time period in the history concerning the topic under
study is the debt crisis of the 1980s. This was the time period when the first modern
day developing nations’ debt crisis emerged. Since then, the topic of external debt
has been a heated topic on the global political agenda.
The debt crisis started in 1982 when Mexico announced it was not able to pay
the substantial amounts of debt it had accumulated. This created a fear other
countries would follow Mexico’s lead, and soon the crisis erupted. (Balaam and
Veseth, 2008, pg. 153) Debt crisis hit Sub–Saharan Africa SSA the hardest in the
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long run. Although several efforts were put forward to develop the continent, its
share of world trade went from 1.2 per cent (1970) to only 0.4 per cent in the late
1990s. Africa’s share of FDI Foreign Direct Investment also lowered; it went from
13 per cent in 1980 to less than 5 per cent in the late 1990s. Since the debt crisis
began in the beginning of the 1980s, SSA’s external debt went from $84.1 billion to
$235.4 billion. (OECD DAC Statistics portal)
The roots of the problem were created many years before the crisis began in
Mexico. The oil crises of the 1970s were one of the main influences; as the oil prices
went up, so did the prices for other raw materials. The oil producing nations had
plenty of extra capital to loan for different purposes. It was generally thought that
technology was the solution to the developing nations’ problems and that lending
money for it would provide a needed solution, although eventually many of the
loans turned out to be useless or used for wrong purposes. (O’Brien and Williams,
2007, pg. 222–223) The prices of agricultural products dropped around the same
time oil prices peaked, and many nations were forced to lend more in order to make
their original loan payments. A vicious cycle was born, and Mexico was the first
one to declare it could not handle the situation. (Eichengreen and Lindert, 1992,
pg. 149–153) Balaam and Veseth state that the core of the problem was ”too much
had been loaned for too many” (Balaam and Veseth, 2008, pg 153). Mugasha (2007)
adds that the situation was worsened by the tightening of the monetary policy in
USA, which led to high interest rates in the 1980s and occasional recessions in the
economy. These reduced demand from the developing countries and deepened the
crisis. Also, corrupted governments in the developing nations played a key role as
did the governments in the North who were willing to lend significant sums of money.
The fact that debtor governments were in some cases the main reasons for the crisis,
is one key reason why some creditors overall refuse to forgive loans (Mugasha, 2007,
pg. 861)
Enrique Carrasco (1999) overviewed the crisis with the following conclusions: (1)
petrodollar recycling by commercial banks to developing countries gave rise to the
debt crisis, (2) decreased exports and high interest rates in the early 1980s caused
debtors to default on their loans, (3) debt restructuring using case–by–case method
saved the international financial system from a collapse, and (4) ”debt fatigue”
during the mid–1980s appeared as commercial banks suggested developing nations’
inability to repay might be permanent. (Carrasco, 2009)
In the Bruntland Report in 1987, the following was stated concerning loans:
”In the 1970s, Latin America’s economic growth was facilitated by external bor-
rowing. Commercial banks were happy to lend to growing countries rich in natural
resources. Then major changes in international conditions made the debt unsustain-
able.” – UN General Assembly (2009, pg. 82)
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Many issues affected overall the developing nations’ inability to pay the accumu-
lated debts. Some argue that the general reason was be the failure of ”developmen-
talist” model of the 1970s and its inability to raise productivity and hard currency
export earnings. (Hoogvelt, 2001, pg. 177) Developmentalist model was effective
at backing up autocratic regimes and helped in financing bureaucratic state func-
tions. The goal was to overcome so called ”international blockages”, which were
seen as hindrances to development. All this went beyond the financial capacity of
most states and resulted in massive external debts. Unfortunately, high external
debts were not the only problem, the system created bureaucratic systems, an e´lite
and high corruption. Despite these massive problems, all this was overlooked by
the international community. Hoogvelt argues this happened for two reasons; the
”scientific” reason was that the global economy wanted Africa to catch up in its
development, and the strategic reason was related to Cold War. Africa and other
developing countries wanted to be kept on the ”capitalist” side of the global political
system of that time. (Hoogvelt, 2001, pg. 177) Wallerstein however opposes that the
reason was the developmentalist model itself, which was easy to point to finger to.
Wallerstein points out that there is always two sides to each policy; state–building
can be seen as bloating bureaucracy, import–substitution industrialization can be
seen as corrupt protectionism, and the before promoted state enterprises were later
seen as inefficient. This new thinking eventually led to the next phase: era of glob-
alization with the ideas of privatization and export–oriented productive activities.
(Wallerstein, 2005, pg. 1265)
Overall, the debt crisis awakened governments to see that there was no central
authority to oversee the system, the problems and the proposed solutions. This
became officially the IMF’s role, since it was already the place for last resort loans.
(Mugasha, 2007, pg. 865) Its analysis of the system at that time has been claimed to
be heavily influenced by multilateral banks and leading creditor governments. The
main determination was, according to Simon (2002), to protect the international
financial system and North’s self–interest. They blamed the crisis on corruption,
loss–generating state enterprises and inappropriate policies. The IMF did also take
notice of the steep rise of interest rates, but did not regard it as a sufficient explana-
tion. The banks were not held responsible for lending the so called ”petrodollars”.
(Simon, 2002, pg. 87)
The debt crisis of the 1980s was in fact a very important phase in the history of
development. Although usually the crisis is discussed in the context of the recent
past, the debt problem has roots far in history, in the early traditions and histories
of lending. Next chapter answers questions concerning the origin of loans and nature
of early credit institutions, where the need for loans came from and how the current
EU Member States differ in their histories of lending.
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3.2 Histories and Traditions of Lending
European expansionist activity started in the mid 1400s and lasted until the time
period after the World Wars. Origin of loans to the developing nations stem from
this time period, although as such it is not considered to be the root of the current
problems with high and unsustainable external debt, which are often blamed on the
economic policies and practices of the 1970s and the inability to respond proactively
to the causes of the debt crisis. However, this 500 year long period of colonial
rule has left visible marks in history and has been especially important concerning
Europe’s political and economic life (Landes, 1999, pg. 422–423) and relations with
the former colonies.
3.2.1 Pre–colonial Period: Origin of Loans
The starting point for loans in history is still unclear. Likely argument is that
lending and borrowing have been practiced since the concept of ownership formed.
Mussi (2010) Credit is sometimes considered a modern device. Although new credit
forms have been developed in the ”North” during the recent centuries, credit has
been used already in the ancient and medieval times. Credit was ”born” as an idea
before industry and banking, and even before primitive forms of money. (Homer
and Sylla, 2005, pg. 3) Loans can be documented at least several thousands of years
back, to ancient Greek and Roman times. Monetary loans were even mentioned
in the Bible. (Mussi, 2010) Loans at ”interest rate” have been said to have begun
when the Neolithic farmers loaned seeds and expected more back at harvest time.
Old Sumerian documents dating back to 3000 B.C. reveal a systematic use of credit
based loans. The recorded legal histories of several great civilizations have begun
with the regulation of credit. At around 600 B.C. the legal history of Greece began
with the laws of Solon. At that time big reforms to the system were needed since
an economic crisis had erupted in Athens. This was partly due to excessive debt
and widespread slavery for debt. The first debt cancellations and reductions were
seen in Greece when also personal slavery for debt was forbidden due to the many
problems they caused. (Homer and Sylla, 2005, pg. 3,17,21)
Firms granting credit to consumers and businesses have existed already in the
ancient world and in the medieval Europe. (Rothbard, 2010, pg. 56) The precise
origins of banking are still a subject of debate (Bordo and Corte´s-Conde, 2001,
pg. 45), but banking in the sense that the lent money was other people’s savings,
began in England in the early 17th century. (Rothbard, 2010, pg. 56) The tradition of
giving loans to the developing nations from Europe stems from mainly the colonial
past. Colonial past as a time period has had a substantial impact on both the
current field of general development assistance as well as global economy (O’Brien
and Williams, 2007, pg. 43).
During the colonial period modern monetary and fiscal policies evolved and were
spread to the ”New World”. Colonial past is the history of capitalism and modern
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statehood, but also the history of long–term exploitation. This exploitation has cre-
ated, through imperial pursuits, path dependence and global hegemony. Imperial–
colonial ties are the believable variable in explaining the emergence of the Europeans
to the global power position. (Bo¨ro¨cz and Sarkar, 2005, pg. 163)
Colonial time period transformed local cultures by introducing Christianity, no-
tions of European racial superiority, and Western political ideologies, such as na-
tionalism, liberalism and Marxism. Colonial time period’s interaction between the
metropolitans and the colonies was intensive, in all aspects of a society1. In addition
to economic and political cooperation, by–products of the colonial period, such as
massive slave trade, have had significant impacts on global economic and political
life. (O’Brien and Williams, 2007, pg. 58–59).
The driving force behind colonizing areas has been simply to better one’s condi-
tion (Duignan and Gann, 1971, pg. 23). Economic interaction between the metropoli-
tans and the colonies had different forms and outcomes, which were eventually also
political. Economic development during this time period in the colonies happened
in different fields; banking systems, fiscal policies, monetary policies and of course,
in the traditions of giving loans (Bordo and Corte´s-Conde, 2001, pg. 1–3). Most
problems in this field of economic cooperation occurred due to the clash between
the ”old system” of the colonies, and the ”new system” of the metropolitans. Differ-
ences between local communal economies and more sophisticated colonial economies
were substantial. In many cases these vast differences led to the co–existence of two
separate economic or financial systems; the official and the unofficial (Ray, 1995,
pg. 449). The shift from the old system to the new system required changes also
in the political institutions and ways of governing (Bordo and Corte´s-Conde, 2001,
pg. 2–6)
Rudimentary Forms of Credit
The already ”in existence” lending systems in the developing nations ranged from
different forms of agricultural (rural) credit, for example in Argentina and Zanz-
ibar, to different kinds of indigenous credit institutions, for example in West Africa.
(Austin and Sugihara, 1993). Also the profession of ”a moneylender”2 existed in
most of these countries (Schrader, 1994, pg. 185–187). Often credit was based not
1Causes for the expansion of the Europeans have been named to be greed for valued products
outside Europe, fear by competition from other metropolitans (Europeans as well as Islamic forces
of Egypt blocking routes to Asia), knowledge of crucial technologies enabling development of sailing
ships for example, and biological ”good fortune” (due to the Europeans’ possession of a stock of
threatening diseases and domesticated production animals). (O’Brien and Williams, 2007, pg. 58–
59)
2During the Middle Ages, Italian moneylenders set up their benches in local marketplaces and
would charge interest on their loans on a rate they themselves set. The word bench in Italian is
”banca”, which was where the word ”bank” was derived from. If the moneylenders did not have
good business in the marketplace, they would break up their benches, in Italian ”banca rupta”,
where the word bankrupt was derived from later on. (Mussi, 2010)
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on property such as land or goods, but to the security of his own person, credit
was a matter of kinship (Duignan and Gann, 1971, pg. 42). Before the develop-
ment of the ”cash–crops” such as cocoa, credit in the modern sense was unavailable.
Lending however was not unknown in the form of wealth, for example the Masai
cattle–herders loaned stock. Credit of the capitalist kind was confined mainly to ar-
eas where Africans were in touch with Arabs, Europeans or Asians. Muslim peoples
in Sudan were familiar with credit in different forms. (Duignan and Gann, 1971,
pg. 42) Later other non–monetary forms of debt emerged in the developing nations
(18th and 19th centuries), such as debt bondage3, but that was already influenced by
the colonial time period’s slave trade. Slave trade flourished during colonial period4
traditions (Crow and Thorpe, 1988, pg. 36–37). In some regions of Africa, where
there was contact with European importers, different kinds of credit were formed,
which were mainly based on the exchange and re–sale of commodities. The vol-
ume of these transactions remained however small compared to later phases when
bank loans were initiated as official banking systems were established (Duignan and
Gann, 1971, pg. 42) In some regions, after colonization, locals were forced to create
their own informal credit markets, as the metropolitans’ banks were racially dis-
criminatory in terms of access to loans, for example in British West Africa (Austin
and Uche, 2007, pg. 10) Banking institutions in Africa for example were initially
confined to South Africa, where the standard Bank opened in 1862 (Duignan and
Gann, 1971, pg. 42) .
3.2.2 Colonial Period: Need for Loans
In the unification process of the colonies’ and metropolitans’ economies was where
the tradition of giving loans started for many different kinds of loans, not merely
the bilateral sort. Loans, like most other things, were created out of need. Need for
extra financial funds during the colonial period existed for both parties involved; the
metropolitans and the colonies. Colonies’ need for loans was created mainly by the
metropolitans for different development endeavors5. Loans were used for (1) state
planning and adding interest of investors, (2) helping in financing infrastructural
development (mainly railroads for easing exporting and importing), (3) helping in
financing wars and coping with war damages, (5) enhancing trade and productivity
(6) adding purchasing power and economic opportunities in general, and (7) enhanc-
3Refers to a situation in which someone is forced to pay their debt by providing either services
or goods to their creditor.
4Between the years 1450–1900 about 9–13 million slaves were transported from Africa to the
Americas (O’Brien and Williams, 2007, pg. 65), but had begun before the colonial period. (Rodney,
1973, pg. 103–107)
5Metropolitans encouraged multiple investors, such as bankers, traders and business groups to
attract investment. The British expected the colonies to pay their own way, and their government
only occasionally helped in the forms of loans and grants. French and German governments put
more of their own money (instead of loans) in the colonies from the beginning of the colonial
period. (Duignan and Gann, 1971, pg. 8)
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ing self–sufficiency. (Thompson and Adloff, 1975, pg. 128–141) Form and function
of loan practices varied between metropolitans, but eventually the knowledge of dif-
ferentiated practices spread widely. Interest free loans were used from early on also.
It was thought that as they would promote development, the loss of the interest
would be covered later by successful development. (Havinden and Meredith, 1993,
pg. 140–142).
In more detail, wars did play a significant role in issues relating to debt and colo-
nial relations, since frequent wars of the colonial period required unusual financial
resources. Before wars became more frequent, financing them was easier due to the
existence of ”war chests”, i.e. savings and the possibility to lend from either bankers
or material suppliers. The idea was that paying for the debt would be easy once the
war was over and the victorious party would acquire the defeated party’s resources.
However, when this circle was repeated several times, it led to problems as there was
”nothing more to take”. Many metropolitans ended up defaulting on their loans,
for example Spain in the 17th and 18th centuries. (Bordo and Corte´s-Conde, 2001,
pg. 7–8)
Tradition of using loans to develop colonies was used by most metropolitans at
some point in time; for example the British government allocated 98 per cent of its
total funds going to the colonies as loans. Almost all funds before the 1920s went to
railway construction, nearly all in either Central or East Africa. Most often loans
did include interest payments, and they needed to be met since the beginning of the
loans. After World War I, British imperialists took over colonial affairs with the aim
to provide more money and possibilities on easier terms as well as comprehensive
program of colonial development. Loans were given to the colonies with the idea
that as they would develop, markets for British goods would also develop, enhance
the purchasing power of individual inhabitants in the colonies, and produce future
benefits for British trade. The overall goal of these policies was to decrease high
unemployment rates in the United Kingdom. Interest free loans appeared a bit
later for similar infrastructure project loans, with the justification that Britain ”had
to develop her possession”, and also that the benefits from these projects would
later surpass initial sacrifices of interest free loans. (Havinden and Meredith, 1993,
pg. 140–142)
France adopted a similar approach as Great Britain. French trading companies
almost entirely dominated African colonies’ economies. In 1921 the colonial minis-
ter Sarraut introduced the concept of state planning, which had the goal of making
France and its colonies as economically self–sufficient as they could be. Loans were a
partial solution in this transformation process. French public funds were to be used
to promote the colonies’ productivity. The plan was abandoned at the time due
to lacking finances, but revived in 1931. The depression of the time called for new
economic development programs and two laws were passed in France to initiate pro-
grams of ”public works” for each colony. Loans were given for the execution of these
plans. They proceeded and were somewhat successful until they were interrupted
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by World War II. The allocated funds from France went mainly to communication,
some also to the ”increasing of production” and promoting the ”balance of social
development”. Also in some areas loans were granted from funds borrowed from
the local colonial administration for agricultural and transportation development
needs. Coastal territories were favored over others, which led to stagnating growth
inland and a mass–move towards the coastal cities. (Thompson and Adloff, 1975,
pg. 128–141). Overall the French public investments in colonial Africa during the
time period 1870–1936 were focused on military and port functions. Indirect loans
were used in financing railroad construction, much like in Britain’s case. Loans were
repayable from federal revenues at interest rates ranging from 3.5 to 6.5 per cent.
Overall the French African policy, including the consequences of loans, caused much
critique and anti–colonialism as the policies were a growing burden on the French
tax–payers. (Thompson and Adloff, 1975, pg. 133–145).
Different colonial powers had different ways of developing the credit institutions.
For example, the Dutch were in a key role in spreading credit practices. Voluntary
credit markets for public debt were pioneered by European cities during the Mid-
dle Ages, but the municipal practice was successfully started in the Low–countries
(mainly in Holland). After its independence from Spain in the 1580s, these prac-
tices spread to the whole of Dutch Republic and were later copied by others. Mon-
etary arrangements in Dutch colonies included for example plantation loan booms
in the mid–18th century. During the same time credit facilities to planters also
increased. Spanish fiscal policies were in turn much influenced by its colonial em-
pire and France was not able to leave much of a monetary legacy for its colonies as
political constraints hampered reform in its political and economic system. (Bordo
and Corte´s-Conde, 2001, pg. 95,135,181)
Colonial period came to an end due to different reasons and the decolonization
process in itself was strenuous and had vast economic and political consequences.
Some European states recognized the difficulty of continuing to rule foreign coun-
tries, in some areas the local populations waged campaigns to give up to control.
Second World War was also a major factor, and the growth of nationalistic move-
ments within the colonies had also an effect. As large number of ”new” countries
came into being, the balance of international organizations shifted. New organiza-
tions were established to serve the interests of the developing nations. Decolonization
pushed the development issue to the international agenda, where it has ever since
stayed. (O’Brien and Williams, 2007, pg. 120–121)
Bilateral lending started during the colonial period and as a method it spread
widely and was used later in different development purposes. However, not all
current EU–15 Member States have adopted bilateral credit practices. Next, the
differences among the colonist and non–colonist EU Member States are discussed.
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3.2.3 Post–Colonial Period: Emerging New Creditors
Origin of loans from the Member States with no colonial pasts is quite a different
story than from former metropolitans, which had tied close relations early on with
the developing nations. Traditions and ways of giving assistance in the form of
loans or aid have changed, and each Member State has their own characteristics of
development practices.
The eight European powers with (differing) colonial pasts6 were Portugal, Spain,
Holland (or Netherlands), Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany and Italy. The
years these countries started giving loans and which were reported in OECD statis-
tics were; Portugal (1961), Spain (1980), Netherlands (1961), Great Britain (1961),
France (1960), Belgium (1963) Germany (1960) and Italy (1961). Note here that
this is not the time when the granting of loans started, but when their reporting
has begun and therefore the timing of when they can be objectively studied. The
remaining seven with no colonial pasts are Finland, Sweden Denmark, Luxembourg,
Ireland, Austria and Greece. Luxembourg and Ireland have not given any loans for
the developing nations during the entire time period under study. Greece has given
some loans, but started as late as in 1998. Sweden started giving loans in 1963 and
Austria a year earlier, in 1962. Finland started a decade later, in 1972. (OECD
DAC, 2010)
There is more variation in the starting years for loans in the non–colonial group
than the colonial group. Reasons for variation might be differences in general na-
tional development policy outlines, or in lack of finances.
Northern donor group countries’ early forms of development assistance have been
based on the work of church missionaries. Although many European countries acted
as missionaries, the emphasis was stronger for the Northern Member States than for
others. (Carbone, 2007a, pg. 46) For example, Finland has practices development
cooperation for over hundred years in different forms. In the beginning it was
missionary work (in Northern Namibia for example), but it wasn’t until 1965 when
an official office was set up for development practices. (Artto, 2009, pg. 5) This
mind–set and perspective to development cooperation, and actions in the developing
nations is quite far from lending and different loans practices. Other Northern donors
also shared the same background, and therefore did not start lending until official
development aid offices were established and different aid form and their benefits
explored. In 1970 the international law on development credit came into force and
an increasing number of development aid from Finland was given in the form of
credit, which was also tied to purchases from Finland. In 1973 about one–third of
aid was given in credit form. Later as it was noticed that the credit form aid did not
function well, the policy of accentuating loans in aid was relinquished (Artto, 2009,
pg. 19) and actually the law concerning development credit was overruled in Finland
6Differences among colonial rulers were significant, different form of direct (for example French
colonies of Africa) and indirect rule (for example British colonies in Africa) were adopted. Choices
of the form of rule also impacted economic relations. (Crow and Thorpe, 1988, pg. 23,27–28)
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in 1992 (Finlex, 2010). Finland’s case is just one example of the countries involved,
others are not discussed here as there are difficulties in finding the appropriate data
concerning the issue.
The differences among Member States in terms of origin of lending practices are
due to the differing histories of relations with the developing nations. Countries
with earlier ties in economic relations have practices also loans earlier. Countries
with development aid policy background in missionary work have been introduced
to lending practices later, mainly in the 1970s. This was the time period when an
ideological shift in development thinking gave birth to new concrete development
practices, such as international development credit and concessional credit system7.
3.3 EU and the Debt Crisis of the 1980s
The debt crisis of the 1980s has been overviewed in the beginning of this chapter.
What is especially important in this context, is how the EU Member States reacted
to the debt crisis, how did it change policies and what are the differences in reactions
between the Member States.
3.3.1 Reaction to the Debt Crisis
In 2010 Eurodad stated that ”A country facing debt difficulties today would run
into the same problems it did three decades ago, namely meaning that there is no
internationally recognized procedure to work–out sovereign debt difficulties in a fair,
predictable and transparent manner.” (Eurodad Debt Overview, 2010) EU’s role in
the debt field was passive for a long time after the crisis erupted. In the midst of the
debt crisis of the 1980’s, not much happened on behalf of the Europeans. Europe
did not launch any special action programs for Africa, despite the deep crisis, it did
extend additional finance assistance to sub–Saharan Africa. Once it did, it did it
through the international channels (IMF and World Bank), not by itself. The main
reason why Europeans did not use their own channels was that they had their own
on–going negotiations with African countries concerning Lome´ III and did not want
to get these processes confused. (Grilli, 1996, pg. 38–39)
It took several years after the eruption of the debt crisis for the EC Community
to act on the issue, for some creditors it took even longer. Even though several
requests and urgent need for debt reduction existed, Europeans did not react to the
crisis until the year 1988, five years after the eruption of the crisis. Data concerning
debt relief is discussed in chapter five, refer to figures 5.10, and tables 5.1 and 5.2.
Figure 3.1 shows what the sums for loans, grants and debt releif have been and how
they have developed since the 1960s. The delayed reaction to the debt crisis is well
observable.
7For more information see for example (Halonen, 2007).
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Figure 3.1: EU DAC Member States’ grants, loans and debt relief since the 1960s.
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In 1988, Germany, France, Italy and the UK agreed with Canada, Japan and
USA to act on the crisis, and (finally) promised debt relief for African countries. The
G–7 showed by taking the decision unilaterally, that the opinion of the developing
nations didn’t really matter. (Grilli, 1996, pg. 39) Interestingly, these four EU
countries, (then EC) decided to approach other large countries, instead of the other
current EC Member States. According to Grilli, this choice was made in order to
share the financial burden with other major creditors instead of the ”small players”
of the EC. (Grilli, 1996, pg. 39)
Overall, EU’s efforts, or the lack of them, need to be put in a larger global frame-
work. One of the most important ones is EU’s own political and economic interest.
Mold (2007) states quite straightforwardly, that ”it is no secret that the developing
countries are in a secondary place on EU’s agenda”, especially in relation to other
foreign policy interests. One clear example of this is how some of the relationships
with developing nations are handled at the ”European level” and relations with the
more important countries are handled at the national level, for example with USA
or Russia. (Mold, 2007, pg. 17)
3.3.2 Solutions to the Debt Crisis
Debt crisis demanded a reaction from the global community and the European
countries involved in creating the problem. That response came late after crisis, as
mentioned.
Stanley Fischer presented three different kinds of options for a solution to the
overall crisis in the late 1980s. First option he proposed was ”muddle through”,
which means that simply the global community would just try to survive the sit-
uation using different methods. Second option he presented was to do a series of
different agreements between each debtor and its creditors, involving both relief and
lengthening of the debts. International institutions could monitor these negotiations.
And thirdly, he suggested that a large international organization would be set up
just for this purpose with a goal of disposing the debt problem. Mixed together,
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these options could have provided the needed solutions to the crisis. (Fischer, 1989,
pg. 322) Fischer’s ideas were only partially implemented in the actions of both the
global community as well as the EU Member States for example in the Highly In-
debted Poor Countries Initiative HIPC and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative MDRI
programs, explained next. Despite vast efforts of the global community, countries
and non–governmental organizations, the debt problem has not been eradicated as
new loans have been given and unpredictable issues have emerged. Hoogvelt argued
over two dacedes later, that the debt problem still remains as the most intractable
problem in the modern global economy. Since the debt crisis began in the beginning
of the 1980s to the early 2000s, Sub Saharan Africa’s external debt increased from
USD$84.1 billion to USD$235.4 billion. (Hoogvelt, 2001, pg. 173–175)
Solutions proposed by the EU Member States in the process of solving the debt
crisis can be divided in two opposing categories. Category one options offer hope to
the creditors, and aims to give the expected returns from given loans, category two
options aim to cancel the debts of the developing nations on the basis of need and
the difficulty of the situation in the debtor countries. (Mugasha, 2007, pg. 861)
EU Member States adopted a passive role in the aftermath of the debt crisis, and
as was concluded in the previous chapter, most of the solutions were developed in
cooperation with the multilateral institutions. As a solution to the Crisis, the multi-
laterals introduced Structural Adjustment Programs SAPs and Economic Recovery
Programs ERPs.
Structural Adjustment Programs SAPs
SAPs were designed to cut government expenses, reduce the extent to which the gov-
ernment intervenes in economy, and promote liberalization as well as international
trade. SAPs did not achieve much from the point of view of national development
or improving the standards of living in African countries, but they were a success
when measuring the acceleration of globalization. The programs tied Africa’s phys-
ical resources into servicing the ”old” segment of global economy and at the same
time it has transformed the financial system by which wealth is easy to transfer out
of the region. Unfortunately for Africa, this removed them from the very resources
they needed for dynamic adjustment to the new global economy. (Hoogvelt, 2001,
pg. 184)
IMF approved SAPs were adopted and implemented in many developing nations,
since they were the prerequisite for receiving financial support. The World Bank,
regional development banks and most of the bilateral donors followed IMF’s lead.
Soon it was virtually impossible to borrow without a SAP. Extend of the control
widened in 1990, when economic conditionality was accompanied by political condi-
tionality. The aim of this was to promote ”good governance” in developing nations.
Based on experience, SAPs and ERPs were refined in the late 1980s and during the
1990s. Local circumstances, social aspects and negative impacts were taken into
account. (Simon, 2002, pg. 88–89) During the years 1980–1989, 171 SAPs were
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introduced in Sub–Saharan Africa (SSA) and a further 57 by the end of 1996. Post–
crisis studies have shown that SAPs have had mixed effects on poverty. (Carrasco,
2009) For example, SAPs were designed to address the debt problem, but actually
led for example to the downsizing public sector, which influenced healthcare, edu-
cation, etc. (O’Brien and Williams, 2007, pg. 226) The urban poor were among the
worst affected. Job losses, salary cuts and high commodity price increases reduced
well–being. The benefiters have been large traders, import–export merchants and
agricultural producers. SAPs and ERPs have caused problems also in food security
and in the environment. However, the most evident political problem has been the
loss of sovereignty. (Simon, 2002, pg. 89–90)
Due to these problems, poverty reduction strategies changed when the new mil-
lennium approached. The SAPs and ERPs were replaced with Poverty Reduction
Strategies PRSs. During this time development assistance was also replaced by de-
velopment ”cooperation”. (Simon, 2002, pg. 89–90) More recent initiatives relating
to debt, such as the HIPC and the MDRI are discussed next.
The HIPC and the MDRI
The HIPC and the MDRI are currently the two main global initiatives to eradicate
the debt problem– Both initiatives aim to provide vast debt relief. In 2008, the
committed debt relief under the HIPC was 68 billion US dollars (in nominal terms)
of which 45 billion was delivered to the 23 post completion–point countries and 23
billion to the remaining interim HIPCs. The MDRI added another 43 billion in
assistance to the 23 countries. Hence, the sum adds up to 112 billion USD, making
their overall influence quite substantial. (Presbitero, 2009, pg. 6)
The HIPC initiative got started in 1996 by the IMF and the World Bank. Fund-
ing of the initiative is divided in half between two groups: bilateral and commercial
creditors and multilaterals. Debt relief from the multilateral financial institutions
is dealt with in the framework of the HIPC Trust Fund, which the World Bank
manages. A variety of donators give funds for this, including the EU. (EU HIPC,
2009) In 1999, the G–7 summit decided to provide faster and more broader and
comprehensible debt relief. The initiative has been extended several times, in 1998,
2000, 2002 and 2004. Since 1999, the Initiative has been known as the Enhanced
HIPC. Its main aim is to reduce the debt burden of poor countries to a sustainable
level. (EU HIPC, 2009) The beginning was rocky for the HIPC; the IMF set the bar
high and only three countries received relief during the first four years. In the year
2000, the Jubilee 2000 movement, see for example Jubilee Debt Campaign (2009),
mobilized the global community behind the issue of debt relief and a decision was
made to expand the HIPC program. According to Stiglitz, after 2005, 28 countries
have received more than $56 billion of debt relief, reducing the debt burden of these
countries by approximately two–thirds. The HIPC did not include former Soviet
Union countries and did nothing to help some of the most indebted nations, like
Argentina. More relief was needed and in 2005 (at the G–8 Summit) the Members
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agreed to provide up to 100 per cent debt relief for the 18 poorest countries in the
world, of which 14 were African. (Stiglitz, 2007, pg. 226–227)
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative MDRI on the other hand provides 100 percent
relief on debt that has been loaned from multilateral institutions to a group of low–
income countries. The meaning of this initiative is to get these countries closer to
the UN’s Millennium Development Goals with the main focus of halving poverty by
2015. The EU supports the MDRI by financing the multilaterals and is of course,
committed to the MDGs also. The MDRI goes further than the HIPC by provid-
ing full debt relief. In order to be a part of the MDRI, a country must qualify IMF
terms and criteria. These include (1) macroeconomic policies; (2) implementation of
a poverty reduction strategy, and (3) public expenditure management. (IMF Debt
Relief, 2010)
The more recent initiatives presented in this chapter have aimed to provide an
overview of the kind of actions EU Member States have taken to battle the problem
caused by high external debt. These different common initiatives have been vastly
studied before and are not the main focus of this study. The empirical segment of
this study focuses on the bilateral actions, in which these functions fall under mul-
tilateral cooperation. This chapter is concluded next with an analysis concerning
the differing development policies, which will give more insight to the meaning of
history as well as participation in these endeavors.
3.3.3 National Differences between EU Member States
National differences between the Member States concerning the characteristics of
external assistance are important since the differences among the EU–15 are quite
substantial. Until the 1960s, France and UK were the only donors, providing as-
sistance mainly to former colonies in Africa and Asia. During the 1960s, Germany
became more active and was driven mainly by political and commercial motivations.
Nordic countries got also involved but they were mainly motivated by non–material
reasons. During the 1980s and 1990s, France and UK changed their policies; France
normalized its relations with former colonies and Bretton Woods institutions, UK
changed focus from national interests to poverty eradication. Southern Member
States have become donors more recently. (Carbone, 2007a, pg. 58–59)
The differences in national histories between the EUMember States have resulted
in a situation where different characteristics have been emphasized in bilateral de-
velopment assistance or cooperation. The main characteristics concerning aid in
general are summarized in table 3.1 for the Big–3 countries and in table 3.2 for
other groups defined by Carbone (2007a). Eastern donors are included in the table,
but they are not included in data analysis.
The three largest donors belonging to the Big–3 group presented in more detail
are the most influential donors since their sums exceed those of other EU Member
States, in some cases even multiple times. Therefore their policies are of importance.
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Colonial heritage of France and UK have clearly influenced their policies, and close
ties with former colonies have not vanished. All three Big–3 countries seem to have
based their decisions on financial issues and the past, more so than on moral grounds,
for example.
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Table 3.1: Big–3: development assistance characteristics.
Term Definition
France Mainly driven by colonial past, closely linked to foreign
policy. Relations with Africa have included aid, trade,
military assistance and monetary collaboration. Supported
former Soviet countries after the Cold War ended, has
continued to support its former colonies. Introduced aid
suspension for countries violating human rights and
democracy. Lowest point in aid amounts was in 2001. Too
much emphasis on education and culture, too little on the
social sector. Main multilateral channel is the
EC.(Carbone, 2007a, pg. 41–43)
UK Maintained close relations with former Commonwealth
nations. Has used development co–operation as a platform
to support activism in international arena. Aid programme
influenced by the US during the Cold War. Reductions
were made in the 1980s and the 1990s. In the 1980s, was
first to use conditionality for aid. Development aid became
a central issue in the political agenda in the late 1990s
(when labor government elected). During the new
millennium it has untied aid, reallocated it to low–income
countries and made Africa its priority (once again). Past
years has been concerned over terrorism and international
security. Main multilateral channel has been the EC.
(Carbone, 2007a, pg. 43)
Germany No strong legacy of colonialism, never favored any specific
geographic area but supports middle–income countries.
Significant donor since the 1960s, used aid to rebuild its
image. Aid has been also driven by commercial reasons,
especially to sustain heavy industries. In 1990s, amounts
were reduced due to many things, such as high costs of its
re–unification and increased focus on Eastern Europe.
Tight fiscal situation has kept aid amounts below EU
average in the 2000s, but in 2006 amounts were increased.
Very high shares of total aid go to the EC. (Carbone,
2007a, pg. 45–46)
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Table 3.2: Northern, Southern and Eastern donors: development assistance charac-
teristics.
Group Characteristics
Northern donors Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands are the best
performers of development aid, in terms of quality and
quantity. Finland is a partial exception. Northern
countries have a longer tradition, which dates back to the
church missionaries. Became relevant donors in the 1960s.
Are not burdened by colonialism and support countries
based on needs. Take active part in global development
debates and cooperate with like–minded countries. They
all prefer cooperation with the UN for idealistic reasons;
for example, developing nations are included in the
decision–making processes. The Netherlands and Finland
support the efforts of the EC to coordinate development
policy at the EU level, Sweden and Denmark remain more
critical. (Carbone, 2007a, pg. 46)
Southern donors Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain do not have a long
tradition of development aid. All but Italy became donors
relatively late. Spain and Portugal were recipients until the
1970s and Greece until the 1980s, (explains low volumes).
Aid allocation has been driven by colonial heritage. Italy
started its program in the 1960s, and became a large donor
in the 1980s. Since the early 1990s, has reduced aid due to
internal political crisis. After 2006, has increased volume of
aid a bit. Spain has emphasized commercial and cultural
interests and its focus has been on Latin America. In 2004,
Spain changed its focus to Africa and poverty eradication.
This group donates large sums to multilaterals, aiming to
increase their own influence in the arena. Group supports
the EC in its efforts to coordinate development policy.
(Carbone, 2007a, pg. 46–47)
Eastern donors The Eastern group is different than the other donors.
Eastern Member States which have provided aid before the
collapse of the Soviet Union, are East Germany,
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. After the collapse, all
discontinued their aid and became recipients themselves.
Some have managed to restart foreign aid programs, like
Czech Republic and Hungary. Amounts are very small and
allocation has been motivated by geographic proximity.
Most concentrate on the former Soviet Union countries, the
Balkans, and some communist regions. Tend to use project
aid and sector–wide approaches rather than programme aid
or budget support. A significant amount of aid is tied, in
order to gain public and business support in return.
(Carbone, 2007a, pg. 41–47)
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The Southern, Northern and the Eastern donors do differ from the large donors
in the Big–3 group in many ways. Northern Member States have based their actions
on moral grounds more so than the large donors, starting from a early focus on
the missionary work. They prefer working together with the UN and other legiti-
mate actors and involve the developing nations more actively in decision–making.
Southern Member States have emphasized other issues than the Northern states,
but have suffered from financial problems which have debilitated them from giving
lots of aid. Eastern Member States are new to the donor field and aim to get benefits
from policy conditionality to support their own development as well.
Overall, the national differences in approaches to aid significantly matter in their
approaches to debt as well. I have not found any research which would characterize
EU national level differences in approaches to the debt issue, but it can be assumed
that most likely that the same overall characteristics would apply to some extent.
For example, countries supporting international institutions would support that they
keep on taking the leading role in the debt issue. Also, countries which base their
development aid decisions using moral grounds would support loan forgiveness over
lending. More concrete information is needed to form a better understanding of
the concrete practices and the fit between these characteristics and debt practices.
Before that data is analyzed, debt in the context of development policy framework
is discussed, which is followed up with the actual data analysis concerning debt
practices.
Part II
DEBT POLICY
Chapter 4
Debt in EU Development Policy
Framework
This chapter outlines where and how the issue of external debt of the developing
nations exists in the framework of EU development policy. The framework itself
includes many components, and the issue of debt is presented in them in different
forms. The five components of the development policy framework discussed here are
(1) European Consensus on Development, (2) UN’s Millennium Development Goals,
(3) Policy Coherence for Development, (4) Intervention areas, and (5) Geographical
partnerships. These five areas of the development policy framework include the
issues of external debt in different ways.
Part I of this study has included the theoretical perspectives influencing Euro-
pean debt policy, and the historical aspects relating to it. EU debt policy profile is
formed in this and the following chapter, which include part II of this study.
Figure 4.1: EU’s debt policy profile structure.
  DEBT PRACTICES 
   OF COUNTRY X 
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The content of debt policy and the relationship between the theoretical back-
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ground and history is presented in figure 4.1. The specific content of the practices in
the center of figure are presented in chapter five, the development policy framework
content is the topic of this chapter.
What then exactly is the European Union’s development policy framework? The
European Union’s development policy framework outlines and determines the prac-
tices possible for each country. Actual practices are also influenced by history,
mainly that of the country itself, but international relations matter as well. Each
EU–15 Member State has established relations with both, the multilateral organiza-
tions, and the ACPs. These relationships, between both groups, may form a highly
or moderately relevant part of each Member State’s debt policy and the relation-
ship can be either active or passive. The relevancy of the relationship between the
country and the ACPs in development cooperation is connected to colonial history.
Activity of multilateral cooperation on the other hand is not linked to any specific
events in history, but more so the traditions of each Member State. Voting powers of
course differ for the EU countries, which means that the power each EU–15 Member
State has in the multilateral organizations, is different1. (WB, 2009b) and (IMF
voting power, 2009)
Since development policy is a field of shared competence, the countries may
freely choose which regions and income groups they choose to finance, and how the
distribution between these different groups in total ODA has and will turn out. A lot
of similarities, but also some differences have occurred in this allocation over time,
which will be shown in detail in chapter five. Some EU–15 countries have not given
any loans to the developing nations. Some of these countries have given a lot of loans
in relation to grants, and one country has even given on average more loans than
grants during the time period 2000–2008. Most donors have in fact favored poorest
country groups in grant allocation and, in ratio, more aﬄuent country groups in
loan allocation, and some have practiced reverse policies. Debt policy part of this
study aims to describe the content of development policy framework and differences
and similarities between donors and donor groups in these debt practices (chapter
five). Figure 4.1 should be used in understanding the larger structure of debt policy
and factors contributing to each Member States’ practices. The content analysis
part starts with the European Consensus on Development.
4.1 European Consensus on Development
According to the EU, the European Consensus on Development is a joint policy
statement, which reflects its willingness to eradicate poverty and build a more stable
1EU donors have a varying amount of influence in multilateral organizations. Germany has the
most voting power in the World Bank as well as in the IMF, 4.49% in IBRD, 6.49% in IDA, and
5.99% in the IMF. UK has 4.31% in the IBRD, 5.17% in the IDA and 4.94% in the IMF. France
has 4.31% in the IBRD, but 4.14% in the IDA and as UK, 4.94% in the IMF. Smaller countries
have much less voting power and significance overall, than the three largest donors of the Big–3
countries. (WB, 2009b) and (IMF voting power, 2009)
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world (EC Consensus, 2009). The political meaning of the European Consensus on
Development is enormous, because it commits the whole Union (Member States and
the Community) to development policy. It provides the political orientation needed
to advance the agenda of the EU. The Consensus was signed by the highest level
representatives: presidents of the Council, the Commission and the Parliament in
2005. (Manservisi, 2009, pg. 7)
The adoption of the Consensus marked an important change in the role of the
EU. Several Member States criticized European Commission’s proposal to upgrade
the 2000 EC development policy statement into an actual development strategy.
Northern Member States and the UK opposed, since they wanted to maintain their
right to carry out their development policies autonomously, which is an interesting
point. DG Development initiated still a consultation process and presented their
proposal for a statement of the EU development policy. The proposal contained two
parts, one for the EC and one for the EU. Proposal for the EU also faced a lot of
criticism, more than the proposal for the EC. Major difference between the proposal
and the actual plan approved, was that a common thematic framework and action
plan proposed DG Development did not end up in the final version. Still for the
first time, the Member States had agreed on common values, principles, objectives
and methods to eradicate poverty, which is a very important step in its own right.
(Carbone, 2007a, pg. 55–56)
Consensus includes only three paragraphs which mention the issue of external
debt of the developing nations. The statements are presented next, and a brief con-
tent analysis is given.
EU has agreed to the following statements in the Consensus on Development:
”23. Further debt relief will be considered, as well as innovative sources of finance
in order to increase the resources available in a sustainable and predictable way.”
(EC Consensus, 2009, pg. 10)
In this paragraph the EU states that further debt relief will be considered. This
implicates that as it will be under consideration, there are factors influencing that
decision, what those are, is left unanswered. The mentioned innovative sources of
finance are vague and need more specification. Giving more loans, or better and
improved development assistance? Increasing resources might mean in fact giving
more loans, or more grants, which is also left unspecified.
”28. Debt reduction also provides predictable financing. The EU is committed to
finding solutions to unsustainable debt burdens, in particular the remaining multi-
lateral debts of HIPCs, and where necessary and appropriate, for countries affected
by exogenous shocks and for post–conflict countries.” (EC Consensus, 2009, pg. 11)
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In this paragraph the EU gives a clear statement that it is committed to seek-
ing solutions to unsustainable debt burdens. Also, the EU states that the HIPC
group is one of its main focuses regarding the debt issue. The countries that have
experienced exogenous shocks and live in post–conflict stage are especially taken
into account. Iraq’s loans from the EU have been forgiven for the most part and
also some countries that were badly damaged in the Tsunami of 20042. EU partic-
ulates in this document that countries, such as the above mentioned, are supported
more so than other nations in need of debt relief. Favoring countries on the basis
of exogenous shocks has been criticized not to be completely fair towards countries
which have been battling with debt–related problems, but have not experienced
large ”one–time” shocks. Favoring countries belonging to the HIPC group over
those which do not, indicates that reducing loans of the countries agreeing to the
political terms of the HIPC program are to be favored.
”117. Debt reduction, which is comparable to indirect budget support, with low
transaction costs and a tendency to promote coordination and harmonisation be-
tween donors, could where necessary and appropriate help countries to reduce their
vulnerability to external shocks.” (EC Consensus, 2009, pg. 33)
This paragraph links debt reduction to the ability of a developing nation to endure
external shocks. Shock resistance is highly important for all developing (and devel-
oped nations), and should be included in all development policy outlines and goals.
However, shock resistance is not the only benefit of debt reduction, which should
not be forgotten in this context. Reducing the amount of external debt through
forgiving loans can also improve a country’s ability to develop their society further,
free capital for investment purposes and create more lasting solutions for sustain-
able development. External shocks are a risk, but many highly indebted developing
nations have already other internal shocks to be prepared for, such as famine due to
drought, internal conflicts, etc., which would benefit from debt reduction as well.
Overall, the Consensus includes the issue of external debt, but not in a very
comprehensible manner and it is not emphasized. Next, the UN’s Millennium De-
velopment goals are discussed.
4.2 UN’s Millennium Development Goals
The European Union, along with most of the international community, adopted the
Millennium Declaration in 2000 and agreed in it to work together in order to secure
peace, security and to reduce poverty. The Millennium Declaration combines a set of
interconnected and mutually reinforcing development goals into the global agenda.
The main goal of the MDGs is to halve poverty by 2015. (UN MDG Report, 2009)
The Millennium Development Goals are: (1) Eradicate extreme poverty and
2Refer to OECD DAC (2010) for more specific country level information.
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hunger, (2) Achieve universal primary education, (3) Promote gender equality and
empower women, (4) Reduce child mortality, (5) Improve maternal health, (6) Com-
bat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, (7) Ensure environmental sustainability,
and (8) Develop a global partnership for development. (UN MDG Report, 2009)
Goal (8) ”develop a global partnership for development” is the goal which in-
cludes the sub–targets concerning the issue of debt. The goal in itself is rather vague
when compared to the other ones for example ”reduce child mortality” or ”achieve
universal primary education”. Measuring the progress in global partnership is be
more challenging than measuring the reducement of child mortality, or amount of
children receiving primary education. Also, the issue of external debt has been in-
dicated to be directly linked to many of these issues, not just ”global partnership”
and by reducing or cancelling debts it could be less challenging to reach other goals
as well.
Goal 8 and its sub–targets 13 and 15 include the following statements concern-
ing debt:
”Target 13: Address the special needs of the least developed countries (includes
tariff–and quota–free access for exports, enhanced program of debt relief for HIPC
and cancellation of official bilateral debt, and more generous ODA for countries
committed to poverty reduction)”. (WB, 2009)
The actual target 13 is rather unspecific in the actual statement, but more precise
in the explanation part. The mentioned special needs of the LDCs, the enhanced
HIPC program and the cancellation of official bilateral debt are good and (possibly
also concrete) actions needed to combat the problem. More generous ODA for coun-
tries committed to poverty reduction indicate that the countries which are willing to
commit themselves to political conditions and neoliberal policies of the World Bank
will be favored in ODA amounts. This is a contradictory statement considering the
goal under which this sub–goal exists. Global partnership is hard to reach if and
when strict political conditions are put forward. Also, the indication that countries
which agree to policy changes will be favored over others is also not a way to reach
global partnership, or at least it indicates that reaching global partnership will be
done on the North’s conditions.
”Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries
through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in
the long term.” (WB, 2009)
Target 15 is overall a bit more general than target 13’s explanations part, which
indicated conditions for actions. This target brings forward the issue of comprehen-
sibility and long–term sustainability, which have both been quite challenging in the
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past and are of course very important issues. First of all, dealing comprehensibly
with something refers that an actual policy is needed and that the issue itself would
be linked to all other issues it is affecting. Debt sustainability is a very important
issue to be mentioned as a long term goal, but again more concrete proposals for
solutions should be seeked. It is disappointing that the only concrete proposals
mentioned about this issue are in target 13 and have been presented in a way which
indicates policy conditioning.
According to the mid–term analysis of the UN about the MDGs, it has been
stated that the share of developing countries export earnings devoted to servicing
their external debt fell from 12.5 per cent (2000) to 6.6 per cent (2006). This is a
good development and of course allows the countries to allocate more resources to
poverty reduction. (UN Mid-Term Report, 2009, pg. 4)
EU evaluated its own progress regarding the MDGs in 2005 and concluded the
following further steps: (1) set new intermediate targets for growth in official aid
budgets by 2010 with a view to achieving the overall target of 0.7 per cent, (2) speed
up reforms to improve the quality of aid, (3) rethink the way that the EU, through
its policies, influences the conditions for development, and (4) ensure that Africa is
the number one beneficiary of these new approaches and seize new opportunities for
partnership between the two continents. (EU Legislation MDGs, 2009)
In 2010 it is clear that the all MDGs and their sub–targets are very hard to reach
mainly due to the unexpected recession starting in late 2008. In the Millennium
Summit (September 2010), USA’s President Obama concluded that global actors
need to alter their approach, if the Goals are to be met. If current behavior of the
countries continues, Obama concluded that some improvements are made, but some
of the goals will not be reached. (Helsingin Sanomat September 23rd, 2010)
The overall issue of MDGs and debt has been approached by Gunter et al.
(2009) in a recent article ”towards an MDG–consistent debt sustainability concept”.
They have provided empirical evidence of a robust relationship between achieving
the MDG’s and having greater capacity to bear debt. Their finding is that capac-
ity to bear debt is related to progress made in social development and also, that
the capacity to bear debt shows a significant positive relationship with social de-
velopment. Currently existing debt–related initiatives, like the MDRI, state that
countries cannot accumulate new debt even if their debt levels are below threshold
and still would remain sustainable. This has raised concerns over the fact that this
framework might lead to a ”low–debt, low–growth” situation. UN has proposed to
”redefine debt sustainability as the level of debt that allows the country to achieve
the MDGs and reach 2015 without an increase in debt–ratios”. UN has requested for
suggestions for a conception of debt sustainability which would be more consistent
with reaching the MDGs. As an overall solution, Gunter, Rahman and Shi (2009)
propose debt cancellation followed by development aid. But since this might not be
possible in many donor cases, it would be useful to provide more loans to countries
that are able to handle more debt. (Gunter et al., 2009, pg. 269–286)
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In terms of recent developments concerning the EU and the MDGs, the EU has
set up a new action plan for the reaching of the MDGs. After the UN summit on the
MDGs in September 2010, the EU declared that the speed for reaching the MDGs
is inadequate. In 2009, total ODA in the EU was 0.42% of GNI, far from the goal
set for 2010, which is 0.56%. In order to be able to reach 0.7% in 2015, as set in the
MDGs, the EU has set an action plan to speed up the process of reaching the MDGs.
Action plan includes the following:
”EU countries would be called upon to produce annual action plans indicating how
they will reach the 2015 targets, and to organize a yearly peer review. The member
countries and the Commission should work together even more closely in developing
countries to make EU aid more effective. All EU policies would be made coherent
for development – trade and finance, climate change, food security, migration and
security are all part of the fight against poverty. Targeted aid would focus on the
goals and countries where progress is slow, particularly fragile states. The EU would
develop further its partnerships with poor countries to combat climate change, rising
food prices and migration, and to achieve security and financial stability.”
Who would benefit and how?
Directly: hundreds of millions of people living in poverty, whose health and stan-
dard of living would be improved. Indirectly: everyone. The wellbeing of people in
developing countries benefits Europeans as well.”(EU Achieving the MDGs, 2010)
EU also states that the areas which have made the least progress so far have been
fragile states, and areas of Sub–Saharan Africa. Current food, oil and financial crisis
have scaled back development in many countries and risking the developments so
far. The goals which are the most ”off track” are child & maternal health, and
sanitation.
These statements from the EU and the action plan itself is certainly needed in
order to be able to reach the Goals set for 2015, and the added coherence called for
in the actual plan altogether is a good step in the long process of developing EU
development policy. In order for the action plan to succeed, a very concrete plan
is needed, where roles of both donors and recipients are determined3. Next, other
policy areas are discussed, starting from the Policy Coherence for Development.
4.3 Other Areas of Development Policy
Other documents within the development policy include Policy Coherence for Devel-
opment PCD, development policy intervention areas, and geographical partnerships.
3For example, what is the role between the ACPs and non–ACPs in the recipient end?
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The content and references to the question of debt are summarized here in order to
form a coherent overall perspective to how and where the issue of external debt ap-
pears in other EU development policy documents than the widely known Consensus
and the Millennium Development Goals.
Policy Coherence for Development
Policy Coherence for Development PCD gives a good example of how the issues
in development policy and other fields of EU policies are conceptualized. In 2005,
European Union agreed to apply the Policy Coherence for Development approach in
12 policy areas. These policy areas are thought of being able to accelerate progress
towards the Millennium Development Goals. It is self–evident here that the issue of
external debt or its management is not included as they are not official policies. Of-
ficial Policy Coherence areas include trade, environment & climate change, security,
agriculture, bilateral fisheries agreement, social policies (employment), migration,
research/innovation, information technologies and transport & energy. (EU PCD,
2009)
The official idea behind PCD is to find synergies between policies other than
development cooperation which have a strong impact on developing countries. The
idea has stemmed from the perception that development policy formed or practiced
in isolation will not bring sufficient results. The achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals depends not only on aid but also on the policies defined and
implemented by the EU and other international actors. Commitment towards policy
coherence is also embedded in the European Consensus for Development. (EU PCD,
2009)
As mentioned, policy coherence does not include the issue of external debt or
practices concerning loan allocation to the developing nations. However, as the
aim of policy coherence is to find issues which have a strong impact on developing
countries, practices in the field of finances could be included (trade is already on the
list). The argument here is not to say that the issue should be on the list (as it is
impossible since it is not an official policy), but simply to inform which items are on
it. The structure and perspective to the issues influencing development could also
be different.
Overall the question of policy coherence is difficult in the context of the EU
considering the question of external debt. Based on the Maastricht Treaty and the
formulation of PCD, the question of external debt should be included, whether or
not it is a part of these 12 policy areas or not. This is based on the fact that
in this context it can be understood as a question of coherence in EU’s internal
(development) policy. Next, the intervention areas are discussed.
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Intervention Areas
The European Consensus on Development discussed earlier includes two parts; (1)
EU common vision on development and (II) policy guiding the implementation of
this vision at the Community level. In the Consensus it was agreed that the Commu-
nity will be primarily active in nine different areas: (1) trade and regional integra-
tion, (2) environment, (3) infrastructure, communications and transport, (4) water,
(5) energy, (6) rural development, territorial planning, agriculture and food security,
(7) governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional
reforms (8) conflict prevention and fragile states, human development, and (9) social
cohesion and employment. Additional cross–cutting issues are (1) democracy, good
governance and human rights, (2) gender equality,(3) environmental sustainability,
and (4) fight against HIV/AIDS. (EU Debt Relief, 2010)
Area 7 includes debt relief as a part of the ”support for economic and institutional
reforms”. Within this intervention area only the HIPC Initiative and MDRI are
discussed. HIPC’s aim is to reduce external debt of the poorest and most indebted
developing nations to sustainable levels. So far (October 2010) 41 countries have
been involved, mostly from Africa. Since June 2008, 23 countries have completed
all stages of the procedure to qualify for debt relief, 10 have completed preliminary
stages (decision–point) and 8 have been identified as potentially eligible 4. The
HIPC Initiative is supplemented by the MDRI, countries qualifying for the HIPC
debt relief will also be granted 100% relief on eligible debt owed to all various
multilateral creditors, including African Development Bank, and Inter–American
Bank in addition to the World Bank and the IMF. (EU Debt Relief, 2010)
So far EU’s contribution to the HIPC has been substantial when asked from
the EU itself. More than 1.6 billion Euros have been pledged, of which 680 million
Euros has been given as relief in its own terms and 934 million Euros has been
donated to the HIPC trust fund. European Commission was the first multilateral
institution to provide debt relief beyond the HIPC terms, and reserved from the
European Development Fund EDF have been used for contribution to the HIPC. The
HIPC program has had some encouraging results for HIPC beneficiaries, including
reduction in debt and interest payments, increased spending on poverty reduction,
and better management of public finances. Challenges have included the securement
of full financing of the HIPC Initiative, dealing with litigation against the HIPCs
by some creditors, and ensuring long–term debt sustainability. Also, dealing with
exceptional cases, such as countries emerging from conflicts, has proven to be a
4Completion–point countries are Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guyana,
Ghana, The Gambia, Honduras, Mali, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua,
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
Interim countries are Afghanistan, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo,
DR Congo, Guinea, Guinea–Bissau, Haiti, Liberia and Togo. Pre–decision–point countries are
Comoros, Co˜te d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Kyrgyz Republic, Nepal, Somalia and Sudan. (EU HIPC Status
Report 2008, 2009)
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challenge. (EU Debt Relief, 2010) On another note, the HIPC program, although
highly spoken for in many EU statements, has also received criticism. For example
the previously presented study by Toivio (2006) has concluded that the influence and
success is controversial and inadequate in terms of being able to solve the problem
of high external debt.
EU’s debt relief focus has been heavily directed towards the HIPC countries.
In order to be eligible for debt relief via the HIPC Initiative, policy conditions (in
the form of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers), must be fulfilled. (Presbitero,
2009) The impact and influence of the HIPC and MDRI programs have been widely
discussed also in chapter two, and are not included in detail in this study. In the
next chapter the geographical partnerships between the EU and some regions of the
developing world are discussed.
Geographical Partnerships
The final item(s) in the development policy framework overview are the geographical
partnerships. European Union has tied geographical partnerships with the ACP
and OCT states (groups of former colonies and Overseas Countries and Territories).
Geographical partnerships are managed through individual and regional strategy
papers and progress is evaluated through annual country reviews. Separate regional
strategy papers include separate programs for Africa, Caribbean and Pacific regions
as well as for the OCTs. Geographical partnerships are a good concrete example
in addition to the EDF, of how the former colonies and currently still associated
countries have a better position in EU’s development cooperation.
Africa
EU’s current partnership with Africa includes the Lisbon declaration and the Joint–
Africa–EU Strategy action plan (outlined in 2008). The Africa–EU strategy provides
overarching long–term framework for Africa EU relations, and its first action plan
has specified concrete proposals for 2008–2010. It focuses on eight partnerships;
Peace and security, Democratic governance and human rights, Trade, regional in-
tegration and infrastructure, Millennium development goals (MDGs), Energy, Cli-
mate change, Migration, mobility, Employment and Science, Information Society
and Space. The main objectives of EU relation with Africa is to promote the achieve-
ment of UN MDGs in the region, which will be strengthened and complemented by
the specific objectives pursued within the Cotonou Agreement, for example. (EU
Geographical partnerships Africa 2010)
Caribbean
EU in general has close ties with the Caribbean States, of which 16 belong to the
ACP group and 15 of these have signed the Cotonou Agreement. Several EU Mem-
ber States still enjoy close ties with the region, which were formed during the colonial
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period. In its partnership with the Caribbean, EU seeks ”growth, stability and devel-
opment”. It aims to strengthen its political partnership, support regional integration
and help countries in responding to foreign competition, and help to address the re-
gion’s specific vulnerabilities. These include for example natural disasters and drug
trafficking. (EU Geographical partnerships Caribbean 2010)
Pacific
EU’s partnership with the Pacific countries include 15 ACP countries and 3 OCTs
in the Pacific region. The strategic aims of this partnership include strengthen-
ing of political dialogue, focus development cooperation on economic growth and
stability and to improve the effectiveness of aid delivery. The enhanced political di-
alogue established between the EU and the Pacific Islands in 2008 includes security
and governance, economic stability, growth and international trade, environment,
development cooperation (including progress towards MDGs), and fisheries. (EU
Geographical partnerships Pacific 2010)
OCTs
There are 20 overseas countries and territories linked to EU Member States (Den-
mark, the Netherlands, UK and France). OCT nationals are in principle EU citizens,
even though the OCTs are not part of the EU or directly subject to the laws of it.
The regions benefit from association arrangements, including economic and trade co-
operation, sustainable development, and regional cooperation and integration. (EU
Geographical partnerships OCTs 2010)
Financing for all strategic partnerships come from numerous sources, depending
on the region and use. EU has aimed to use already in–existence financial instru-
ments for the regional partnerships. European Development Fund EDF and Euro-
pean Investment Bank EIB are one of the main sources; finances are also derived
from private sector actors as well as civil society organizations, and international
organizations. Bilateral contributions from both Member States’ and recipient gov-
ernments are also used. Financing is provided both in the form of grants and loans.
(EU geographical partnerships Africa 2010)
Overall, the geographical partnership outlines do not directly name the issue of
high external debt as a focus area, but indirect references are made in two cases,
those of Africa and the Pacific, which both include the reference in the form of
progress towards the MDGs. The content of the more itemized country strategy
papers describe cooperation more specifically, but they are not in the scope of this
study due to limitations on length.
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Development Policy Framework and the Issue of Debt
The peculiar thing in the framework of development policy is how the issue of
external debt of the developing nations appears in the documents. Although it is
of high importance in terms of actual concrete development, it is given surprisingly
little emphasis. When it is discussed, it is not approached in a comprehensible
manner, i.e. debt appears often in a minor role within other issues, such as within
global partnership in the MDGs, not as one main problem field. It seems that it
is most often either directly surpassed or only partially included in the content.
The reasons for this incoherent and sporadic approach are not clear, but overall the
structure of the framework could be improved in many ways when looking at the
overall representation of this big problem in the policy. Literature presented earlier
and the history of the issue conclude that external debt has had and will have a
strong impact on development. Amount of external debt is one of the basic elements
in the equation to produce development and the consequences of unsustainable debt
amounts have been seen in the 1980s, and in some ways in the crisis starting in 2008
as well. Yet, the issue itself remains to be kept within the structure of development
policy framework but not lifted up as one main area. Next, the actual debt practices
of the EU Member States are presented and analyzed. Data included will make
the role of debt practices explicit in relation to grant aid and overall development
policy framework. The aim of the next chapter is to objectively compare national
differences between EU–15 donors.
Chapter 5
EU–15’s Debt Practices
This chapter presents the quantitative data of the debt practices in three different
parts; (1) ODA evolution, (2) Loans, grants and debt relief by Region and Income,
and (3) Grant – Loan Index, where national level orientation of ODA is measured.
Composition of data and reasons for its selection were presented in chapter one,
figure 1.3. Debt practices are defined for the EU–15 countries, since the remaining
12 Member States are not OECD DAC members and have not had debt practices.
Although the focus of practices is limited to the EU–15, the importance of the lack
of actions of the EU–12 is included in conclusive analysis where the overall debt
policy of the EU is analyzed.
Most data has been collected from the OECD DAC statistics portal in April
2010, with the exception of the ACP data collected in October 2010 when it became
available (all data which was compared was gathered on the same day to avoid any
problems concerning comparability in terms of exchange rates, although the ACP
data was collected later since it became available in the fall of 2010.)1. The groups
included in data by region are Europe, Africa, America, Asia, Oceania and separate
”Unspecified” group. Groups by income are the LDC (Least Developed Countries),
LIC (Low–Income Countries, aka OLIC in current OECD statistics 2010, meaning
other Low–Income Countries), LMIC (Low–Middle Income), UMIC (Upper Middle–
Income), MADCT (ex–developing countries), and separate ”Unallocated by Income”
groups2 (OECD Glossary, 2009).
Since the given grant and loans sums under focus here differ substantially be-
tween the donors, the data overview starts with presenting the actual sums of grants,
1Access to data on OECD DAC statistics portal, first select theme: development, select: ag-
gregate development statistics, after which three types of statistics are available; ODA by donor,
ODA by Recipient and ODA by Sector, which all have been used in this study.
2The sixth group included in both by region and income data comprise of funds not directly
beneficial to any recipient, such as administrative costs, and research performed in donor countries
for the benefit of the developing countries. Unallocated aid has risen in the past years and caused
concern for the efficiency of aid in general. (Nunnenkamp et al., 2004, pg. 15) Unallocated data is
included in group comparisons, although often it is simply left out of country comparisons. Here it
is included since it is important to acknowledge the size of the shares going to ”indirect aid” (and
changes in it).
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loans and debt relief from the EU–15 Member States. Data by region and income is
presented in percentages by each group, but the differences in sums should be kept
in mind as the policies of countries with large quantities of aid matter more.
5.1 ODA Evolution
ODA evolution chapter includes general level analysis of ODA by Type and ODA
by Sector data during the time period 1960–2008 (ODA Type), and 1967–2008
(ODA Sector). Sector data is not available until the year 1967. These two data
types include same data, but in different forms. Both of these data types help
in understanding how the ODA structure has changed both in content and in the
emphasis of the practices. ODA by Type and Sector data will describe the larger
evolution of the debt practices in the context of the entire ODA structure.
ODA by Type
ODA by type data summarizes the decades when different new types of loans have
been reported in OECD DAC statistics. Figure 5.1 includes summary of the new
data types, the decade of their emergence and a brief description of the content of
each ODA type.
Data shows that new types of loans have emerged in statistics (reporting) mainly
during the 1960s and 1990s, and some in the 1970s. The 1980s and the 2000s have
been slower in terms of new types of loan activities. The 1980s are also known as the
lost decade of development, so the lack of new loan types is not surprising. During
the 2000s old, already in existence types have been allocated more funds, such as
debt relief. Figure 5.1 also lists the types of ODA as they are reported in the actual
OECD DAC system. As can be seen, there are a large number of the different kinds
of ODA types somehow involved with the issue of debt. This both emphasizes and
concretely indicates how big of a portion of ODA is about loans or debt relief in one
way or another. For the entire structure of the ODA by Type data, refer to (OECD
DAC, 2010).
Since the 1960s, reported debt practices have included debt forgiveness (and debt
relief grants in it), non–grant bilateral ODA, rescheduling, other lending, bilateral
interest received, offsetting forgiven interest, and funds allocated to IDA, regional
development banks and concessional lending. During this time lending consisted of
basic practices. In the 1970s food aid loans, loans included in Associated Financing
packages and multilateral interest received were added to the lists. In the 1980s no
new types of loan related ODA were invented, or at least not reported in the DAC
statistics. In the 1990s (mainly the year 1995) many new types emerged and some of
the previous groups became main groups under which these new types were labeled
under. Debt forgiveness got ODA, OOF and private claims, as well as grants for
debt service reduction. Other action on debt was formed, which included service
payments, debt conversions, buybacks and other debts. Loans by government, ODA
74
Figure 5.1: ODA types and decade of appearance in EU Development assistance.
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claims, OOF claims, offsetting debt organization were labeled under non–grant bi-
lateral ODA. And finally, the HIPC was included in statistics. In the 2000s the only
addition has been a memo of IDA Debt Reduction Facility funds.
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Overall a move from ”basic practices” of the 1960s and 1970s to more complex
system of the 1990s is easily observable according to this data due to the increasing
amount of practices labeled under previously existing data types. The enthusiasm to
develop the loan system more in the 1990s is most likely linked to the establishment
of the EU in 1995 (when most of the new types emerged, also the year when EU was
established). Other possible reason is the enlargement during the same year. Due
to restrictions on length, the differences between EU Member States in terms of new
loan types in ODA is not examined here in depth, but it is recognized as an important
and interesting field to be explored. Next, ODA by sector data is presented, where
more detailed information is given concerning the share of loan related practices in
ODA of the EU Member States, by donor groups and by individual donor countries.
ODA by Sector
ODA by sector data includes 12 different sectors of ODA. Sectors are: I. Social
Infrastructure & Services, II. Economic infrastructure and Services, III. Production
Sectors, IV. Multisector / Cross–Cutting, V. Total sector allocable (I+II+III+IV),
VI. Commodity aid and general program assistance, VII. Action Relating to Debt,
VIII. Humanitarian Aid, IX. Administrative costs of donors. X. Support to NGO’s,
XI. Refugees in Donor Countries and XII. Unallocated/Unspecified (OECD DAC,
2010).
Figure 5.2: Sector VII means for the three donor groups.
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The focus here is on sector VII’s ”Action relating to Debt” development for the
three donor groups in percentage shares. This sector includes all actions relating
to debt: debt forgiveness, debt conversions, swaps, buy–backs, rescheduling and
refinancing.
Sector VII mean shares in ODA are presented in figure 5.2, individual country
shares for each donor group are presented in figure 5.3. As can be seen from data
concerning sector VII’s mean shares in ODA for the three donor groups, there are
differences between the donor groups.
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Since means can often hide relevant information, the actual shares of sector VII
in ODA of each EU–15 country are presented. From this general comparison it can
be seen that SDs have had higher shares during the late 1960s as well as early 1990s.
Share of sector has been surprisingly low during the 1980s. Northern donors have
had the lowest shares on average during this time period (except in 1978).
Figure 5.3: Sector VII shares in ODA for the three donor groups (1967–2008).
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Figure 5.3 shows well what kind of variation is hidden behind mean calculations.
Southern donors have in reality much higher percentages of sector VII in ODA
(Greece has not given any loans, which affected mean data results). What is also
interesting here between the groups is the high variation of the shares of the SD
group in both actual percentages and between time periods. Big–3 group on the
other hand has had much less variation between the donors. Still it should be noted
that the shares of Sector VII have grown for the Big–3 group during the 1990s and
2000s, and especially for the SD group (Austria and Italy had high percentages early
on in the 1960s). Similar development has not happened for the Northern donors,
except for Belgium. Interesting is also the low activity on the sector during the
1980s for all three groups, and the increased activity in the 2000s. The growth of
sector VII on total ODA in shares is an indication that debt–related practices are
an active component in development cooperation.
5.2 Debt Practices
Loans, grants and debt relief given by the EU Member States to the developing
nations is presented here in the following order: (1) Grants, loans and debt relief
in sums, followed with by region data and by income data,(2) ACPs vs. non–ACPs
in terms of given grants, loans and debt relief, (3) EU versus multilaterals in given
grants, loans and debt relief.
5.2.1 Grants, Loans and Debt Relief
This chapter includes grants, loans and debt relief. Grants are included to provide
a good backdrop to which loans and debt relief are to be compared to.
GRANTS
Grants to the developing nations have been reported in OECD DAC statistics since
the year 1960. Figure 5.4 shows the sums given by each EU Member State. As can
be seen from the data, the differences in sums for the donor groups are substantial.
What is also evident and important, is that countries within groups appear to have
been acting in a similar manner.
Grant sums of the Big–3 countries have developed similarly, except during the
1990s when France and Germany gave more than the UK. Sums have increased
steadily since the 1960s, except for France and Germany during the latter half of
the 1990s and late 2000s for the UK and France. Grant sums from the Northern
donors have also steadily increased during the time period. Netherlands, Sweden
and Denmark have given the most aid in sums out of the group. It is clear from
figure 5.4 that the Northern countries have gotten a later start in their grants than
the Big–3. Grant sums from the SDs are smaller when compared to the Big–3
countries. Like the NDs, the Southern donors have gotten a later start to grants,
78
Figure 5.4: Grants to the developing nations in sums
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even later than the Northern countries. Italy has given larger sums in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, but others started as late as early 1990s. Reasons for this have
been overviewed in table 3.2. As the new millennium has approached, a all EU–
15 countries have acted as donors. Overall when comparing the grant sums of the
donors, it is noticed that (1) the timing for the start of giving grants is different for
the donor groups, (2) there are differences between the stability of given sums, and
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(3) countries in each donor group indicate similar developments in their grant sums
during different times than the other countries in that same group.
Grants by Region
Grants by region data presented in figure 5.5 shows the differences between the
donor groups in the allocation of grants to the developing nations by regions.
Figure 5.5: Grants by region from the three donor groups.
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All groups share the overall increase in the percentage allocated to the Unspec-
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ified group. All groups have also given most aid throughout the time period to
Africa. Least grants have been allocated to Oceania. Big–3 group has been fairly
stable in its allocation and no large shifts have occurred, except for the rise in the
shares allocated to the unspecified group and the slight decrease in grants going to
Africa and Oceania. Northern donors have varied a bit more, Africa’s share has risen
during the early phases of ODA. Asia’s share has decreased significantly towards the
2000s, America’s share has also decreased, but not as much as Asia’s share. Oppos-
ing developments have occurred in the cases of America (share of grants from the
NDs decreased, share of grants from the SDs increased during the time period), and
in the case of Africa (rapid decline in shares of grants from the SDs and the Big–3
during the 1960s, sharp increase in grants from the NDs during the same time).
Also, Europe’s share of grants is much higher from the Southern group than the
other two donor groups. Looking at the main differences in the data concerning the
2000s, it is clear that America’s role as a recipient of grants from the NDs and the
Big–3 has decreased, but the Southern donors have allocated nearly as much to it
as Africa. Southern donors overall show the most variation. Interestingly, Africa,
America, Asia, Europe and the Unspecified groups are coming together in their
share in the 2000s. While the two other groups indicate clear preferences towards
some groups, such as Africa in the case of the Big–3 and the NDs, no such prefer-
ence appears in the case of the Southern countries, or at least the differences among
group shares are smaller. Policies towards grant allocation therefore seems to be
more equal in the case of the Southern donors, while the Big–3 prefer Africa and
Asia, and the Northern donors prefer Africa as well. This might be because of the
lower grant sums, fairly short history of giving grants, and simply that there hasn’t
been enough time to form traditions concerning grant allocation. Low finances are
also a possible cause for variation between annual sums.
Grants by Income
Grants by income data in figure 5.6 indicates which income groups have received
the most grants from each of the three donor groups. Again, similar developments
can be seen in this data than in the two previous data sets. The Big–3 group has
shown stable policy throughout the time period; main focus of grants has clearly
been the LMIC group, while other five groups have received much lower shares. Like
the Big–3, the Northern donors have also preferred one group, but that group has
been the LDC group, not the LMIC. This is a relevant difference in policy between
the donors, which is somewhat expected based on the characteristics of development
assistance.
The share of grants going to the LDCs have also decreased significantly during
the time period, and in the 2000s the Northern donors have allocated same shares to
the LDCs and the unallocated group. The Southern donors have again had the most
variation between groups, and there is no clear policy pattern emerging from the
data. Like in the case of the two other donor groups, grants going to the LDC group
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Figure 5.6: Grants by income from the three donor groups.
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have decreased for the SDs as well since the 1980s. This development is somewhat
unexpected as the role of the least developed/poorest developing nations has been
emphasized both in EU documents and in global development discourse. What is
expected however is the low share of grants allocated to the MADCT group from
all three donor groups3.
3MADCT countries are former developing countries
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LOANS
Loans to the developing nations have also been reported in OECD DAC statistics
since the 1960s. Loan sums for each donor are presented by group in figure 5.7.
Germany and France have had a surprisingly similar development concerning loans
sums. Surprising is UK’s role in the 1980s and 1990s, when it has loaned significantly
smaller sums, near to zero level, despite the fact that in the 1960s and 1970s countries
indicated similar policies, and again in the 2000s when UK’s sums have increased.
Sums of the Northern donors are significantly smaller, largest sums have been loaned
by the Netherlands and Denmark during the 1980s. The overall timing of loans is
rather different than those of the Big–3’s, peak time period for the Northern donor
group was the late 1970s to early 1990s. Loans from France and Germany increased
heavily during the entire 1980s and again in the early 2000s when also UK has given
larger sums. Sums loaned by the Southern donors are mainly from Italy and Spain.
What is surprising here is that the sums of loans have in fact increased after the
debt crisis. Peak time for loans was early 1990s, a decade after the debt crisis. The
given sums also vary more than for the other donor groups.
Overall when comparing the sums of loans by the three groups the main differ-
ences concern (1) the timing of given loan sums, and (2) the differing reactions after
the debt crisis. Peak timing for loans for the Big–3 was in early 1990s and again in
the 2000s, for the NDs it was during late 1970s to early 1990s and for the Southern
donors the late 1980s and early 1990s. As the Northern donors have reduced their
already small sums given in the 1980s, the Southern donors have in fact increased
theirs after the debt crisis. Big–3 group donors France and Germany have also de-
creased their shares, but UK has increased its sums in the 2000s, approaching the
sums of France and Germany. What is also notable in the data is that the decreas-
ing of the sums, by the Big–3 for example has happened mainly in the 1990s, fairly
late after the beginning of the debt crisis. In the late 2000s, France, Germany, UK,
Spain have increased their loans sums, surpassing the annual sums given before the
debt crisis.
The relative impact of the differing policies between the donor groups should be
analyzed while keeping the large differences of sums in mind, i.e. good policies of
the NDs do not really matter if the sums given by them are many times smaller
than those of the two other groups.
Loans by Region
Loans by region data for the three donor groups is presented in figure 5.8. This data
indicates some similar developments previously seen in the grants by region data,
for example concerning the role of America.
Overall the three donor groups appear of having largely differing histories of
allocating loans to the developing nations. Big–3 countries appear to have been
practicing a common policy, where mainly loans have been allocated to Asia and
83
Figure 5.7: Loans to the developing nations in sums
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Africa, while the other three groups and the unspecified group have gotten much less,
America and Europe about both 10%, unspecified and Oceania near 0%. Northern
donors on the other hand have varied more in their loan share allocation. Clearly
most loans have gone throughout the time period to Asia, Africa coming in second,
but with much lower shares. America was given almost as much loans in the 1960s,
but the shares have lowered during all decades, stabilizing to about 10% in the
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1990s and the 2000s. NDs also prefer Asia and Africa as the main recipients of
loans, but the differences between these groups are larger than in the case of the
Big–3. Southern donors on the other hand have had the most variation in their
loan shares. Africa has been the main recipient of loans. As in the case of grants
to America, also loan shares from the SDs to America have increased during the
1970s and the 1980s. While the Big–3 and the NDs have allocated very little loans
to America, SDs still give about one–fourth of its loans in the 2000s to that region.
All groups have allocated the least loans to Oceania. Largest allocation to the
unspecified group in the 2000s has been given by the NDs.
Overall the most important differences among groups in terms of loan allocation
is that the Big–3 seem to have been practicing a set policy during the entire time
period, or at least their shares have changed the least. NDs have clearly reacted to
happenings in the debt field, for example by lowering America’s share of loans and
by favoring Asia in its loan allocation. SDs have practiced a widely varying policy,
where shares have changed significantly and not to a favorable direction. In order
to find out more specifically to which income groups these loans have been given to,
data by income is presented next.
Loans by Income
Loans by income data shows which income groups have received loans from each
donor group. Loans by income data reveals that all three donor groups have similar
policies concerning loan allocation, but some differences do occur. All three groups
have allocated most loans throughout the time period to the LMIC group. Share
of loans going to the LMIC have increased steadily since the 1960s. Based on
previously presented knowledge concerning how loans function (successfully), this
policy is useful. The Big–3 countries have given similar, much lower sums to other
groups, with very little variation. The NDs have had more variation than the Big–3
group, but not as much as, again, the SDs. In the 2000s, the groups receiving the
second and third most loans were the LICs and the UMICs from the Big–3, the
LDCs and the LICs from the NDs, and the LDCs and UMICs from the SDs.
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Figure 5.8: Loans by region from the three donor groups.
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Figure 5.9: Loans by income from the three donor groups.
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The most important similarities in the loans by income data is that all groups
have allocated the largest shares of loans to the same income group. Variation has
again been the highest in the case of the SD group. One important difference is the
larger share of loans allocated to the LDCs by the SDs especially during the 1980s
when nearly 40% of loans were given to the poorest developing nations by the SDs.
DEBT RELIEF
Debt relief has been reported in OECD DAC since the year 1988, approximately
five years after the beginning of the debt crisis. On the basis of data in figure 5.10
it is observable that the largest sums have been given in the 2000s.
Interestingly, although debt relief started in 1988, sums have been multiple times
larger in the 2000s for all donors. Debt relief sums should also be scaled to loan
sums presented before, i.e. how much has been lent affects those sums which can
overall be forgiven (for example Northern donors versus the Big–3). Ireland and
Luxembourg have not given debt relief at all, but also not loans either. Southern
Donors started giving debt relief three to five years later than other donors, as late
as mid–1990s (with the exception of Greece). Large annual sums in 2005 are mostly
due to the Tsunami of December 2004; and loan forgiveness for Iraq during the Iraq
War (in 2005 and 2006).
Since debt relief is already included in the grant statistics, the shares going to
different regions and income groups are presented here in table format. The data
includes mean debt relief for 1980s, 1990s and 2000s4. Debt relief data by region and
income is presented in means and using the Coefficient of Variation (CV=[standard
deviation/mean]*100). This gives a percentage sum, indicating how big the variation
of each donor group’s debt relief. For example, if CV is 300%, variation is three
times as large as the mean, indicating very strong differences in annual data. If
CV is about 20%, it would be an indication that the variation is very low, i.e.
policy concerning allocation of funds would in that case be fairly stable. In the
data concerning region, it is clearly seen which regions did not receive debt relief
at all (means=0, and CV=0), these regions were Europe, America, Unspecified and
Oceania in the 1980s. Main recipients of debt relief were Africa and Asia, and mainly
by the Big–3 and the ND groups. During the 1990s, activity rose for all groups. All
groups got the highest means in the 2000s, during which more debt relief has been
given, as was seen in figure 5.10. The coefficient variation measure for the data
indicates that during the 1980s NDs and the SDs had the lowest variation, while
the Big–3 had most fluctuation. During the 1990s the NDs had the lowest CV
in general, while the SDs and the Big–3 fluctuated more. During the 2000s less
variation occurred in all groups when compared to the 1990s. This might be an
indication of that debt relief practices have stabilized. It is also noted from data
4The 1980s data of course includes only the years 1988 and 1989, so it should be taken into
consideration that the means and Coefficient of Variation have been calculated for only two years
in that case.
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Figure 5.10: Debt relief to the developing nations in sums.
1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Mill USD
France
Germany
UK
(a) Big–3
1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Mill USD
Netherl
Belgium
Finland
Sweden
Ireland
Luxembo
Denmark
(b) Northern donors
1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Mill USD
Austria
Greece
Portugal
Italy
Spain
(c) Southern donors
that groups receiving low means also often have high CV, this is an indication that
country groups receiving little debt relief should be prepared that it is not allocated
as stable as for regions receiving lots of aid with low CV, such as Africa in the 1990s
for the SDs (mean 220 millions of USD, CV 71%), and Oceania in the 2000s (mean
2.72 millions of USD, CV 300%).
Debt relief by income data revels similar results. What is particularly worth
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Table 5.1: Debt relief by region, donor groups.
Group Measure Europe Africa America Asia Oceania Unspec
Big–3
1988–1989 Mean 0 90.16 0 7.50 0.01 0
CV 0 137.11 0 141.42 141.42 0
1990–1999 Mean 14.69 614.83 97.00 28.01 0.10 0
CV 275.78 67.95 138.05 84.55 340.90 0
2000–2008 Mean 195.62 2939.85 89.16 1311.79 0.03 1.27
CV 161.80 90.25 125.61 112.49 265.96 300.0
Northern
1988–1989 Mean 0 72.53 0 1.75 0 0
CV 0 1.59 0 51.46 0 0
1990–1999 Mean 3.31 88.97 52.19 43.33 0 13.64
CV 197.06 39.44 70.42 107.64 0 168.03
2000–2008 Mean 18.57 466.56 11.87 132.12 0 4.08
CV 177.63 81.03 103.86 130.83 0 198.74
Southern
1988–1989 Mean 0 0.49 0 0 0 0
CV 0 80.81 0 0 0 0
1990–1999 Mean 0.10 220.63 23.71 6.22 0 0.69
CV 316.23 71.47 166.88 191.09 0 276.74
2000–2008 Mean 40.72 663.11 160.93 614.02 2.72 0.20
CV 153.04 71.47 90.67 126.16 300.00 197.35
Table 5.2: Debt relief by income, donor groups.
Group Measure LDC LIC LMIC UMIC MADCT Unalloc
Big–3
1988–1999 Mean 82.70 8.76 3.86 0.94 0 1.42
CV 141.42 141.42 141.42 141.42 0.00 133.43
1990–1999 Mean 324.39 130.19 280.82 10.48 0.33 8.42
CV 59.52 144.31 97.25 234.90 316.23 315.86
2000–2008 Mean 853.31 1473.49 1964.49 245.08 0 1.35
CV 96.20 170.58 93.60 133.97 0 280.81
Northern
1988–1989 Mean 45.58 54.04 0.38 0 0 0
CV 2.10 0.79 141.42 0 0 0
1990–1999 Mean 19.97 42.81 29.24 3.14 0 4.85
CV 39.10 31.50 53.43 89.23 0 163.07
2000–2008 Mean 17.27 53.52 26.81 2.29 0 0.11
CV 59.89 27.68 70.81 162.88 0 300.0
Southern
1988–1989 Mean 0.49 0 0 0 0 0
CV 80.81 0 0 0 0 0
1990–1999 Mean 176.47 17.85 52.11 4.13 0.10 0.69
CV 85.13 159.88 148.77 215.63 316.23 276.74
2000–2008 Mean 317.27 214.84 908.11 41.28 0 0.20
CV 92.65 148.41 92.70 171.75 0 197.35
noticing here is for example the allocation of debt relief to the LDC, LIC, LMIC
and UMIC, which all have the same CV value in the 1980s. This may appear a be
mistake in data, but it is in fact not. This indicates that some regular policy and
a a clear pattern did exist during that time. Otherwise, the data reveals that CV
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values during the 1980s were highest for the Big–3, and lowest for the SD as they did
not give much debt relief during that time. During the 1990s highest CV values are
gotten by the SDs. During the 2000s, donor groups receive similar CV values, but
Northern donors have the least variation in allocation to all income groups, except
in the case of unallocated group.
Next, the differences between ACPs and non–ACPs are compared in terms of loans,
grants and debt relief. The special role of ACPs in EU development policy history
has been discussed in this study, and the aim of the next chapter it to describe how
this special role is seen in the statistics.
5.2.2 ACPs vs. non–ACPs
The role of the ACPs and the non–ACPs has been special in EU development policy
throughout the time period it has existed. Here, the role of the two groups is
compared in terms of differences in the given grant, loan and debt relief shares. For
the debt policy to be ”mathematically equal”, the sizes of the country groups are to
be compared. (Note here that it is widely known that mathematically equal policy
in EU politics is not possible or even desirable, but for the sake of argument the
groups are compared in these terms.) Since the ACP group includes 71 countries5,
and the non–ACP includes 100 countries, the non–ACPs are approximately 60% of
the total group ([100/171]*100=58.5%).
Figure 5.11 shows the shares of allocated loans and grants to the non–ACPs.
The 60% line is drawn to the diagram to indicate where the values should be in
order for the policy to be ”equal”.
Grant shares to the non–ACPs have in fact been approx. 60% since mid–1960s to
2000s. In the first years share was over 80% and again in the late 2000s it was about
70%, but the general level has been at about 60%. Loan shares to the non–ACP
group on the other hand have varied between 100% in 1960 to 80% in the 1960s and
1970s to about 60% in late 1980s, and again nearly 90% in the 2008. According to
this data, more loans have been allocated to the group than should be considering
the size of two groups and if these groups were to be treated as equals.
Share of debt relief to the non–ACPs and ACPs presented in figure 5.12 has
5This data includes those 71 states the OECD names as ACPs in their data. In the EU ACP
information page there are overall 79 ACPs named. Countries included in the data are: Angola,
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Rep., Chad,
Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea–Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome &
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda,
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts–Nevis, St. Lucia, St.Vincent & Grenadines, Trinidad
and Tobago, Guyana, Suriname, Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands,
Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. (OECD DAC Statistics portal)
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Figure 5.11: Loans and grants to the non–ACPs.
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varied significantly. In the late 1980s over 90% went to the ACPs, and very little
to the non–ACPs. The development, or ”coming together” of the shares going to
the groups in 1988–1996 is very interesting. Despite differing group sizes, only on
three occasions has the level of debt relief for non–ACPs exceeded the ACPs; in 1997
at 63%, in 2001 at 55%, and in 2008 at 75%. Data indicates that the ACPs have
gotten more debt relief than they should have based on their group size. However,
this might be due to the fact that more loans have been given to this group as well.
Next, the practices of the EU countries are compared to those of the multilaterals.
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5.2.3 EU vs. Multilaterals
The main focus of this study is on the differences between Member States in giv-
ing different kinds of ODA. It is however also important to know how the EU–15
countries as one compare to the multilateral organizations. The data presented here
includes the OECD DAC EU Member States and 28 multilaterals. Since EU Mem-
ber states also fund the multilaterals through the ODA system, the presented data
is partially overlapping. Multilaterals include also EU institutions and the Council
of Europe. Other organizations included are AfDB, AfDF, AsDF, CarDB, Council
of Europe, EBRD, EU Institutions, GAVI, GEF, Global Fund, IBRD, IDA, IDA
Sp.Fund, IFAD, IFC, IMF, IMF Trust Fund, Montreal Protocol, Nordic Develop-
ment Fund, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNECE, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNTA, WFP
and Arab Agencies.
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Figure 5.13: EU versus multilaterals: grants, loans and debt relief sums.
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Given grant sums for the two groups are highly similar, EU Member States have
given combined a bit more (except in 2006) and both sums have increased towards
the 2000s. Sums have been similar particularly during the earliest time period under
focus, the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.
Loans from the EU Member States and the Multilaterals are quite interesting.
Initially EU gave more loans than the multilaterals, but this changed already in
early 1970s. Since then up until early 1990s, sums have increased for both. In 1992
loans from the EU started decreasing but the multilaterals’ loans kept increasing.
Loans sums have increased again in the late 2000s for the EU Member States as
well. Year 1992 marks an important policy shift in loans practices. The cause of
this policy shift should be further explored.
The data concerning the relationship of debt relief given by the EU Member
States and the multilaterals reveals a dramatic difference in volumes of debt relief.
This is however expected as the multilaterals do not mainly give debt relief. When
a country gives debt relief for example within the HIPC initiative that debt relief
appears in the bilateral statistics, not as multilateral debt relief. In these terms the
data used does give a slightly wrong impression of the involvement of the multilat-
erals in debt relief initiatives, which has been brought up in previous chapters.
The final part of this study applies partially the data presented in the previous
parts of this chapter to measure the current orientation of ODA of each EU–15
Member State.
5.3 Grant–Loan Index
The Grant–Loan Index developed here is an example of a possible use of the data
examined in this study. It is developed to test how the data used can be applied to
gain more concrete knowledge of the characteristics of each Member State in terms
of their ODA structure. The Grant – Loan Index aims to portray the differences
among EU Member States between ODA practices in a concrete manner, focusing
on the division between loan aid and grant aid. Results of the comparison are
compared to the EU Member State division by Carbone (2007a) and they will also
be presented using Chernoff (1973) method of visualizing data with faces.
Data used is obtained from OECD DAC statistics portal, as mentioned, and will
include ODA grants and ODA loans from the years 2000–2008. This time period
was chosen for different reasons; first of all, the data is current and therefore relevant
”today”. The time period is long enough to do some meaningful comparison between
Member States, and all Member States included have been EU Members for several
years before the year 2000 (at least 5 years). Also, the 2000s are considered of being
a separate time period in EU development policy during which several important
agreements have been signed, including the Cotonou agreement in 2000, the MDGs
in 2000 and the Consensus in 2005, see for example (Carbone, 2008, pg. 58) or (van
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Reisen, 2007, pg. 56–58).
5.3.1 Idea
My idea to develop and use an Index for this data started with a notion that there is
a large amount of data available concerning the issue and finding the most relevant
points, similarities and/or disparities, is quite a challenge to anyone who is not
familiar with the data beforehand. The index formed here is merely one way of
approaching the issue and comparing the countries to each other. The spirit of debt
practices data analysis has been hypothesis generating; therefore this Index is to be
interpreted as one example of the use of this data to form a new approach to looking
at the behavior of the EU Member States.
The results of the Index are compared to Carbone’s (2007a) group division.
However, the variables used in this index are entirely different from those used by
Carbone. Carbone’s data concerned mainly the quality of ODA, this comparison
will concern mostly the structure of ODA. Carbone’s study yielded the model which
included three different donor groups to which the EU Member States were divided
to; the Big–3, Northern and Southern donors. Each of these groups had different
typical characteristics Carbone had concluded on the basis of the data he used.
Carbone concludes the Northern donors as being the best performers of development
assistance in terms of both, quality and quantity. They have a strong tradition of
church missionary work and are mainly motivated and driven by idealistic reasons.
(Carbone, 2007a, pg. 46) SDs have not had a far–reaching tradition of development
cooperation, and all but Italy have become donors relatively late. Aid allocation
has been driven by colonial heritage. In many cases internal political crises have
reduced aid. France and UK have both maintained close relations with their colonies,
but Germany has not favored any geographic area over others. All have acted as
significant donors, in Germany’s case aid has been driven by commercial reasons as
well. France has suspended aid for human right’s violations, and UK was the first
to use conditionality to aid. (Carbone, 2007a, pg. 41–47)
In this comparison, Northern donors are hypothesized to be mainly grant oriented
in their practices since they’ve had a strong moral element in aid since its beginning.
Northern donors’ development aid history as church missionaries speaks for favoring
grant–type forms of assistance. They are also the best performers in aid (quality
and quantity) according to Carbone, which is important here. The Big–3 group is
hypothesized as being both ”loan and grant oriented”. This is based on the fact
that they all have given high volumes of aid, but also have had stronger commercial
components in it (for example Germany). High shares of aid have gone through the
EC, so readiness for multilateral cooperation and loans as well do exist. They also
have both extensive colonial histories (including far–reaching traditions of giving
loans), and also substantial financial means available for different kinds of ODA.
Southern donors are hypothesized to be mostly loan oriented in their practices as
some of them have had strong colonial legacies and tradition of giving loans from
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Table 5.3: Grant – Loan Index variables and description.
Variable Description
Grants by Income in % of ODA (GI) Mean of grants allocated to the LDC and LIC
groups in ODA. The higher the share of grants
given to the poorest two country groups, the
more points the country receives.
Loans by Income in % of ODA (LI) Mean of loans allocated to the LDC and LIC
groups in ODA. The higher the share of loans
given to the poorest country groups, the less
points the country receives.
Loans in % of Grants (LG) Mean of loans in grants ([loans/grants]*100).
The higher the share of this percentage, more
loan–oriented the country is and the less point
it receives.
ODA in % of GNI (OG) Mean of ODA in GNI. The higher the share of
ODA in GNI, more points the country receives.
Grants , CV, (VG) Variation for grants is measured by using the
Coefficient of Variation ([standard deviation of
grants/mean of grants]*100). The higher the
variation is, less points the country receives
since the higher the variation, the less
predictable the given ODA is. Note! CV can
be over 100%.
Loans, CV, (VL) Similarly with ”Grants, CV”, more variation,
less points the country receives.
early on. They’ve also had political crises’ in the recent years, which have affected
annual ODA sums and their lower GDP per capita could also induce giving loans
as they provide a way to accumulate some wealth through interest rates (Carbone,
2007a, pg. 41–47)
5.3.2 Composition
The developed Index formed in this study includes six different variables; (1) Grants
by Income (GI), (2) Loans by Income (LI), (3) Loans in per cent of grants (LG), (4)
ODA in per cent of GNI (OG), (5) Variation of Grants (VG) and (6) Variation of
loans (VL). The formation of these variables is explained in table 5.3.
The Index rewards for giving grants to the two poorest income group countries,
giving loans to the high income developing nations, of having a small share of loans
in total grants, giving a large percentage of GNI as ODA and having a low amount
of variation in both annual grant and loan sums. Low variation is rewarded as
97
it indicates stable and well–thought of actions in the field of development. High
variation of ODA sums, whether they are grants or loans, indicates vice versa that
the system is perhaps not working as efficiently and rationally as possible, or that
at least it is prone for fast and / or unpredictable changes. Fluctuations in annual
support sums can also cause problems in the developing nations.
The countries received points between (minimum) 0 and (maximum) 20, for
each variable, based on the values received. When the number for each country is
calculated for a variable, the countries are then organized in order. The first three
countries receiving for example the lowest share of ODA in GNI are given 0 points,
the next three 5 points, next three 10 points, and the next three 15 points. The
three countries with the highest points, receive 20 points. This is done for all six
variables and always the EU Member States are compared to each other (not for
example to how well each Member State is approaching the goals set for example
in the MDGs). Comparison in order was chosen as the method since the main idea
of this index is to compare the Member States to each other, not to their common
goals, for example (goal was to describe structure of ODA, not outcomes or quality
of aid). Comparing EU Member States actions to their goals would be almost
meaningless when researching policy differences, since it is now known that nearly
all EU Member States are in fact lagging behind on their development policy goals
(mainly explained due to reasons concerning the recession starting in 2008), as was
discussed earlier in chapter four. The Grant–Loan Index is based on a point system,
and therefore it is possible for a country to receive same point accumulation although
the policies differ. To overcome this challenge, I will use Chernoff’s (1973) method
of faces to portray visually the differences among the Member States. This method
will aid in finding and understanding differences between the actors involved.
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Table 5.4: Grant – Loan Index variable values.
Country GI LI LG OG VG VL
Austria 19.53 58.08 0.23 0.35 64.43 218.92
Belgium 48.67 51.78 2.35 0.46 37.72 145.93
Denmark 54.85 12.03 3.13 0.89 23.92 127.56
Finland 39.57 21.6 2.64 0.38 42.54 85.95
France 39.01 32.83 17.15 0.39 34.68 60.90
Germany 30.70 10.84 17.91 0.32 44.10 60.67
Greece 9.83 0 0 0.18 42.56 48.48
Ireland 66.53 0 0 0.43 58.39 48.11
Italy 40.95 29.19 14.17 0.19 50.16 45.65
Luxembourg 44.63 0 0 0.83 36.64 40.12
Netherlands 36.64 2.56 0.13 0.80 31.19 36.94
Portugal 64.99 75.08 103.78 0.28 22.92 24.91
Spain 17.98 12.46 31.15 0.30 75.18 0
Sweden 33.44 15.48 1.24 0.87 36.58 0
UK 52.21 27.4 7.76 0.38 45.42 0
Table 5.5: Grant – Loan Index points.
Country GI LI LG OG VG VL Sum
Austria 0 0 15 5 0 0 20
Belgium 15 0 10 15 10 10 60
Denmark 20 15 10 20 20 5 90
Finland 10 10 10 10 10 15 65
France 10 5 5 10 15 10 55
Germany 5 15 0 5 5 15 45
Greece 0 20 20 0 10 20 70
Ireland 20 20 20 15 0 20 95
Italy 10 5 5 0 5 10 35
Luxembourg 15 20 20 20 15 20 110
Netherlands 5 15 15 15 20 0 70
Portugal 20 0 0 0 20 0 40
Spain 0 10 0 5 0 15 30
Sweden 5 10 15 20 15 5 70
UK 15 5 5 10 5 5 45
5.3.3 Results
The results of the Grant – Loan Index reveal interesting issues concerning the EU
Member States’ policy differences. Points received by each Member State are listed
in table 5.4 by variables and by corresponding index points in table 5.5.
Since differing policies can yield similar results in this Index (points counted
together), it is important to know exactly how the policies differ. Due to this, data
for the index is summarized, including each variable and the points each country
has received for it.
The minimum and maximum values in each variable case indicate more specif-
ically what kind of differences there are between the Member States. In the case
of variable ”Grants by Income”, which was ”how large percentage (%) of grants
in ODA on average have gone to the two poorest country groups during the years
2000–2008”, Ireland gave nearly 70% and Greece less than 10% on average. Simi-
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larly, in the ”Loans by Income” variable, Portugal gave over 75% on average of its
loans to the two poorest country groups LDC and LIC, whilst some of the Northern
donors gave something closer to 10–20%, and some did not give loans at all. Share of
loans in aid varied between 0% (or close to 0%) to over 100% (103.78% for Portugal,
meaning that they gave more loans than grants on average). Northern donors have
had constant low shares of loans in grants.
Share of ODA in GNI in (%) varies between 0.18% (Greece) to 0.89% (Denmark).
Coefficient of Variation of grants and loans indicate also interesting differences. The
lowest Coefficient of Variation of grants is Portugal (22.9%), i.e. that Portugal
has varied the least out of all EU Member States in the amounts of grants it has
allocated to the developing nations. Interestingly, Portugal also has the highest
Coefficient of Variation for loans, over 200%. Meaning that its loans amounts have
varied the most in comparison to other EU Member States, and that variation has
been quite substantial, over double. Similar kind of case is Spain, which has the
highest Coefficient of Variation of grants, but the lowest Coefficient of Variation
of loans (24.9%, out of countries which have given loans). It is really important to
note also that on average the EU Member States have much higher variation in their
loan sums than in their grant sums. The mean for grant Coefficient of Variation for
the data presented in table 5.4 is approximately 43%, and approximately 63% for
loans. As can be seen from the data in the same table, some EU Member States
have low variation of grants, and high variation of loans, such as Austria, Denmark,
Netherlands, Sweden, UK and the previously mentioned Portugal. Some Member
States had less of a difference between the variation (still higher variation for loans
than grants), such as Belgium, Germany and Italy. Only two countries had more
variation in grants than in loans, which were Finland and Spain.
The overall order of the countries is presented in table 5.6. Grant–Loan Index
results are in compliance with Carbone’s model. The order between the EU–15
countries is mainly the same as in Carbone’s division. Northern donors receive
highest scores, Big 3 are placed in the middle and Southern donors received the
least points. Exception is Greece, which received 70 points, and is therefore placed
as high as Northern donors.
In order to understand the differences between the data, method of visualization
called Chernoff’s faces is used in the final part of this chapter.
Chernoff’s Faces
Data visualization is always a challenge when dealing with multivariate phenomena
such as in the case of the Grant – Loan Index. The chosen visualization method in
this case needs to be able to portray key differences within a large group of countries
in a manner, which is visually clear to readers. Normal diagrams or charts do not
include options suitable for this. The point system used in this study included six
variables; therefore there are multiple different ways of receiving same point total.
The countries receiving low points did not have similar ”bad” policies. If not visually
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Table 5.6: Grant – Loan Index results.
Country Total Points Group
Luxembourg 110 ND
Ireland 95 ND
Denmark 90 ND
Netherlands 70 ND
Sweden 70 ND
Greece 70 SD
Finland 65 ND
Belgium 60 ND
France 55 Big–3
Germany 45 Big–3
UK 45 Big–3
Portugal 40 SD
Italy 35 SD
Spain 30 SD
Austria 20 SD
compared, it would be easy to bypass important policy differences.
As explained, the Grant–Loan Index uses ordinal scale, as values are given corre-
sponding points in order and scaled to each other. But the visual comparison done
here is for the original data, which includes ratio measurements. This assures that
differences between the visual images are based on real and accurate data.
Chernoff’s faces (1973) is a method of data visualization which fulfills the criteria
in this case. It is a method which summarizes multivariate data subject to strong
but possibly complex relationship in such a way that the investigator can quickly
comprehend relevant information and then apply appropriate statistical analysis.
(Chernoff, 1973, pg. 361) This type of data is used in the Grant – Loan Index, and
the method is applied to create an actual a face for each Member State; each face
represents that country’s policy. The facial expression itself embodies how well or
how poorly that country scored in the Grant – Loan Index, for example a smiling
or content looking face means that country scored well, and grumpy or sad looking
face means that it did not do so well in the comparison. The facial expression of
each Member States’ face is to be compared to that of the others. It is important to
compare which countries have similar expressions, meaning that their Grant – Loan
orientation is also similar. By focusing on the differences between facial expressions
in figure 5.15 and the variables of the Grant – Loan Index is table 5.4, it is possible
to notice where differences occur in policies.
Chernoff’s face comparison is executed with SURVO computing environment.
(Mustonen, 1992, pg. 298–301). Chernoff’s method of faces is based on 18 variables
each influencing one aspect of the face figure. Variables not used in this comparison
were eccentricity of upper and lower face, vertical position of mouth and separation
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Figure 5.14: Chernoff’s faces variables.
of mouth. Leaving out some variables is normal in Chernoff’s face implementation
process, as each data is different and includes different amount of variation. These
variables were left out since they distorted the faces too much in this particular case.
See figure 5.14.
Figure 5.15: Chernoff’s faces.
Luxemb. Ireland Denmark Netherlands Sweden
Greece Finland Belgium France Germany
UK Portugal Italy Spain Austria
Faces of each EU–15 Member State in figure 5.15 easily show the differences
between the Member States. Countries with the highest scores, Luxembourg, Den-
mark, Netherlands, Sweden and Ireland appear to be more content than countries
with low scores, such as Austria, Portugal or Spain. Although Greece places high
in the comparison, it resembles visually Spain and other SD group Members. This
is due to the fact that since Greece has not given any loans, it received high points
in the index, but still was at the low end of other measurements concerning grants.
Big–3 countries France, Germany and UK resemble each other quite well. Portugal
and Spain both belong to the loan oriented end of the spectrum, but as is visually
perceptible, they do in fact differ quite strongly in their grant – loan practices. The
differences visually portrayed are to be analyzed with the original data presented in
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table 5.4.
The results of the Grant–Loan Index and its compliance with Carbone’s model re-
veals interesting issues concerning the EU–15’s debt practices. As Northern donors
are mainly at the grant oriented end, Big–3 countries are both grant and loan ori-
ented, and Southern donors mainly loan oriented, what does this entail of the overall
picture? At least the differences in ODA volumes need to be taken into consider-
ation when looking at this data; countries with large volumes have wider influence
in terms of policies (official or unofficial) than the practices of countries with low
volumes of grants, loans and debt relief. However, as some of the EU Member States
have in fact a heavy focus on loan oriented ODA practices, the role of loans should
be more visible in EU development policy framework as well. Next, the disparities
within the debt policy are discussed by concluding the findings of debt practices and
development policy framework in the final chapter of this study.
Chapter 6
What is the European Debt
Policy?
In the quest of defining and analyzing the debt policy of the European Union and
its Member States, vast differences between actors’ individual policies have been
determined both in long–term and short–term practices. This study has described
(1) how the question of external debt of the developing nations appears in currently
in force EU development policy framework’s documents, (2) how EU–15 Member
States have differed in giving grants, loans and debt relief to the developing nations
by region and income since the 1960s to the 2000s and measured (3) the orientation
of each EU–15 Member State in terms of grants and loans in ODA by developing
the Grant – Loan Index. This study has been descriptive in nature and this study
has used both qualitative and quantitative data.
The aim of this Master’s Thesis has been to form a coherent perspective to what
are the European Union’s debt practices towards the developing nations’ external
debt. This issue has been approached from the perspective of development policy
framework and debt practices while using an applied structure of policy analysis.
Policy analysis was chosen as a method to complement the complex structure of these
practices, of which no previous research from this perspective has been executed.
Field of research linked to this issue was multiform as well, including political econ-
omy’s perspectives to choosing either loans or grants as methods of development,
the specific field of EU development policy, and the context in which interaction
between the developing and the EU Member countries happens, i.e. the North –
South conflict. History discussed concerned the origin and traditions of lending, as
well as the meaning of past colonial relations in current policies.
The concrete approach of this study applied Carbone’s (2007) study of different
characteristics of the EU Member States’ development policies in two ways. The
groups used by Carbone were used in comparing grants (including debt relief as
a separate item), and loans to different developing nations by five groups of region
and income (sixth group in by region was unspecified and by income the unallocated
groups, which both included same funds for development projects in donor countries,
not the developing nations). Carbone’s division was also used in the development of
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a Grant – Loan Index to measure the orientation of EU Member States’ grant and
loan practices. This comparison was aimed at forming a concrete way to specifically
determine the differences between Member States in terms of the structure of ODA.
As a result it was concluded that the Grant–Loan Index results are highly compatible
with Carbone’s findings, except in the case of Greece. However, the findings support
the idea that structure of ODA links directly to its quality and more research should
be put into the seemingly small, yet strategically important differences between the
Member States.
The research question of this Master’s Thesis was ”What is the European Union’s
debt policy profile?”. This question was approached from two different angles, which
together form the debt policy; development policy framework and debt practices.
Next, the key findings of each, the content of the development policy framework and
debt practices, are summarized and compared in terms of the most relevant aspects
in light of today’s situation.
6.1 European Union’s Debt Policy
The debt policy profile for the EU Member States is summarized in this chapter.
First the content of development policy framework is discussed, followed up with a
summary of the debt practices. They are compared, after which the challenges of
the study and future study areas are discussed.
Development Policy Framework
The development policy framework included five different parts of the development
policy in detail, the European Consensus on development, the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals, Policy Coherence for Development, Intervention area of debt relief
and geographical partnerships. The focus in this chapter was on how the issue of
external debt appears in these documents / policy outlines of the EU development
policy.
The Consensus called for further debt relief and finding solutions to the debt
burden of the developing nations. Debt relief was seen as a method in reducing vul-
nerability to exogenous shocks. Countries which have experienced exogenous shocks
and which are in post–conflict state, are mentioned of being in focus. Millennium
Development Goals mentions the issue of external debt in goal 8, ”Develop a global
partnership for development”. Sub–target 13 calls for addressing the need of the
least developed countries, includes the HIPC and overall puts emphasis on rewarding
those able and willing to fulfill the policy conditions set for debt relief. Sub–target
15 included dealing with the issue of external debt in a comprehensible matter in
order to reach sustainability (of loan accumulation). Policy coherence did not men-
tion the issue of financial practices with the developing nations, as expected, but
in the discussion it was brought up that the approach could also be different and
that it is important to note that it is not. Out of 9 different intervention areas of
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development, one, number 7, included debt relief within the support for economic
and institutional reforms. In it the focus was on the HIPC and the MDRI. Since
only 23 countries have completed the HIPC, it is possible to say that the HIPC
Initiative is neither an easy nor necessarily the best global solution as discussed
previously. More research is needed in this aspect as well. Finally, the geographical
cooperation focused on the former colonies and the OCTs indirectly included the
issue of external debt in the cases of Africa and the Pacific regions. In both of these
cases the indirect reference was through the content included in the MDGs, which
were included in the partnership.
Overall the existence of the issue of external debt in the framework of the devel-
opment policy framework appears to be more narrow in focus (than needed), and
not comprehensible. The MDGs was the only not entirely EU–focused component
of the framework and it did include, if compared to others components, the only
references to the need of having a ”comprehensible approach” to the issue. In EU’s
own documents the references to the issue took often only one narrow perspective,
such as the HIPC Initiative, and did not bring up analysis or references concerning
the meaning of debt in the overall development equation.
Debt Practices
In the debt practices data loans, grants and debt relief to the developing nations were
presented in different forms. It was concluded that new types of loans appeared in
the OECD DAC statistics mainly during two time periods, 1960s and (mid–)1990s.
It was also concluded that the Big–3 and the SD groups had the highest shares
of sector VII ”Action on Debt” and national comparisons revealed differences in
variation. SD group had high variation of the sector, Big–3 group low variation.
Sector VII activity was notably low during the 1980s for all donor groups. There
were also some differences in timing of when sector VII was allocated high shares,
for example Northern donors had significantly lower shares of the sector in the 2000s
as opposed to the two other groups. Differences in previously given loan sums are
perhaps the reason for differences in sector activities in recent years.
The differences in loans and aid within ODA for the three donor groups exist in
terms of timing, stability and equality of the practices. Timing referred to differences
in (”political”) reaction times and chronological placement of practices or policy
shifts, stability refers to (either high or low) variation in practices, i.e. changes in
allocated sums or shares. Equality refers to how equal the groups have been in their
practices towards different developing countries by regions and income.
More specific differences in debt practices data were found as follows. Loan sums;
timing of lending, differing reactions to the debt crisis, and differences in relative
impact of the actors’s practices since volumes of loans differ substantially. Grant
sums; differences in timing when grants were given, the stability of given sums, and
similarities in grant sums within donor groups. Debt relief sums: differences in
timing, stability and again, the volumes. Grants and loans by region: differences
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in (1) policies concerning Africa, (2) stability of loan shares, (3) stability of grant
shares, and (4) growth of unspecified / unallocated sector. Debt relief: Africa has
received the most debt relief over time, but Asia’s share has grown in the recent
years. Grants and loans by income concluded that (1) the LMIC group was the
main recipient of loans for all groups, but differences appeared in (2) stability of
given shares and (3) equality of practices. Debt relief: the LDC and LIC groups
have received less debt relief than the LMIC group, which is most likely due to the
fact that it has gotten the most loans as well. Highest income groups have received
less debt relief than lower income groups, as expected and hoped.
In the comparison of ACPs versus non–ACPs it is found that ACPs have been
favored in both debt relief and loans, but that grant sums have been more equal.
ACPs received on average more debt relief than the non–ACPs and less loans on
average than the non–ACPs when compared to group size. Since data is from 1988,
and before current equalization of policies, results are expected. However, both
average loan sums for the non–ACPs have been over 60% in the 2000s, and more
debt relief has gone to the ACPs than the non–ACPs, except in 2007 and 2008,
when opposite has occurred.
In the comparison between the EU DAC Member States and the multilateral
organizations, it is found that volumes of grants have been similar; EU with annual
totals a bit higher than the multilaterals. Loans have been also similar until the
year 1992; multilaterals with a bit higher on average loan sums. Since 1992, EU
Member States decreased loan sums significantly, which was a clear policy shift,
as the multilaterals continued with increasing sums. Their financing does come
partially from the European Union Member States and this interaction/cooperation
should be further investigated. Debt relief sums are significantly different between
EU Member States and the multilaterals; EU has given massive volumes throughout
the time period in comparison to the MLs. Since in the current system some loans
are channeled through the multilaterals but debt relief almost entirely given by the
countries themselves, some indication of outsourcing politically ”negative” actions
to faceless multilaterals, while practicing positively toned actions in national level,
does exist. More research into the relationship between the EU Member States and
the multilateral loans is clearly needed.
Grant – Loan Index was formed to measure the orientation of the EU–15 Member
States’ grants and loans in ODA practices. This was done with six different variables
based on ODA data available through OECD DAC. It was found that the NDs were
grant oriented, Big–3 grant and loan oriented and SDs mainly loan oriented. One
exception to the model was Greece, which placed in the midst of the Northern donors
in the grant oriented end, although the country is a member of the Southern donors
group. This exception was due to the Grant – Loan Index’s emphasis on loans; if a
country had not given loans, it would score high points. Model is concluded to be in
compliance with Carbone’s model concerning development assistance performance,
with the exception of Greece, as mentioned.
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Overall the Grant – Loan Index results reveal substantial differences in a short
time period among the Member States’ policies in all variables, especially the differ-
ences in Coefficient of Variation of grants and loans indicated that grant practices
are in general more stable than loans practices, i.e. grants are given in a more stable
and better thought–of manner. This is highly relevant when discussing the develop-
ment policy practices overall. Further development of the Index could include more
detailed comparison of those countries which have given loans in terms of bilateral
relations, and for example the role of former colonies in each former metropolitan’s
practices. This study included all EU–15 countries and even those which have not
given loans, since in this stage it was important to include all countries of the EU–15
to gain knowledge of the overall relationship between the donors. Different formu-
lations of the Index could also be formed by including and excluding different (old
or new) variables.
The EU-12 were not included in this study, but the relevance of their perspec-
tives to the issue should not be excluded in future research. The fact that 12 of the
current 27 EU Member States have not had debt practices, is significant. The large
number of countries without debt practices will probably work as an obstacle to the
possible forming of a separate debt policy or strategy. However, if and when these
countries will become more active in debt practices and other ODA activities, the
relevance and need for a comprehensible approach is again emphasized.
Table 6.1 presents the content of the ”empty holes” in development policy pre-
sented in figure 1.1. Five most relevant differences in current development policy
framework and past and current debt practices are included in this same table as
a summary of those items most interesting and important in terms of studies in
relevant fields as well.
The complexity of the issue itself is in a way mirrored in the results of both the
development policy framework and the debt practices. The main argument of this
study is, that the concrete debt practices of the EU-15 form a substantial part of
overall development assistance. However significant in concrete actions, the role of
external debt in current development policy framework is rather insignificant. Over-
all the disparity between the practices and development policy framework should be
further investigated in relation to the concrete work in the EU towards reaching the
goals set for the development policy, and in overall development of the development
policy.
It is hard to estimate what kind of a world would exist if all unsustainable
external debts of the developing nations were managed better or cancelled entirely,
or if this had been done in the past. It might be that loan accumulation would
start all over again, since loans do entail ceaseless opportunities. In the light of
other discussed studies, this study and the found ”existing contradictions” between
the practices and policy framework, it is suffice to say that a more comprehensible
approach in needed.
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Table 6.1: Debt policy item comparison.
Development
policy framework
Debt practices
Debt discussed within other items,
not seen as one main issue in devel-
opment.
Different kinds of loan types for a
big portion of total ODA practices
and the basic practices have
existed since the 1960s.
Lack of comprehensible approach in
EU documents (UN’s MDGs only
one demanding coherence).
Share of sector VII very high in
total ODA for many Member
States in the past and in current
situation.
Focus on multilateral initiatives
with policy conditions.
Variation high between practices of
different Member States, yet
similarities exist also within and
between donor groups.
EU does not take or demand active
role in the solving of the external
debt problem of the developing na-
tions.
Common features of actions
between donors reveal that similar
practices are conducted and a
logical, although ”unofficial”,
policy does exist. Carbone’s group
division applies well to the debt
practices.
Based on the overall content, EU
wishes to remain fairly distant from
the problem by discussing it within
and through other items, issue
clearly left out of focus.
Overall practices concerning
external debt management are
numerous, and highly influential.
In addition to the debt policy item comparison, the structure of the main influ-
encing factors relating to a country’s debt practices are summarized here, see figure
6.1 for visualization.
The core factors influencing debt practices are presented closest to the center, and
issues influencing both the practices, and the issues in the middle area, are listed in
the outer sphere. Issues such as common initiatives, development policy framework,
multilaterals, agreements and policies, actions plans, etc. are all influenced by the
colonial period, and history, but also by ”norms” (created by EU’s own action)
during the time period development cooperation has existed. The ”peer group” is
also listed in the outer layer. This refers to the wider influence countries appear to
have on other EU-15 countries, this was seen for example in the debt practices data
concerning sums where similar development have occurred1.
1The more abstract concepts such as the peer group and norms have not been discussed in this
study any further due to length limitations, and since the focus has been on allocated sums and
policy content. They would however make a great future research area
109
What is evident form this study, is that external debt in global politics is an
intriguing phenomena. It is not just a mere economic fact, but as Chomsky has
stated, but a social and ideological construct (Global Issues, 2010). And as Eurodad
concluded in 2010, there still is no comprehensible approach to the issue of external
debt of the developing nations. This study has shown that in detail in the context
of the EU.
Figure 6.1: Debt practices policy profile influencers.
  DEBT 
PRACTICES
Peer group
     Financial 
     situation
   Agreements and 
     policies
        EU Action plans
            Country and regional 
            strategies
Legislation Norms
   Development 
     policy 
   framework
Common initiatives
Behavior of the
   developing
    nations
Unexpected events
Multilaterals’
role and actions
Colonial past
North - South relations
"cost - benefit" 
     analysis
Reputation
Agreements
Development
policy
goals
Alternative Policy
As the differences between debt practices and development policy framework content
have been discussed in detail, and the overall setup has been overviewed in other
chapters of this study, it is order to discuss the alternative policy (or policies). This
purely hypothetical analysis concerning the ”what ifs” of the policy include two
different ”options” regarding the future of debt policy. In the current situation
responsibility of the debt policy of each EU Member State has been left entirely in
the hands of each member government. These governments have practiced widely
differing policies. This fact or the other fact that development policy is a field of
shared competence, should not limit the discourse or debate around debt policy or
external debt management in the context of the EU. Alternatively, the EU could
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adopt a different approach to the issue in the future. On the basis of the findings in
this study, there are two separate strategies the EU could adopt in the future.
First strategy option would be to improve the system step–by–step, without
changing the already in–existence structures in the EU and shared competence in
the field. This option could include firstly an outline for an official debt strategy.
Debt strategy would include policy suggestions, which might be for example specific
guidelines concerning lending and debt relief (to which income group countries and
in which terms) and outlines concerning how large of a share debt practices could be
in relation to given grants. Debt strategy would also need to alter the way the issue
of external debt is currently represented in development policy framework and make
it more visible, or vice versa explain why it is not emphasized. EU could also list
all of its official debt practices, and define its official relationship with international
lending organizations, including the Paris Club, IMF and World Bank. The role and
significance of actors within the EU, such as EIB, ECOFIN, EDF should also be
clarified. These actors are all interesting especially in terms of the internal policies
they practice. The structure of OECD DAC statistics by type data could also
be simplified to better accommodate researchers, and the number or geographical
groups could be increased from five to about ten to give a better understanding of
regional division of ODA.
Strategy option two would include practices that would require a massive re–
organization of the current system. In option two most debt practices would be
outsourced to a separate EU–level organization focused on the issue. This organiza-
tion would be financed by all EU member governments. Member governments could
participate in decision–making and in the outlining of a common internal policies.
This organization could be placed under the European Central Bank ECB, which is
in charge of the definition and implementation of monetary policy for the euro area;
the conduct of foreign exchange operations; the holding and management of the
official foreign reserves of the euro area countries and the promotion of the smooth
operation of payment systems (ECB Tasks, 2010). This strategy would however
require a massive change in the existing system but also in ideology, and its real-
ization is of course improbable. Strategy one would be a plausible goal to reach at
some point, but even that would require strong political will to push the issue on
the agenda. Developing nations’ external debt is not as ”hot of a topic” as it has
been before. Multiform good and functioning initiatives have been since started,
which have improved the situation. The number or practices and initiatives has
grown, and although the simple adding of practices does not solve the problem, the
existence and emergence of several initiatives make the future of EU debt policy
seem certainly more bright than its past since they do entail the assumption that
the issue is important. Developments in the system during the past years have laid
out a good starting point for a new and more comprehensible approach.
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6.2 Limitations of Study and Future Research
This study has focused on the practices of the EU–15 Member States in the field
of high external debt from the perspective of the relationship between grants, loans
and debt relief in ODA. Due to limitations concerning length, this study has been
solely focused on the actions of the EU–15 countries, not other institutions within
the EU involved with loans and external debt of the developing nations. Data used
has remained on a general level, and many details have not been included. The
most relevant lack in analysis concerns the reasons behind policy choices of the EU–
15 countries, which have been discussed here merely through theoretical analysis
concerning plausible reasons behind selecting either loans or grants, or both. This
subject would be more suitably studied as a content analysis concerning each EU–15
Member States’ own policy outlines and the ways in which lending and debt relief
has been motivated and justified, suffice to say based on this study, reasons for not
giving loans are most likely different in the Northern than in the Southern donor
groups, for example.
The field of external debt in the context of the EU is a highly interesting and
fruitful field of research, where not much research has been conducted before. Find-
ings indicate that more research should be directed especially towards the relation-
ship between the EU Member States and the multilaterals, and all the actions of
organizations within the EU involved with external debt, for example the European
Investment Bank and the EDF. More detailed research into the policy choices of
those countries which have not given loans at all, would also be interesting. Norms
and peer groups influence on behavior of governments would also be a challenging
research area. Newer Member States, the EU–12 were not included in this study,
but their role in the development as well as debt practices should be analyzed in
the future as soon as they activate in the field of development cooperation. Other
applications of data in addition to the Grant–Loan Index are encouraged to better
portray different aspects of the field.
6.3 Afterword
The completion of this study and the year 2010 approach their end at the same
time. This past year has been an interesting year in both EU politics and especially
concerning the question of debt. Debt has been in the headlines mainly in the
context of national debt of the EU Members themselves, not the developing nations.
Both Greece and Ireland have had to apply for loans from the global community
in order to save their national economies from collapsing. It seems that in the EU
we are still living in a state of balancing between crisis and catastrophe, which
has lasted since the eruption of the financial crisis in late 2008. Looking back, it
seems that loans have played a significant role in many crises, which remind us of
the overall importance and difficulty of debt management. Although debt practices
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have been initiated since ”biblical times”, it seems that still the management of
global credit is a challenge in many levels, in both the developing and the developed
nations. Reasons and valid policy solutions for ways of managing global credit are
truly needed, for which more research, to support policy choices and shifts, is the
only viable solution.
The national debts of the EU Member States have directed the focus from the
developing nations to themselves, but the Millennium Development Goals to be
reached by the year 2015 have in fact evoked some activity in EU development
policies in 2010 as well. The Millennium Summit held in September 2010 concluded,
as explained, that the EU is lagging in its progress and a separate action plan with
annual reporting has been set–up in late 2010. This again is one needed step towards
developing the quality and impact of development assistance.
The results of this study should be utilized and used in the development of de-
velopment policy and in analyzing the reasons why the EU is lagging behind in its
progress towards the MDGs. What is the larger relevance of this study then? The
overall approach and analysis method of this study could be applied in different
fields of social sciences. The aim of this study has been to take a large entity with
different components, and analyze them together in order to gain not previously
known information. Social science and politics studies in all levels should not shy
away from studying large and abstract entities due to the heightened level of dif-
ficulty often included, but to approach them with a combination of different data
analysis methods and methodological tools. In the current era of globalization, the
different bilateral, multilateral and private actors interact in a complex and vast web
with its own rules and guidelines. Most interesting and currently relevant problems
emerge from this complex cooperation and this is where most interesting research
set–ups can be invented and applied in. This study is by no means an example of
this, but is an example of a study where large entities are discussed in a hypothesis–
generating spirit. This will hopefully inspire others in the future to develop this or
similar data further and execute research with similar goals and set–up in mind.
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